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LETTER FROM THE EDITOR 
 
We exist in a moment of unprecedented connection to our fellow human, and the effects are both 
awesome and disturbing. Near infinite growth in global interaction and communication means that 
our relatively small journal can reach thousands, that humanitarian efforts can reach millions, and 
that the well-intentioned may connect to spread positivity around the globe. However, exposure to 
new ideas and new ways of life simultaneously incites conflict in those unprepared for potentially 
paradigm-altering consequences. Racism, economic hardship, and systematic violence are just a 
few localized results of this increasingly globalized world.  
Nevertheless, we must not turn away from new ideas simply because they are not readily 
compatible with the status quo. Our communities, countries, and world will continue to evolve, 
whether we wish for that evolution or not. The only responsible recourse, therefore, is to rigorously 
explore, develop, and interrogate those ideas so that we may shape the world as we wish to see it. 
In 1825, Dartmouth College alumnus Daniel Webster foretold, “It is a wonderful fellowship of 
individual intelligences which will make up the minds and opinions of the age.” What follows is 
such a fellowship, comprised of undergraduate students from across the country and distilled into 
eight articles which we hope may help make the minds of the age.  
I would like to acknowledge the entire DUJPEW staff for their efforts over the past two years. 
This journal would not exist without these close friends and collaborators: Mason, for your 
steadfast leadership and guidance; Emma, for your unyielding and indispensable support; and 
Sahil, for your willingness and ability to fill any role asked of you. This issue in particular would 
not exist without our new staff, who will hopefully look to the past two editions for inspiration and 
guidance in the many yet-to-come.  
Likewise, I must thank the network of mentors, professors, and readers who continue to place their 
faith in our relatively new enterprise, engaging and connecting us to new scholarship across the 
globe. But most of all, I would like to thank the eight extraordinary authors who provided the 
critical pieces necessary for the present edition. This journal is a platform for your work, and I will 
be forever grateful for your willingness to engage with the world and expand the limits of human 
knowledge. 
Jacob Meister ’20 
Editor-in-Chief 
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The ‘Security Pacific Letter’:  
Estimating the Causal Effect of Securitization on Banks’ Systemic Exposure 
 
Paul-Angelo dell’Isola  
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Abstract 
This paper aims to test the hypothesis of the ‘Safe Asset narrative’ which states that banks 
became manufacturers of pseudo safe assets to meet a global shortage of safe assets in the pre-
crisis period. In this narrative, securitization is the mechanism which enables banks to become 
underwriters of safe assets. This paper takes this hypothesis to the data and attempts to estimate 
the causal effect of securitization on banks’ systemic exposure. In particular, this paper exploits a 
regulatory change that occurred in 1987 when the OCC expanded the scope of assets US national 
banks could securitize. By using state-chartered banks as a control group and estimating a diff-in-
diff model, I find that securitization significantly increased banks’ systemic exposure. I then 
provide evidence on changes of banks’ balance sheet features to pinpoint a direct channel through 
which securitization may have increased banks’ systemic exposure. 
This paper aims to test the hypothesis of the ‘Safe Asset narrative’ which states that banks 
became manufacturers of pseudo safe assets to meet a global shortage of safe assets in the pre-
crisis period. In this narrative, securitization is the mechanism which enables banks to become 
underwriters of safe assets. This paper takes this hypothesis to the data and attempts to estimate 
the causal effect of securitization on banks’ systemic exposure. In particular, this paper exploits a 
regulatory change that occurred in 1987 when the OCC expanded the scope of assets US national 
banks could securitize. By using state-chartered banks as a control group and estimating a diff-in-
diff model, I find that securitization significantly increased banks’ systemic exposure. I then 
provide evidence on changes of banks’ balance sheet features to pinpoint a direct channel through 
which securitization may have increased banks’ systemic exposure.  
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Introduction 
Both the subprime mortgage crisis and Eurozone sovereign-debt crisis can be understood 
as crises of pseudo-safe assets engineered by the private sector in the US and issued by fiscally-
weak countries in Europe. The ‘Safe Asset narrative’ assumes that a global shortage of safe assets 
facilitated the excessive issuance of debt instruments during the pre-crisis period. In such a 
scheme, the development of securitization may have been a channel through which the safe-asset 
shortage materialized in the real economy. Indeed, securitization allowed banks to engineer 
pseudo-safe assets by transforming pools of illiquid assets (mortgage, commercial and retail loans) 
into liquid (tradable) securities. The resulting assets were labelled as “safe” prior to the crisis even 
though they could not insure against systemic risk. 
This paper aims to test the hypothesis that banks engaged in securitization as a response to 
a safe assets shortage, thus becoming manufacturers of ‘safe assets’ and underwriters of insurance 
against systemic risk. In particular, I deliver causal evidence on the effects of securitization on 
banks’ systemic exposure. Assessing the impact of securitization on banks’ exposure to systemic 
risk presents an empirical challenge as securitization indirectly fueled the growth of a national real 
estate mortgage market, thus indirectly exposing banks to systemic shocks. I overcome this 
identification challenge by estimating the causal impact of a regulatory change that affected US 
banks independently from their connections to the real estate market. By exploiting a regulatory 
change to the range of permissible assets that national banks could securitize and using state-
chartered banks as a control group, I find that securitization significantly increased banks’ systemic 
exposure. 
Having established a causal link between securitization and banks’ systemic exposure, I 
provide further evidence on structural changes to banks’ balance sheets so as to identify the 
8
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channel through which national banks increased their exposure to systemic risk. In doing so, I test 
the empirical prediction of the ‘Safe Assets narrative’. In the new ‘Originate and distribute’ 
banking model that developed after 1990, banks were allowed to originate assets and redistribute 
the associated risks through securitization instead of keeping those assets on their balance sheets. 
I find that national banks significantly decreased the share of their loans financed by deposits, 
which implies that banks increased their reliance on alternative sources of funding to finance their 
lending activities. This evidence is consistent with my initial hypothesis and pinpoints a channel 
through which securitization may have increased banks’ systemic exposure. Had securitization 
been aimed at merely diversifying the banks’ funding structure, we would not observe such 
increase in systemic exposure. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the existing economic 
literature on the ‘Safe Asset narrative’ and provide theoretical motivation for my empirical 
hypothesis. Section 3 presents my identification strategy and Section 4 describes the data. Section 
5 and 6 present the results of my diff-in-diff estimation and further evidence of changes to banks’ 
balance sheet features. Section 7 concludes.  
 
Literature Review & Theoretical Motivation 
The ‘Safe Asset Narrative’ of Financial Crises 
A recent strand of economic literature on the demand and supply of monetary aggregates 
has emerged to explain the cyclical over-issuance of debt instruments leading to debt crises.1 In 
this framework, monetary aggregates – the so-called ‘safe assets’- encompass money  and money-
like financial instruments that are used as cash and transacted without much concern for adverse 
selection in financial markets. Unlike the ‘Minskyan approach’ which emphasizes the role of 
9
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agents’ expectations about the value of liquidity,2  the ‘Safe Asset narrative’ focuses on the global 
asymmetric issuance of safe assets and assumes that a global shortage of safe assets during the 
pre-crisis period facilitated the excessive issuance of debt instruments in advanced economies who 
were suppliers of those scare assets. In this framework, the subprime mortgage crisis can be 
comprehended as a crisis of pseudo-safe assets engineered by the private sector in the US to meet 
the needs of a globally integrated financial system. 
In spite of its intuitive explanatory power, this narrative is difficult to test empirically. In 
this regard, Gorton, Lewellen and Metrick provide some evidence of a structural change to the 
manufacturing of safe assets. While the share of safe assets has remained constant over the last 30 
years, the authors point at the change in the components of this share. Governments and banks – 
traditional manufacturers of safe assets through sovereign debt issuance and banks’ deposits 
certificates – have been replaced by the “shadow banking” sector, which now produces a 
substantial fraction of those assets. Indeed, money market mutual funds shares, commercial papers, 
repurchase agreements and securitized debt are all money-like instruments that can be used as 
collateral in financial markets.  
 
The ‘Safe Asset Narrative’ in Practice: Securitization and Systemic Risk 
Focusing on the rise of structured finance is therefore key to test the validity of the ‘Safe 
Asset narrative’. Indeed, this narrative implicitly assumes that the development of a new ‘Originate 
and distribute’ banking model was a response to the growing demand for safe assets from global 
investors. In this model, banks originate loans and resell them to outside investors instead of 
keeping those assets on their balance sheets. This process effectively distributes the associated 
risks to the rest of the financial sector and release banks from the constraint of keeping illiquid 
10
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assets on their balance sheet. This new model essentially offers alternative funding sources to the 
banks who are no longer dependent on their customers’ deposits. If the development of the 
‘Originate and distribute’ funding model was a response to the safe asset shortage, the banks’ 
manufacturing of new financial instruments would be tantamount to the underwriting of insurance 
against systemic risk. In this regard, securitization was a channel trough which banks financed the 
origination of illiquid loans through the issuance of liquid, thus tradable securities. It is both a risk 
transfer and liquidity transformation mechanism whose resulting securitized products were bought 
for their perceived safety prior to the crisis.3 
According to the ‘Safe Asset narrative’, the development of securitization should therefore 
be concomitant to an increase of banks’ systemic exposure. In their survey of the economic 
literature on the effect of growing interconnectedness and increased contagion risk in financial 
networks, Paul Glasserman and H. Peyton Young highlight the unsolved question of whether more 
interconnectedness tend to amplify or dampen systemic shocks. The ambiguous role played by 
securitization is at the heart of this tradeoff. On the one hand, banks can diversify their funding, 
thus better insuring themselves against systemic risk. On the other hand, securitization creates new 
obligations and increases the dominance of funding liquidity on market liquidity. The bank lending 
activity is more subject to adverse shocks as its financing depends on third agents’ perception of 
the resulting security liquidity.  
Glasserman and Young illustrate the groundwork for models of interconnected balance 
sheets with a basic intuitive scheme. Figure 1 show the stylized balance sheet of a bank 𝑖 who has 
two categories of assets. ‘Outside assets’ 𝑐# are claims on non-financial entities such as households 
or corporations while ‘In-network assets’ 𝑝#% are claims on any financial entity 𝑘 such as banks or 
11
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asset managers. Likewise, the bank has ‘Outside liabilities’ 𝑏# towards depositors and ‘In-network 




I used their stylized representation of banks’ balance sheets to contrast the ‘traditional 
banking’ model with the ‘Originate and distribute’ model. The two figures represent the structural 
features of a bank’s balance sheet in the two distinctive banking models. In the traditional banking 
model, the bank finances the origination of its outside assets with outside liabilities, thus somehow 
isolating its traditional lending business from market fluctuations. In the ‘Originate and distribute 
model’, the bank combines outside liabilities and in-network liabilities to finance its outside assets. 
Implicitly, this structure increases the bank’s financing liquidity and allows the bank to increase 
the size of its outside assets. Consequently, this stylized representation of a bank’s balance sheet 
sheds light on the new risk of asymmetry caused by securitization. The origination of bank assets 
is made increasingly dependent on the liquidity of asset-backed securities and their perceived 
safety.   
Estimating the effect of securitization on banks’ systemic exposure is therefore key to 
explore the tradeoff between better risk diversification and increased dominance of the safe asset 
liquidity on the banks’ origination business. Indeed, securitization may have been a channel 
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through which the safe asset global shortage materialized. Before the financial crisis of 2007, the 
general consensus was that securitization supported financial stability.4 This view was prevalent 
among policy makers such as the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), which 
recognized the benefits of securitization: 
The need for liquidity and the ability to engage in sound asset-liability 
management practices is all the more important to the maintenance of a safe 
and sound banking system.5 
 
Securitization was aimed to cater investors’ need for safe assets as the payments tranching allowed 
to meet several liquidity needs:  
Structural credit enhancement and diversified asset pool free investors of the 
need to obtain a detailed understanding of the underlying loans.6 
 
Consequently, the development of securitization can be viewed as a ‘safe asset’ engine. If 
securitization was adopted to create a safe asset, thus turning banks into underwriters of systemic 
risk insurance, we should observe an increase in treated banks’ systemic exposure. Testing this 
hypothesis could shed light on the role played by bank regulation in enabling this structural change. 
 
Identification: The ‘Security Pacific Letter’  
Identification       
This paper aims to estimate the causal effect of securitization as a new funding source on 
banks’ systemic exposure. Disentangling the effect of securitization as a new funding source from 
contemporaneous changes in banks’ systemic exposure represents an empirical challenge. Indeed, 
the effect of securitization is twofold. On the asset side, securitization can indirectly increase a 
bank’s exposure to systemic risk if the greater amount of assets originated are highly correlated 
with systemic events. In the US, securitization fueled the growth of mortgage-backed securities.7 
13
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Together with other government policies that encouraged home ownership through various tax 
subsidies and home finance programs, securitization turned the real-estate market into a national 
one and strengthened the transmission line between a shock to the real economy and a bank crisis. 
Analyzing the role played by securitization in the increase of banks’ systemic exposure could 
therefore lead to overestimation. The aim of my identification strategy is thus to test the direct 
effect of securitization as an alternative funding source for banks, independently from its indirect 
effects on the underlying assets markets. I overcome this identification challenge by exploiting a 
regulatory change regarding securitization which is independent from the story of the real estate 
mortgages in the US. 
 
The ‘Security Pacific Letter’ 
In this section, I argue that the 1987 ‘Security Pacific Letter’ constitutes a valid natural 
experiment to test the causal effect of securitization on banks’ systemic exposure by differentiating 
between national commercial banks and state-chartered banks responses.  
In the 1980s, the process of securitizing bank assets became much easier.8 In a 1987 letter 
to Security Pacific National Bank – the so-called ‘Security Pacific Letter’–, the OCC expanded the 
scope of permissible assets national bank could resell as securitized products. In spite of the 
applicable Glass Steagall Act, the OCC allowed the underwriting of securitized assets by stating 
that national banks could securitize and sell ‘any of their […] lawfully acquired assets’. The 
supervisor of federal-chartered banks assumed that the pass-through certificates – representing 
claims on the trust holding the underlying illiquid assets - were not ‘securities’ within the meaning 
of Glass-Steagall Act and that securitization did not consist in the securities underwriting of the 
securities business. The Comptroller’s ruling was challenged by the Securities Industry 
14
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Association which argued that the OCC’s decision allowed national banks to deal in securities, 
thus creating a breach to the GSA which clearly separated the banking business from the securities 
business. The U.S. Court of Appeals upheld the OCC ruling in 1989. The court stated that:  
If the activity constitutes the “business of banking,” then the Glass-Steagall Act 
prohibitions … do not apply. (885 F. 2d 1034, 1048) 
 
Hence,  the court’s decision sanctioned the sale by a national bank of any type of securitized assets, 
including the banks’ own consumer credit card receivables, automobile and boat loans, 
commercial loans and leases.9 Following this court ruling, the OCC started approving many 
securitization programs of national banks after 1989.  
I propose to use this regulatory cutoff to isolate the effect that securitization had on national 
banks, independently from the underlying securitized assets. This regulatory change represents an 
empirical setting where I can differentiate between a treatment and control group, thus satisfying 
an essential condition of causal inference in observational studies. In this setting, state-chartered 
banks constitute an ideal control group as they were subject to the Glass-Steagall Act (GSA) but 
not to the OCC ruling. Indeed, the GSA provisions applied to all FDIC insured banks, be they 
state-chartered or federally-supervised while OCC rulings only applied to national banks. Given 
that both state-chartered banks and national banks were subject to the GSA, I propose to use state-
chartered banks as a control in this natural experiment. My identification strategy therefore 
consists in estimating the change in a bank’s systemic exposure following the regulatory change, 
based on whether or not the FDIC insured bank was a state-chartered bank (control) or a national 
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Data & Methodology 
The banks’ betas are used as proxies for their systemic exposure. A bank beta (𝛽#) arises 
from co-movements of the stock price with the market and therefore captures the systemic 
component of a firm’s stock price as opposed to its idiosyncratic component.  
I obtained the lists of all FDIC insured banks from 1982 to 1992 from the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation website. Estimating my model using FDIC-insured banks only – be they 
state-chartered (control) or OCC-chartered (treatment) – was key to ensure that they were subject 
to the same regulations prior to 1987. The FDIC dataset indicates whether each affiliated bank was 
supervised by the OCC or had a state charter. I matched this dataset with the banks’ betas time 
series that I retrieved from the Bloomberg database. To do so, I used the FDIC variable indicating 
whether the individual bank was held by a holding company and obtained a list of state-chartered 
banks and OCC-chartered banks at the consolidated level. Given that each bank in the control 
group needs to be state-chartered and that the outcome variable is observed at the level of the 
holding company (‘consolidated’) only, matching the data at the consolidated level avoids 
identifying treated banks as state-chartered (control) in situations where the holding company of 
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Using a market-based measure of systemic risk puts a constraint on my sample. Indeed, many of 
the affiliated banks, be they national or state-chartered, were privately held. In order to obtain the 
most accurate measure of national and state-chartered banks’ systemic risk, I decided to remove 
all holding companies’ whose subsidiaries were not only banks but also insurance companies or 
other financial firms (‘diversified financials’). Indeed, the other lines of businesses of such 
companies would have created uninformative noise to my response variable.  I also checked that 





Lastly, I retrieved data on some of my sample banks’ total assets, total loans, total deposits 
and total liabilities from Mergent Online, a database of corporate information covering US and 
foreign companies from 1982 onward. A first overview of the differences in banks’ systemic 
exposure before and after the 1987 regulatory cutoff date is provided below. The changes in the 
distribution of the OCC-chartered banks’ betas should serve as a preliminary guess regarding the 
sign and magnitude of the causal effect of securitization.  
17
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To assess the internal validity of my empirical strategy, I first used my sample to test the 
parallel trend assumption, which is critical to any diff-in-diff identification strategy. Ensuring that 
both the control and treatment group have parallel trends in their outcomes values prior to the 
treatment should support the appropriateness of the chosen control group as a counterfactual. I 
therefore plotted the moving average of each bank’s stock beta time series, covering the period 
from 1982 to 1992.  Figure 3 shows the moving average trend of each bank group – national and 
state-chartered banks.  
Consistent with my identification assumption, Figure 3 shows that state-chartered and 
national banks’ betas followed the same trend prior to 1987 when the OCC released the ‘Security 
18
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Pacific Letter’. I formally tested the robustness of this identification assumption in section 5.C. 
 
 
The Effect of Securitization on Banks’ Systemic Exposure 
Model Specification  
 
I used the banks panel data to estimate the following diff-in-diff model:  
β+, = 	α+ + 	s, + 	θ	D+, +	𝜀#4 (1) 
In this model, each bank 𝑖’s beta at time 𝑡 – thereafter denoted 	β+, –  is regressed on its entity fixed 
effects α+, time fixed effects s, and a treatment dummy D+,.  
D+, = 6
= 1, 	𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘	𝑖	𝑖𝑠	𝑎	𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙	𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘	𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟	1987
= 0, 	𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  
Note that the coefficient of interest in this regression model is θ, whose sign and magnitude 
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Results 
 Dependent variable: 
   
OLS 
OLS 
with Standard clustered errors 
 
 (1) (2) 
 
Treatment θ 0.067*** 0.067*** 
 (0.014) (0.015) 
Constant 0.683* 0.683* 
 (0.407) (0.407) 
Time fixed effects YES YES 
Entity fixed effects YES YES 
Observations 27,639 27,639 
R2 0.491 0.490 
Adjusted R2 0.480 0.479 
Residual Std. Error 
0.404  
(df = 27067) 
 
F Statistic (df = 571; 
27067) 
45.672*** 45.672*** 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 1: The ‘Security Pacific Letter’ effect on national banks’ systemic exposure 
 
20
Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2018], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/dujpew/vol1/iss2/3
 Page 21 of 277 
Table 1 reports the main results from the estimated model. Column 1 shows the point 
estimates derived using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Column 2 shows the point estimates of the 
same model estimated with standard errors clustered at the bank level. 
The two estimated coefficients have high statistical significance (one percent) and are 
robust to clustered standard errors. The point estimates on the treatment dummy variable are pretty 
consistent across all estimated models and robust to outlying values. The above estimated model 
thus suggests that the OCC decision increased national banks’ systemic exposure by 0.07. The 
tables consequently support the view that exposure to securitization increased banks’ systemic 
exposure.  
 
Robustness of Parallel Trend Assumption  
In order to assess the robustness of my identification assumption, I estimated the following 
model:  
β+, = 	α+ + 	s, + 	 ∑ 𝜌4# (G+ 	× 𝑠4) +	𝜀#4 (2) 
In this model, I regress banks’ betas on time and entity fixed effects and an interaction term 
between time fixed effects s, and a dummy variable G+ indicating whether the bank 𝑖 belonged to 
the treatment group (national bank) or control group (state-chartered bank).  
G+ = 6
= 1, 	𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘	𝑖	𝑖𝑠	𝑎	𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙	𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘
= 0, 	𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘	𝑖	𝑖𝑠	𝑎	𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒	𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑	𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 
This model aims at testing the parallel trend assumption, which is a necessary condition to 
estimate causality in a difference-in-differences empirical setting. In particular, estimating the 
difference in the mean response of the treatment and control group implies that the assignment of 
treatment should be insignificant before the treatment date. The coefficients of interest in this 
specification are therefore the series of coefficients on the interaction term between group 
21
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assignment and time fixed effects 𝜌4. In the hypothesis that state-chartered banks constitute a valid 
control group, the series of 𝜌4 should equal 0 before the regulatory cutoff date and be significantly 
different from 0 after the treatment.  
The time series of 𝜌4 and their 99% confidence intervals are plotted in figure 4.  
 
Figure 5 : Time series of the Group assignment statistical significance 
      
Figure 4 supports the parallel trend assumption of this empirical setting. The point 
estimates are statistically insignificant before 1987 and present statistical significance after 1990.  
 
Discussion: Identification of a potential direct channel 
My results consequently point at an indirect effect of securitization on banks’ systemic 
exposure. However, this empirical setting does not allow me to pinpoint the direct channel through 
which the regulation impacted banks’ balance sheet and therefore their systemic exposure. To 
identify the potential channel explaining the estimated indirect effect,  I used the panel data on 
banks’ balance sheets retrieved from Mergent online. Based on random sample of 50 banks, I 
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found data on only 25 banks’ balance sheets. I then computed the Loan to Deposits ratio of each 
bank in 1986 and 1992. I propose this ratio as a proxy for the share of a bank’s lending activity 
that is financed through deposits. In a traditional banking model, this ratio should therefore be 
close to 1 as the bank only uses outside liabilities (deposits) to fund the origination of outside 
assets (loans).  Table 3 shows the growth rate of the Loan to Deposits Ratios for both national and 
state-chartered banks between 1986 and 1992.  
 
 
I decided not to run any formal diff-in-diff model because of the small sample size. Instead, 
this data is only aimed at giving a hint of the direct mechanism at stake and should serve as a basis 
for future research using this empirical setting. Both national and state-chartered banks decreased 
their loan to deposits ratios. Hence, the share of outside assets financed by outside liabilities 
decreased for both groups of banks, thus explaining a common upward trend of in their systemic 
exposure. Furthermore, the difference in percentage growth shed light on the effect of 
securitization on banks’ systemic exposure. The decline in the share of outside assets funded by 
outside liabilities between 1986 and 1992 is significantly higher for national banks. This result 
suggests that national banks were able to increase the size of their loan portfolio through In-
network liabilities, thus increasing their exposure to systemic risk.  
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These results are consistent with the ‘Safe Asset narrative’. In particular, the causal 
increase in banks’ systemic risk as a result of securitization validates a key prediction of the safe 
asset framework. Indeed, had the banks engaged in securitization for other reasons than meeting a 
shortage of safe assets through the engineering of liquid securities, we would not necessarily have 
observed an increase in their systemic risk. Securitization would have merely resulted in a change 
in the funding structure of the banks and the better diversification of their funding sources may 
have resulted even in lower systemic risk. Instead, my results pinpoint at a mechanism that is 
accounted for in the ‘safe asset narrative’. Securitization did not only result in a change in the 
funding structure of banks but also incentivized them to originate new outside assets so as to sell 
pseudo safe securities to in-network investors. Hence, the increase in banks’ systemic risk puts in 
evidence a change in banks’ incentives and their engagement in a new business aimed at catering 
a growing demand for safe assets. Instead of attempting to measure changes in global investors’ 
demand for safe assets in order to validate the ‘safe asset narrative’, my approach thus looks for 
evidence on the sell-side of new incentives created by a safe asset shortage.  
 
Conclusion  
This paper presents new evidence on the causal effect of bank deregulation on banks’ 
systemic exposure. By using state-chartered banks as a control group and exploiting a regulatory 
change to the permissibility of securitization, I find that securitization significantly increased 
banks’ systemic exposure.   
These findings provide further empirical evidence for the validity of the ‘Safe Asset 
narrative’. Consistently with the intuition of this narrative, banks seemed to have increased the 
underwriting of safe assets through securitization, thus mechanically increasing their exposure to 
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systemic risk. While the estimated causal effect shows that securitization has an indirect effect on 
banks’ systemic exposure, I use banks’ balance sheet data to pinpoint the structural changes at the 
bank level that drove this result. I find that banks that were able to securitize their assets 
significantly increased the share of in-network liabilities used to finance the origination of assets. 
Thus, securitization seems to act as an alternative funding source for banks, thereby increasing 
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Abstract 
Following the 2016 referendum on continued UK membership of the European Union, 
many attempts were made to explain its result. There has been consensus that the issue of 
immigration played a primary role in the Leave campaign and Brexiteers’ minds. The reasons for 
this anti-immigrant sentiment have been explored, with economic and cultural concerns at the fore 
of the literature. Critically, currently missing from the debate is whether racism played a 
substantial role in causing anti-immigrant sentiment in the context of Brexit. This article uses new 
public opinion data from 2018 to investigate the extent to which racism played a part in the Leave 
vote. It found that racism was an important predictor of referendum vote choice, even when 
economic concerns were held constant. Among all levels of financial satisfaction, people respond 
to their sociological concerns when making a political determination about immigration. Despite 
efforts from elites at the fore of the Leave campaign to rid the debates of racism, exclusively 
economic arguments proved to be a façade for private racist attitudes of many Leave voters. While 
concern over cultural pluralism is likely a complementary factor, this article finds the link between 
anxieties over skin color and anti-immigrant sentiment. 
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Introduction 
On Thursday June 23, 2016, 17.4 million people in the United Kingdom voted for their 
nation to leave the European Union, sparking an immediate political frenzy. The Great British 
Pound dropped to a 31-year low shortly after polls closed on Thursday evening. On Friday morning 
at 8:15 a.m., Prime Minister David Cameron announced his resignation after a six-year 
premiership.  
The UK’s relationship with the EU has consistently been questioned by both British elites 
and the public — and other European nations — since its first application to join in 1961 and 
eventual accession in 1973. The first referendum on membership of the European Community (as 
it was then known), held in 1975, revealed that 67 percent of voters supported the UK’s accession. 
The debate nevertheless continued, and by 2015, the public mood was clear — immigration reform 
was a priority, according to opinion polls. From June 2015 to February 2016, Cameron and his 
team renegotiated the terms of the UK’s membership, hoping to convince the public that remaining 
within the EU yielded more benefits than costs. Whether Cameron’s discussions with Brussels 
were enough was now up to Britons. The June referendum was officially announced on February 
20, 2016.  
In early 2016, the media, business world and financial markets assumed that the status quo 
would likely endure after June. Since the results of the referendum, an impressive post-mortem 
has been conducted on the Leave vote. Plenty of literature has sought to explain the surprise result 
by investigating campaign strategies of both sides, trends in opinion polling, and the political 
environment surrounding the debate. There has been consensus that the largest driver of the Leave 
vote, both in terms of campaign strategy and public opinion, was the prevalent feeling of the need 
for immigration control. Leading up to 2016, elites pushed messages of the perceived economic 
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detriments that accompany immigration. Analyzing elite rhetoric belies potential racist 
motivations in anti-immigration. 
This article contributes to understandings of the sociological aspects of anti-immigration 
sentiment in the context of the Leave vote. Specifically, it is an investigation of how British public 
opinion on race manifests into a pervasive anti-immigration societal attitude, placed in the context 
of culture, identity, and xenophobia. In other words, this article seeks to explain to what extent the 
Leave vote was caused by issues of racial identity, an explanation that has been underplayed in 
deference to economic arguments. 
Current literature suggests that anti-immigrant sentiment within the EU membership debates 
is caused primarily by fear of cultural pluralism and the perception of the economic burden that 
immigrants bring. A gap in the literature exists in accounting for the role of racism (discrimination 
based on skin color, separate from cultural xenophobia) in the Brexit debates. In the context of 
immigration, this article evaluates the role of racial concerns, in comparison to economic concerns, 
in pushing Britons towards the Leave vote. 
The next section outlines theoretical and historical frameworks for understanding public 
opinion on identity, culture, and race, as well as whether these opinions contribute to anti-
immigrant sentiment more than economic concerns. It also explains some media effects in causing 
anti-immigrant attitudes. Section three provides a review of current literature on explaining the 
result of the 2016 referendum, including a focus on explaining opposition to immigration. Section 
four dives into empirical analyses of public opinion data, evaluating the comparative explanatory 
power of race and economic concerns within the 2016 referendum debates. Section five discusses 
these data, evaluating them against existing literature and frameworks of understanding, as well as 
previous opinion polling.  
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Theory and History: Public Opinion on Identity Issues in Immigration 
Scholarship on public opinion on immigration has been widespread. This review focuses 
on a few areas of identity politics concerns within anti-immigrant sentiment. Firstly, it looks at 
research on British attitudes towards different ethnic groups and immigrants from differing 
regions. Secondly, it reviews research on people’s fear of cultural pluralism and concerns over the 
potential threat of immigrants to national identity. This article seeks to compare the importance of 
identity politics and economic concerns in shaping anti-immigrant sentiment, so the third section 
of this chapter gauges existing studies that execute this multivariate analysis. 
 
Ethnic Hierarchy 
Researchers have conducted and analyzed various public opinion polls investigating 
discrepant attitudes towards different immigrant groups. Specifically, relevant results compare 
immigrants’ region of origin and race. Shamit Saggar, a leading public policy scholar on British 
race politics, found that negative sentiments are not purely based on color, citing a 2001 ICM poll 
which showed that every age group of respondents emphatically disapproved of having Romanian 
immigrants as neighbors. Almost every age group approved of having Chinese neighbors. The poll 
also revealed that almost every group of respondents approved of white South African asylum 
seekers as neighbors, while almost every group disapproved of Afghan and Iraqi asylum seekers, 
suggesting a complex mix of attitudes relating to differing perceptions based on national origin.1 
While Saggar found opposition to certain white Eastern European immigrants, diminishing 
the importance of skin color, a wealth of scholarship points to the importance of the white versus 
non-white divide. Public opinion scholar and University of Manchester professor Robert Ford 
(2011) pointed to historical evidence emphasizing that non-white immigration is far more opposed 
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by the public than white immigration. Early settlements of Polish wartime refugees and workers 
from Mediterranean Europe and Ireland caused little public resistance compared to the hostility 
faced by South Asian and Caribbean migrants. ‘Race riots’ occurred in Notting Hill (1958), 
Toxteth and Brixton (1981), and Bradford and Burnley (2001) in areas with concentrations of 
black and Asian immigrants and their descendants,2 while there have never been riots of this scale 
against white immigrants. By 2008, the population of West European migrants had surpassed that 
of Indian-born migrants, which did not result in public interest, suggesting the higher acceptability 
of white immigrants.3 
Historical evidence in terms of policy also reveal ethnic hierarchies in the minds of the 
public. While Western European migrants have been uncontroversial, Eastern European arrivals 
have attracted significant media attention and are monitored by the Home Office.4 Within non-
white migration, a ranking ladder is also apparent. The 1950s saw Westminster’s defense of 
migration from the West Indies; this population was regarded as more ‘British’ than South Asians.5 
Recently, Muslims have been seen as more ‘threatening’ than Afro-Carribbeans.6 
Ford also used data from six British Social Attitudes surveys to provide further evidence 
of an ethnic hierarchy, with each white ethnic group above the non-white groups. The surveys, 
conducted between 1983 and 1996, reveal that the least opposed group of immigrants are 
Australians and New Zealanders, followed by Western Europeans, Eastern Europeans, and then 
(in order of preference) immigrants from Hong Kong, Africa, the West Indies, and South Asia.7 
Nationalism scholar Eric Kaufmann (2014) compared Eastern Europeans with non-white 
groups from other regions, and found that while white British ‘habituate’ to both Eastern European 
and non-European immigrant groups, assimilation occurs far more rapidly among European 
immigrants than minorities. Forty-six percent of people classified as children of ‘Mediterranean 
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Commonwealth’ immigrants on the 1971 Census considered themselves as dominant white British 
by 2011. Meanwhile, there is a majority attitude that visible minorities are not accepted as fully 




As for cultural concerns, replicated research has highlighted that perceptions of immigrant 
groups differ depending on the group’s perceived threat to cultural unity and national identity. 
Saggar (2003) cited the 1997 British Election Study which revealed resistance to cultural 
pluralism. Of white respondents, 71 percent agreed that ‘it is far better for immigrants to adapt and 
blend into society,’ rather than keep their customs and traditions.9 Kaufmann (2014) noted that 
ethnic minorities are perceived as the greatest threat when immigrants are close but not too close 
(the ‘halo effect’). Diversity in one’s city or local authority adds to threat perceptions because of 
immigrants’ potential to introduce large-scale change, but Kaufmann’s study showed that positive 
contact with minorities mitigated fears.10 
That Anglo-Saxon settlement happened in England over a thousand years ago, coupled 
with the limited immigration prior to 1948, consolidated a ‘native’ English ethnic group. Most 
western European ethnic majorities use their nation’s name to describe their ethnic group, 
providing an indigenousness that acts as an obstacle to introducing multiculturalism into their 
national identities.11 
 
Are Racial and Cultural Concerns Stronger than Economic Ones? 
 
The two types of identity-politics-based concerns that voters may hold regarding 
immigration are race (or skin color) and culture — the ideas, social behavior and customs that 
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differ among societies. Another factor that may lead to anti-immigration is economic concerns, for 
example immigrants’ perceived burden on national resources, or the added competition for jobs. 
Multivariate experiments are particularly useful to answer the question of why people 
harbor anti-immigrant sentiments. Studies have compared the relative importance of racism, 
concerns over multiculturalism, the economy, and other influences. There is a multitude of 
research that justifies anti-immigrant sentiment in economic terms, for example a survey that found 
high levels of resentment towards asylum seekers and recent migrants, as opposed to minorities, 
over the concern of the use of public resources.12 
However, multiple studies indicate that a preference for cultural unity is the strongest 
predictor of anti-immigrant sentiment. An experimental study found that Dutch hostility to 
immigrants is amplified by describing them in cultural rather than economic terms.13 While there 
exists research that explains public opinion on immigration in terms of economic concerns, most 
studies which compare economy and identity explanations find that cultural concerns more 
strongly influence opinions on immigration.14 Another study directly tested the variables of race 
against welfare concerns and economic competition, and found race to be the key determinant.15 
Ford (2011) once again used historical evidence to argue against the notion that hostility 
to non-white immigration is driven by fear of increased economic competition for jobs and 
government resources. Far-right mobilizations by the National Front in the 1970s,16 and the British 
National Party since 1999,17 have been on non-white immigrants. Irish, European and Australian 
immigrants have often migrated to Britain in larger numbers but Ford discussed the lack of political 
movements against these groups. Although Ford’s article predates the 2016 referendum by five 
years, he argued that there is strong historical evidence of non-white migrants garnering more 
passionate and organized opposition than white migrants.18 
35
Editorial Board: DUJPEW Issue II 2019
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2018
 Page 36 of 277 
University of Bergen professor Elisabeth Ivarsflaten’s (2005) influential study used 
multivariate analysis to pit cultural unity concerns against other factors in determining individual 
preferences for immigration policy. The study found that a preference for cultural unity matters 
more than all other variables taken together, including concerns about the national economy and 
racism. In the model of maximum impact, where respondents feel strongly about one explanatory 
variable but average on other concerns, belief in cultural unity is five times more influential than 
concerns about the national economy. Racism is also influential in this model (meaning that strong 
feelings of racism can have a significant impact on people’s preferences), but in the model showing 
current impact of each variable observed today, racism is not more influential than concerns about 
the economy.19 
Other scholars have discussed the racialization of economic concerns. Immigration arouses 
a sense of resentment from the white working class, for whom inequality and perceptions of 





It is necessary to note that a significant contributor to anti-immigrant sentiment may be a 
lack of awareness of the proportion and size of immigrants, as well as minorities, in the population. 
A 2000 MORI/Reader’s Digest poll found that the average estimate of the size of the ethnic 
population was 26 percent of the UK population, at a time when the actual figure was seven 
percent. The poll also revealed that the average estimate for the proportion of migrants and asylum 
seekers was 51 percent of the population, when in reality it was four percent. Among the public, 
ethnic minorities, immigrants and asylum seekers are often viewed as one group. Several polls 
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reveal that more intolerant population subgroups are more likely to have erroneous views of 
migrant and ethnic populations.21 
Scott Blinder, a political psychology scholar of US and UK politics, found in a 2015 study 
that both EU and non-EU nationals appear prominently in mental images of immigrants. Sixty-
two percent of respondents pictured non-EU nationals as immigrants, while 51 percent pictured 
EU nationals, which overstated the 2010 EU-immigrant proportion of 30 percent.22 Two 
significant influencers of public opinion are media effects and elite influence in the form of 
policymaking, with the former having the potential to heavily impact perceptions of the numbers 
and characteristics of immigrants. 
Past literature has suggested that incorrect estimates of immigrant proportions may stem 
from the large quantity of media coverage of immigrants or the tendency to inflate the prominence 
of salient minority groups.23 In terms of the composition of different immigrant types, media 
framing has been found to be an effective tool in influencing perceptions. Blinder’s (2018) analysis 
of British newspaper coverage from 2013 revealed that the two most common modifiers of 
‘immigrant’ were ‘illegal’ and ‘EU’/’European,’ consistent with analyses from the past decade, 
even though irregular migrants (those that lack legal status) only comprised 11 percent of the 
foreign-born population and there were more immigrants from outside the EU than within.24 
However, racial framing is rare. Although national origin is frequently mentioned, the avoidance 
of racial terms may be attributed to efforts by anti-immigration elites to ‘detoxify’ immigration.25 
Blinder’s own experiment explicitly tested the effects of framing on perceptions, but it 
found that an ‘illegal’ frame did not influence perceptions on the size of this group. This was 
attributed to the fact that ‘illegal’ was already the most common modifier, and thus, participants 
were already overly exposed to the phrase for the experiment to add any further effect.26 
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A 2016 paper by Blinder et al. moved beyond explaining quantitative perceptions to 
explore the effect of the ‘illegal’ frame on qualitative perceptions of immigrants. British media 
outlets’ consistent emphasis on illegal immigration causes illegality to be associated deeply with 
immigration, depicts immigrants as law-violators, and infuses immigrants with a taint of 
criminality, according to the conceptual metaphor theory. Language in news reports contributes to 
asylum seekers’ routine conflation with immigrants.27 
Elite policymaking can also play a part in qualitative perceptions of immigrants. From the 
beginning of post-war immigration policy, there has been a preference for white immigrants. From 
the privilege of immigrants from white-majority former colonies28 to the lack of policy-maker 
interest at growing Western European immigration in the 2000s,29 elites have socialized the public 
to adopt diverging attitudes on different migrant groups. For example, Whitehall has been more 
willing to defend West Indian migration than South Asian, in reference to the former’s greater 
cultural proximity to ‘Britishness’.30  
Ivarsflaten (2005) hypothesized that elites can influence public opinion by disseminating 
that reducing immigration is a solution to existing problems, thereby associating problems with 
immigration. Her experiment showed that while elites can successfully link some potentially-
unrelated problems to immigration, other problems are already so strongly tied to immigration that 
elite visibility does not make a difference, for example a desire to preserve cultural unity.31 
 
 
Brexit Explained: Existing Research on the Leave Vote and Opposition to Immigration 
 
Explaining the Leave vote 
 
In the lead up to the referendum, immigration was unequivocally the leading issue of the 
day, with 63 percent of voters selecting it as the most pressing issue at the end of 2015 in a YouGov 
poll, well ahead of healthcare (39 percent) and the economy (33 percent).32 Net migration reached 
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336,000, and 69 percent said that migration from the EU was too high.33 In their 2017 book Brexit: 
Why Britain Voted to Leave the European Union, Clarke, Goodwin, and Whiteley’s regression 
analyses found that while evaluations of the economy, immigration and the National Health 
Service (NHS) each had statistically significant effects on support for EU membership, judgments 
about immigration actually exerted stronger effects than economic assessments.34 Their analyses 
also revealed that the benefit-cost variable of Britain’s ability to better control immigration in a 
post-Brexit world was one of the most significant predictors of the Leave vote.35 
Additionally, perceptions of potential post-Brexit immigration levels differed between 
Leave and Remain voters. Among Leave voters, 84 percent thought there would be less 
immigration if Britain left the EU, compared with 27 percent of Remainers, according to a YouGov 
poll.36 However, most polls conducted around the time of the referendum revealed that sovereignty 
was the number one stated reason that people voted Leave, and immigration was the second. 
YouGov’s poll showed 45 percent selecting sovereignty and 26 percent choosing immigration, 
echoed by Lord Ashcroft’s result of 49 percent selecting sovereignty and 33 percent selecting 
immigration. The British Election Study found around 30 percent for each.37  
The Leave campaign employed positive non-immigration messages including the renewal 
of sovereignty and democracy if the UK left the EU. This appealed to middle-class Eurosceptics 
who may have privately agreed with negatively rhetorical anti-immigration ideas but were 
conscious about potential tones of racism within the Leave campaign’s messaging. Another 
important message was the amount of money that could be redirected to the NHS if the UK left 
the EU. Although many Remainers contested the truth of this message, the idea that the NHS 
would be strengthened rather than weakened with a Brexit result resonated with Leavers.38 
Additionally, many Leave voters from the left contested that the EU had become an ‘uber-
capitalist’ club whose efforts threatened the possibility of nationalization of public services.39 
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Overall, while there were other issues that contributed to Vote Leave, it is clear that 
immigration was the dominant concern. Even in surveys that placed sovereignty concerns over 
immigration, it is clear that the two are not mutually exclusive — in fact, to the contrary, the desire 
for sovereignty can be read as a desire to control immigration. 
 
Explaining Anti-Immigration Within the Leave Vote 
 
While this article investigates whether racism motivated anti-immigrant sentiment; 
existing literature has also generated differing explanations for this attitude, including the 
perceived increased job competition, burden on public resources, feelings of national identity, and 
threats to cultural unity. 
Firstly, the perceived economic burden of immigration in terms of increased job 
competition has been a large contributor to anti-immigrant sentiment. A very timely and widely 
circulated 2015 Bank of England report documented that rising immigration could impact wages 
of UK-born people, especially in semi- or unskilled labor forces.40 This caught media attention 
immediately; a Telegraph headline from December 2015 read “Mass migration driving down 
wages offered to British jobseekers.”41 One study showed that the biggest impacts on wages of 
immigration occurred among low-wage workers, and that it was actually associated with an 
increase in wages of higher-paid workers, potentially creating widening inequality in the labor 
market.42 This could contribute to the differing views from different occupational groups about 
EU membership.43 Interestingly, the Migration Advisory Committee found that EU migrants 
actually appeared to have no impact on UK-born employment while non-EU migrants were 
associated with a reduction in UK-born employment.44  
Secondly, the perceived burden on the NHS is another economic concern that people had 
about immigration. The Vote Leave campaign strongly focused on the strain that immigrants exert 
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on welfare resources. At the beginning of 2016, healthcare professionals warned that the NHS was 
being ‘bled dry’ by ‘health tourists.’ In April, Vote Leave released statistics claiming to show 
increased waiting times from immigrants’ pressure on the system. This was effective as surveys 
showed that the percentage of people thinking that it was beneficial for the NHS to leave the EU 
was consistently higher than those who thought that remaining would help.45  
National identity’s role in producing anti-immigrant sentiment has also been explored in 
existing literature. Clarke, Goodwin, and Whiteley (2017) found that national identity was a 
significant predictor for having positive or negative attitudes towards the benefits and costs of 
immigration. As is widely documented in anecdotal evidence, those who identified as English were 
more likely than those who identified as British to emphasize the benefits of leaving the EU.46 
Britain is often viewed as an inclusive, outward-looking society in contrast to the English identity. 
European identity was a powerful predictor of the Remain vote,47 while English national identity 
is more associated with national sovereignty.48 
Within the realm of identity, there has also been exploration on people’s perceptions on 
threats to cultural unity and minorities. There are widespread and entrenched negative attitudes 
towards minority groups among the whole British electorate, with survey data showing far more 
favorability towards the white majority than the four groups tested: Asians, Eastern Europeans, 
Blacks, Muslims.49 However, a strong majority of Leave voters and a solid half of Remain voters 
favored requiring EU migrants to go through the same application processes as non-EU migrants,50 
indicating that the opposition to immigration in general may be based upon concerns with culture 
more than race. This fear of British cultural erosion is substantiated through investigations that 
find culture to be a bigger factor in anti-immigration than economic concerns. Sobolewska and 
Ford (2017) found that people who thought immigration posed a threat to culture did not always 
have the same misgivings about equal opportunity programs for minorities. In fact, only half of 
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those that were worried about culture said that equal opportunity programs had gone too far,51 
indicating a deeper concern for cultural displacement than material. Some studies have also shown 
that concerns over national identity are more important than economic calculations in the context 
of European integration.52 
There is not an overwhelmingly dominant consensus in the literature about the relative 
importance of economic considerations and cultural, but the evidence for concerns about cultural 
erosion are strong. What follows is a deeper dive into how big of a role race played in determining 
aversion to immigration within the 2016 referendum. 
 
Data Analyses 
Data and Methodology 
 
Analyses were conducted using Wave 8 of the UK Household Longitudinal Study 
(UKHLS), commonly known as Understanding Society. Wave 8 was conducted over two years 
from January 2016 to December 2017. Surveys were mostly conducted online, but households who 
had not participated were issued a face-to-face interviewer and there was also a small amount of 
telephone interviewing. The individual questionnaire portion of the survey was used, which 
surveyed 31,166 adults aged 16 and over from 16,015 households, who were mostly selected at 




Wave 8 of the Understanding Society survey asks respondents how important “your ethnic or 
racial background” is to “your sense of who you are.” Using Wave 8 early release data, University 
of Bristol’s Paula Surridge, Siobhan McAndrew, and Neema Begum (2017) found that seeing race 
and ethnicity as important to one’s sense of identity was a statistically significant predictor of 
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voting Leave among White Britons. Among ethnic minorities, the importance of race to self-
identity was not statistically associated with either choice in the referendum.53 These results show 
that, broadly, for the white population, concerns over race are likely to play into their opinions on 
immigration. 
But, to determine with more nuance the extent to which race plays a role in anti-immigrant 
sentiment, a comparison of the strength of people’s concerns about race with their financial 
concerns was made through a series of different models and analyses. In order to compare racial 
and economic attitudes, permutations of two variables were used. The first was the importance of 
skin color to one’s identity, which was recoded into a binary variable (important/not important). 
The second variable was satisfaction with income, which was also recoded into ‘satisfied’ and ‘not 
satisfied.’ Subsets of people who satisfied different permutations of these two variables were tested 
for their mean Leave-vote proportion. 
The first question keeps income satisfaction constant: do people who are satisfied with 
their income and think skin color is important vote in the same way as those who are also satisfied 
with their income but do not think race was important? The first is a key group as they are likely 
to have less economic concerns, but worry about racial identity. The latter group is likely to be 
also economically stable but more ‘color-blind.’ If race were not an important factor in the Leave 
vote, we could expect the two groups to vote in the same way. From the first race-conscious group, 
45.0 percent voted Leave, while 39.7 percent voted Leave from the non-race-concerned group. 
This is a statistically significant difference (p-value < 10-10), indicating that among people who 
were satisfied with their income, those that thought their race was an important part of their identity 
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People who are satisfied with income 
 Race is important Race is not important 
Leave 45.0% 39.7% 
Remain 55.0% 60.3% 
Total 100% 100% 
Table 1: Of those that are satisfied with their income, the Leave-vote proportion differs according 
to attitudes on race. p-value for difference of means for Leave vote: 6.66 * 10-15 
Data: Understanding Society: Waves 1-8, 2009-2017 and Harmonised BHPS: Waves 1-18, 1991-
2009. University of Essex, Institute for Social and Economic Research. 
 
 
The second question keeps racial attitudes constant: is the first group (satisfied with income 
and race-conscious) less likely to vote Leave than those that are also race-conscious but dissatisfied 
with their income? If race were not an important factor in the leave vote, we could expect the first 
group to be less likely to vote Leave as they are more satisfied with their financial state. A 
difference-of-means test found that the two groups do in fact vote differently to a statistically 
significant degree (p-value = 1.66 * 10-5). As stated above, 45.0 percent of the first group voted to 
leave, while 49.4 percent of the economically dissatisfied group did, when keeping racial attitudes 
constant. This indicates that among people who are racially-conscious, economic evaluations are 
still significant for the referendum vote. 
A logistic regression was also modelled to substantiate these difference-of-means tests. The 
regression confirmed that when controlling for income satisfaction, the variable that measured the 
importance of race was a statistically significant predictor of the Leave vote (p-value = 0.005). 
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 Voting Leave 








Table 2: Results of logistic regression analysis. 
Importance of race: 1 = important, 0 = not important 
Income dissatisfaction: 1 = dissatisfied, 0 = satisfied 
 
The next analysis tests the role of race within the Brexit debates in a different way. Under 
the null hypothesis, if race played no role, those that are dissatisfied with the economy should vote 
in the same way regardless of their concerns with skin color. Dissatisfaction with the economy is 
measured using three variables available in the Understanding Society dataset: income 
dissatisfaction, unemployment and lack of job security in the next 12 months. These variables were 
each further subset into two groups: those that thought race was important and those that did not. 
Since the race question is the only variable that differs, if the Leave-vote proportion differed 
between race-conscious and non-race-conscious groups of economically dissatisfied people, then 
opinions on race clearly played a role in determining the vote to leave. 
The first test on people who were dissatisfied with their income found that there was a 
statistically significant difference between the mean Leave-vote proportion for those that thought 
race was important and those that did not. This indicates that for those dissatisfied with their 
income, attitudes on race had an effect on likelihood to vote Leave. The second measure of 
economic dissatisfaction — unemployment — found similarly significant results. Of those who 
were unemployed, racial attitudes also made a statistically significant difference, with 54.0 percent 
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of the race-conscious unemployed voting Leave and 47.4 percent non-race-conscious unemployed 
voting Leave. The third measure of economic dissatisfaction was similar: for those that thought it 
was likely they would lose their job within the next 12 months, racial attitudes impacted decisions 
to vote Leave. It is evident that across three measures of economic dissatisfaction, attitudes on race 





Racist attitudes are difficult to survey, and therefore survey questions do not always wholly 
represent true attitudes towards different racial groups. The variable in the Understanding Society 
dataset that was most closely related to a respondents’ potential views towards racial minorities 
was a question that asked how important “your ethnic or racial background” is to “your sense of 
who you are.” This question acts as an important proxy for attitudes on race. While this merely 
relates to one’s personal identity, placing greater importance on race generally translates into 
greater sensitivity to race. The assumption for the purposes of this discussion is that for white 
Britons, more value and importance in their own race, plus sensitivity to and concern for race, 
corresponds to a sense of superiority and/or more racist attitudes. 
It is highly important to note the limitations in making such an assumption. It is possible 
to value one’s own white race or ethnicity in Britain and not view other racial groups negatively 
— since the question also specifies “ethnic background,” one probable example is a white Briton 
being proud of her Polish heritage. Additionally, for the non-white British population, placing 
importance on one’s ethnic identity does not have the same implication of superiority due to their 
minority status, which is a limitation not accounted for in the data. However, as mentioned, 
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Surridge, McAndrew and Begum (2017) found a statistically significant correlation between 
placing importance on race and voting Leave for white Britons, which intuitively adds conviction 
to the assumption for discussion purposes. Furthermore, ignoring the use of this question as a 
proxy for racism, simply taking the variable at face value (the importance people place on racial 
identity) yields valuable findings in itself. 
Related limitations apply to the questions measuring economic concern. Similarly, these 
questions probe satisfaction with one’s own financial circumstance. As there were no questions 
evaluating the national economy, the questions used were: whether a respondent was satisfied with 
her income, whether she was unemployed, and a self-evaluation of likelihood to lose her job in the 
next 12 months. These three different variables were used to build a more robust model of national 
economic dissatisfaction. It is important to note that personal satisfaction does not always translate 
into national, and vice-versa. Nevertheless, how attitudes towards race vary by economic status in 
itself is revealing and worthwhile to discuss. With these limitations addressed, the discussion of 
results should be taken in a broad sense, indicative of avenues of future research. 
 
Economic Concerns Versus Racism 
 
Regression analysis demonstrated that when income was kept constant, racism was a 
statistically significant predictor of the Leave vote. This is consistent with intuition and past 
literature on attitudes towards racialized immigration in Britain.54 When respondents are subset 
into those that are satisfied with their income and those who are not, both groups demonstrated 
that evaluations of race contributed to the Leave vote. 
A difference-of-means test confirmed that for respondents who were economically 
satisfied, racism mattered. Their attitudes toward race factor into their vote choice: if they are 
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simultaneously racist, they are more likely to vote Leave. As the survey question was about 
personal financial situation, it is unknown if this group has national economic concerns. But, even 
so, race did play a statistically significant role in pushing respondents one way or another. The 
vote was not simply about economics, contrary to some elite narratives, even for those that were 
financially dissatisfied. They did not all follow the same voting patterns; their racial attitudes 
mattered in determining their vote to leave. 
Consistent with past literature but inconsistent with contemporary elite rhetoric in the 
Brexit campaigns, people responded to their sociological concerns, despite efforts from some in 
the Leave camp to shy away from race-baiting. A review of the Leave campaign’s strategy and 
media coverage suggests that economics should have been more important. Granted, the analyses 
show that for more racist respondents, economics mattered. Those that are racist were more likely 
to vote Leave if they were also dissatisfied economically, and less if they were not. Keeping 
immigration at the fore of their campaign, Vote Leave focused on economic and cultural concerns 
with mass migration, sometimes twisting economic facts. The previously mentioned Bank of 
England report that garnered significant media attention was repeatedly used and misused. A 
Telegraph headline from December 2015 read “Mass migration driving down wages offered to 
British jobseekers.”55 Sir Stephen Nickell, one of the authors of the report claimed that his findings 
had been misrepresented and that the impact was “infinitesimally small.”56 Conservative Member 
of Parliament Iain Duncan Smith said during the campaign that British wages are on average 10 
percent lower because of EU immigration within the past decade. This claim was repeated by two 
senior figures in the campaign, including Boris Johnson.57 Nigel Farage, outspoken former leader 
of UKIP, had been consistently espousing for years prior to the referendum that EU immigrants 
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are a detriment to British jobs, saying in 2014 that there was a “massive oversupply” of foreign, 
unskilled labor, pushing wages of the British down.58  
Additionally, immigrants’ burden on the NHS was a Leave camp favorite. Conservative 
MP Priti Patel said “Current levels of migration are causing unsustainable pressure on our public 
services and we can see that the NHS is creaking under the strain.”59 This is likely to fit with 
people’s intuitive logic that immigrants use NHS resources without contributing to its operation. 
The observed media and elite influence highlight efforts from the top to rid the debates of racism, 
instead using economic framing as much as possible, potentially as a façade of latent racism within 
sects of Leave voters. The data analyses demonstrate that latent racism was in fact still a major 
contributing force to the Leave vote, which the campaign did not dare to publicly admit. These 
results bolster the argument that economic framing was effective in appeasing social desirability 





Using national identity survey questions from Wave 6 and combining it with Wave 8 of 
the Understanding Society data, Surridge, McAndrew and Begum (2017) found that having a 
strong British identity — responding to the question “How important is being British to you?” with 
a 6 or more out of 10 — was a significant predictor of support for leaving the EU. Notably, this 
identity had a statistically significant association with the Leave vote for both white Britons and 
non-White Britons.60 The fact that a strong national identity is associated with a desire to leave a 
supranational institution is not surprising, but the consistency among the white and non-white 
population is pertinent. Wanting to protect British national identity from the EU is therefore not 
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associated with ‘whiteness.’ For all races, feeling British led to a desire to reject the EU, suggesting 




People’s evaluations of race do not necessarily suggest the same about people’s attitudes 
towards cultural unity. Unfortunately, Wave 8 of the Understanding Society dataset’s questions on 
attitudes towards culture were exclusively asked in the ethnic minority boost sample. Thus, there 
was no way to analyze this data in conjunction with the referendum vote choice to yield an accurate 
picture of how concerns about cultural unity affected immigration debates in Brexit. 
Despite these difficulties, both past literature and the current narrative point to the fact that 
people are protective of their culture. Section two of this article reviewed literature that supported 
the importance of cultural identity. The 1997 British Election Study found that 71 percent of white 
British prefer immigrants to adapt rather than keep their customs and traditions.61 It is clear that 
many white Britons prefer cultural unity to pluralism. This is not necessarily based on race, but 
since the white population is indigenous to Britain, perhaps there is a preference for sustenance of 
the native culture. Therefore, there could be resistance to immigration which would upset this 
culture. Since cultural concerns are not based on race, this hypothesis is consistent with wanting 
to limit immigration from the EU, even if the immigrants are white, because immigrants from 
within Europe also pose a cultural ‘threat.’ This article demonstrated that race was an important 
consideration in the Leave vote, but past literature has been able to place this within debates on 
culture. For example, Ivarsflaten’s (2005) model showed that concerns about cultural unity had a 
larger impact on anti-immigration than racism. 
An analysis of UKIP strategy and support affirms the importance of cultural concerns. 
Public support for UKIP was partly motivated by feelings of anxiety over immigration, especially 
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when this could threaten people’s identity and culture.62 At a UKIP conference in 2014, leader 
Nigel Farage said that immigration was making parts of the country “unrecognizable” and like “a 
foreign land.” He also later expressed during a press conference his discomfort at hearing foreign 
languages being spoken on a train.63 In the final month of the Brexit campaign, Michael Gove and 
Boris Johnson, key Leave figures, promised a points-based system that would require migrants to 
speak English.64 
When elite influence is taken in conjunction with past British public opinion showing aversion 
to cultural pluralism, it is apparent that people’s evaluations of culture may have played a part 
within anti-immigration debates in Brexit, separate from race’s impact. This article demonstrated 
that racism was a predictor of the Leave vote, but did not solve the puzzle of why there would be 
aversion to EU immigrants based on racism, given that the majority of these immigrants are white. 
A very likely explanation is that those who are sensitive to race are also sensitive to cultural unity. 
This article’s claim that racism is a powerful predictor does not counter the potential predictive 
power of a preference for cultural unity. Further research is necessary to disentangle the two. 
 
Conclusion 
After June 2016, there has been a multitude of analyses that strived to dissect why Britain 
voted to leave the EU. Immigration was unanimously recognized to be the primary issue not only 
for the Leave campaign’s strategies, but also to voters. What caused anti-immigrant sentiment was 
a more complex question. The mobilization of concern over the perceived economic burden of 
mass migration was key, from increased job competition to a strain on welfare resources, namely 
the NHS. Analyses also showed strategies of cultural scaremongering to stoke public fears of 
cultural pluralism. There was also plenty of robust scholarship on public opinion towards 
immigration more generally, which also strived to compare economic concerns with sociological. 
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This article sought to locate race within the anti-immigration debate. It asked the question 
of whether anti-immigrant sentiment was motivated more by racism or concerns with the economy 
in the 2016 referendum. Using new Understanding Society data from 2018, this article found that 
race mattered even when holding economic evaluations constant in determining individual 
referendum choices. 
The amalgam of past literature and this article’s analyses suggest that, although the British 
public and elites who advocated to exit the EU insisted that their campaign was not based on 
racism, people inherently respond to their sociological concerns when making a political 
determination about immigration. It is possible that many white Britons voted to curb immigration 
from the EU because they preferred that the UK retain its Anglo-Saxon culture — which would 
extend antipathy to include white EU immigrants. However, regardless of cultural attitudes, 
people’s racism was translated through the ballot box. Brexit was not simply about perceived 
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Abstract 
Tourism provides a major source of industry in various nations around the world. 
Although historically, tourism has proven ecologically harmful to its host nations, a new 
approach, called ecotourism, takes a more conservationist and sustainable approach. This article 
discusses the agents, aims, pitfalls, and potential of ecotourism in the contemporary global 
sphere, particularly in the Middle East. It then examines the successes and challenges 
experienced by two case study nations: Jordan and Oman. Following an analysis of ecotourism 
in these places, the piece recommends a number of elements for consideration for nations aiming 
to boost the environmental considerations of their tourism sector, including but not limited to 
education and environmental regulations set by policy. 
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Introduction 
According to the World Travel and Tourism Council, a tenth of global jobs and GDP are 
rooted in the tourism industry.1 Ecotourism specifically is one of the tourism industry’s fastest 
growing sectors and has seen growth rates as high as 10-30%.2 Though for some, tourism may 
conjure up pleasant thoughts about sipping margaritas in Cancun, millions of people interact with 
and indeed depend upon the sector for a livelihood. As a champion of these millions and their 
communities, as well as of the environment, education, and economies of millions more, 
ecotourism and its growing popularity stand ready to improve the future of the world at large.  
Ecotourism is a recent concept, the origins of its contemporary usage beginning in the 
1970s.3 In keeping with social movements at the time, the notion of ecotourism paid attention to 
how to alleviate negative impacts on the environment while advocating for the empowerment of 
the marginalized people involved, i.e. those populating the local communities wherein tourism 
took place. Though the meaning of ‘ecotourism’ has and continues to change, many attempts have 
been made to define it and a rough consensus on its core principles has emerged, evidenced by 
The International Ecotourism Society’s terse definition: “Ecotourism is responsible travel to 
natural areas that conserves the environment, sustains the well-being of the local people, and 
involves interpretation and education.”4 
This paper hopes to introduce the reader to the aims of the ecotourism industry, its different 
actors, and some of its pitfalls and potential. In doing so, it will orient the reader to ecotourism and 
its theoretical contours by employing examples from across the globe, which will provide a 
framework for understanding ecotourism generally. The scope will then narrow to two nations that 
have already done much to lead the field in the Middle East, Jordan and Oman. Along with the 
author’s personal experience with both countries, they are at the forefront of ecotourism in their 
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region, there is a great corpus of research in English documenting their progress, they are both 
stable politically, and the differences between the two make them an excellent pair side-by-side 
study. Though the framework established earlier will not map cleanly on to these two case studies, 
it will inform the discussion as it moves on next to the unique successes and challenges of 
developing the ecotourism sector in these countries. 
The paper concludes with larger lessons and recommendations that have relevance for the 
Middle East as a whole. It is undeniable that the region is both dependent upon and ripe for tourism 
development, evidenced by the fact that it witnessed international tourist arrivals grow from 24.1 
million in 2000 to 58.2 million in 2010.5 This growth coincides with a broader, more international 
trend, as demonstrated by the U.N. General Assembly’s declaration of 2017 as the “International 
Year of Sustainable Tourism for Development.” It is hence the author’s stance that, while it faces 
some challenges, ecotourism has the potential to sustainably and sensitively aid the development 
of Middle Eastern economies. Indeed, the Middle East is not only well-positioned to participate in 
the global trend towards more sustainable tourism development, but can lead the drive through 
ecotourism efforts.   
 
Ecotourism Overview & General Discussion 
Though it may seem pedantic, defining ecotourism and its dimensions is necessary to 
understand how to judge the successes or failures of any ecotourist operation. Unfortunately, 
ecotourism as a term encompasses many different interpretations, and it thus resists easy definition. 
Some have simply used it to describe any form of outdoor recreation and nature-based trips, 
although even in its earlier usage many academics stressed its educational components.6 Others 
prefer to emphasize sustainability and claim that ecotourism’s primary focus should be healthy 
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practices that diminish the economic and environmental impacts of normal tourism on surrounding 
community.7 Building off this last usage, others yet foreground the local community at the heart 
of ecotourism, requiring inclusion of local inhabitants in the profits and administration of the 
operation.8 Clearly, ecotourism is a convoluted term and unraveling its many meanings merits its 
own paper. Accordingly, this paper will continue to roughly abide by the aforementioned definition 
supplied by The International Ecotourism Society, chosen for its concision and wide recognition. 
This definition differentiates ecotourism from conventional tourism, which may be understood as 
tourism without any of the normative principles, objectives, or constraints that accompany 
ecotourism. The sole purpose of conventional tourism is economic profit, often expressed as high-
volume mass tourism which can lead to the degradation of a place’s attractiveness.9 Conversely, 
ecotourism strives to achieve greater conservation, responsibility, sustainability, and education. 
 
Actors 
In this definition, then, an ideal ecotourism model incorporates an attentiveness to the needs 
of the local community, a combination of cultural and environmental attractions, education about 
said attractions, and a minimization of ecological impact. However, even these parameters leave 
room for variation and many different ecotourism operations across the globe take different forms. 
Some are state-owned and operated while others are administered by NGOs, and some are 
branches of transnational companies while others are local industries. Every version of ecotourism 
involves, albeit to varying degrees, four main actors. As laid out by Dr. Peter Bjork, “The following 
groups of actors have to co-operate: the tourists, the tourism companies (the tourism industry), the 
authorities, and the local people.”10 For clarity, this paper will retain the terms used by Dr. Bjork 
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with the sole alteration of naming the ‘tourism companies (tourism industry)’ the ‘private tourism 
industry’ to distinguish it from the ecotourism industry as a whole.  
 
Local Communities 
Local people tend to be the actors with the least agency, and thus demand prioritization in 
any sustainable ecotourism model. In fact, to refer back to the definition of ecotourism, the well-
being of the local people is a requisite characteristic. Local communities differ from place to place, 
including nomadic peoples, small villages, or large townships. Some communities are more 
family-based and others more civic-based, and thus approaches to incorporating them in the 
decision-making process varies too, but it is important to meet them on their own terms rather than 
discounting their modes of life as unfit for autonomy. There are a number of ways in which this 
discounting can occur, sometimes even by infringing on the prerogatives for self-determination 
and resource access provided them by the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights, which often targets 
the most vulnerable demographics of “women, indigenous peoples, people living in disputed areas 
and children.”11 In addition to having a say in the initial decision-making, local communities 
deserve inclusion in the running of ecotourism projects in recognition that their opinions and 
values are not static and do change with the progress of a project. One way to accomplish this is 
to include them through employment, intentional purchasing, and other monetary chains. Panama, 
where 56% of tourism income returns to local households, has adopted this principle and sought 
to locally supply “products, labor, tourism services, and increasingly ‘green services’ in energy 
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Authorities 
The authorities’ role is more fluid in that it can serve to reinforce the local communities’ 
wishes or sometimes to oppose them directly, often when taking the side of the private tourism 
industry. Enticed by the prospect of profit, development, and foreign investment some 
governments are too eager to develop a site for ecotourism before obtaining the consent of and 
considering the impacts on the local people. This can occur especially when the local people live 
more traditional lifestyles and thus remain on the fringes of conventional citizenship; for example, 
the high illiteracy rates among Maasai tribespeople led to the local government overseeing the 
conservation and management of their traditional pastoral lands on their behalf.13 This poses the 
danger of excluding another key actor, the local community, in the ecotourism process. Without a 
voice in the process, these parties lose access to the financial benefits of tourism development 
while their proximity entails enduring many of the effects, whether they be environmental 
degradation, elevated cost of living, or cultural intrusion.  
However, authorities also provide the institutional support and assets in backing local 
communities’ interests. Whether at a regional or national level, legislative, executive, and judicial 
powers all can play a critical role in advocating for local communities. The national government 
of Bhutan has sought a “high value, low volume” model of ecotourism that has minimized the 
negative impacts of tourism on the local populace, conserving their environment, culture, and 
livelihoods.14 Furthermore, in Cambodia, the endorsement of community-based organizations by 
the national government, particularly the Ministry of the Environment and the Ministry of 
Tourism, has empowered those organizations to make their own decisions in determining the role 
of outside operators in local ecotourism projects.15 The role of governmental authorities is vital to 
the success of sustainable ecotourism and must be used wisely to further amplify the benefits 
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One often overlooked group is the tourists themselves. Though it is tempting to categorize 
this actor as reactive—a consistent demand-side force that responds to changes in the other 
parties—tourists themselves can influence what ecotourism looks like. Bjork has astutely 
considered the matter:  
A central question still unresolved is how much are tourists willing to pay for trips 
that are more sustainable than mass tourism? Although the environment is in focus, 
we have to keep in mind that even this kind of tourism must be based on 
profitmaking activities, and tourists must have the opportunity to enjoy their stay 
(D' Ayala, 1995; Giannechini, 1993). Another important unresolved question is 
how much comfort do ecotourists need? Are they willing to pay a higher price for 
a lower standard, i.e. usually a more authentic reality? 
 
No matter how well-designed an ecotourism system is, it only succeeds if it attracts tourists. 
While some, more environmentally-conscious tourists are willing to ‘vote with their dollar’ 
and pay higher prices for a more sustainable experience, far greater potential lies in 
attracting wider tourist audiences. Education about the cultural and ecological significance 
of a site, a tenet of good ecotourism, can also lose its impact if ‘preaching to the choir,’ or 
just reaching already environmentally-conscious tourists, who currently constitute the 
majority of ecotourists.16 With these demographics in mind, we can understand how 
ecotourists play a part in the process today and how to envision ways in which to broaden 
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Private Tourism Industry 
As for the private tourism industry itself, it provides the foundation for the 
interaction of all the other actors. At a minimum, the industry must distribute benefits to 
the local community, abide by governmental guidelines, and attract paying tourists, 
coordinating between various demands and expectations. The ecotourism businesses’ 
profits underwrite this confluence of actors, and revenues must be sufficient to both sustain 
the businesses themselves and to provide benefits to the other parties. To strike this 
balance, when the ecotourism operations are run by private-sector, international, and 
corporate tourism companies, it is crucial that these companies avoid extracting the tourism 
money spent in local economies by hiring much of their staff from outlying communities. 
For instance, in the Peruvian Tambopata Candamo Reserved Zone, the employment of the 
indigenous tribe leaves them some 60% of the profits.17 Some prefer to directly distribute 
a portion of the profits back to the community as in the 19% of all revenues in the Maasai 
Mara Reserve in Kenya that go straight to the community there.18 
Ecotourism businesses that are local, smaller-scale, or community-operated, will 
often bring in NGOs for additional funding and support. NGOs can assist in guide training, 
research, conservation area management, investment, and community planning and 
stakeholder meetings, all small burdens that can cripple a nascent ecotourism operation 
before it gets off the ground if not addressed.19 However, the presence of several NGOs 
working towards the same end can result in a “duplication of roles” leading to competition 
or rivalry within the private tourism industry which disrupts the collaboration with other 
actors.20  One study even found, using meta-analysis of over 200 cases, that “the proportion 
of successful projects is greater for NGOs working individually than for those collaborating 
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with other NGOs.”21 At least when partnering individually then, NGOs often complement 
or even fill the role of the private tourism industry in managing operations, earning profits, 
strengthening community, and promoting conservation, especially in developing countries 
where governmental oversight tends to be weaker.  
 
Aims 
Though each actor seeks different aims, it is easy to note shared objectives that have 
emerged in the prior discussion. Among these are emphases on economic development, 
community development and involvement, cultural sensitivity and preservation, sustainability, 
environmental stewardship, and education. These constitute the essence of ecotourism’s ultimate 
telos: reduce the negative impacts of tourism and increase the positive ones. Though simple in 
theory, it requires a substantial amount of thought and foresight to accomplish, as well as a case-
specific method of harmonizing competing goals. For example, stakeholders focused on 
conservation might advocate for no-use resource preservation as the priority while those concerned 
with commercial development might be willing to go further in exploiting natural resource use in 
order to bring economic prosperity to the local communities. No standard equilibrium exists, but 
must be negotiated in every given instance.  
 
Pitfalls 
Unfortunately, despite these lofty intentions, many attempts at ecotourism fall short and 
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Sociocultural Risks 
One damning sociocultural fault strikes at the core of ecotourism, as it questions the 
authenticity of the ecotourism movement. While ecotourism’s public intentions are desirable and 
even noble, the fact remains that by encouraging and enabling visitations from afar, the ecotourism 
industry can inadvertently exoticize the sites, the local communities, and the cultures inhabiting 
them. While this process elide those environmental aspects that have ecological but not 
commercial value, like the conservation of species unattractive to tourists, it also obfuscates the 
voices of local communities who may not share the same marketable goals. Much of this tendency 
originates in the prevailing neoliberal logic of the world which prioritizes profit and the ability to 
attract tourists and their money.22  
Beyond commercialization, ecotourism at its worst evokes ‘poverty tourism,’ that moniker 
given to projects that found their appeal on the exposure to abject conditions or alien lifestyles of 
other people. One Kenyan woman living in a ghetto noted “that it is morally unfair that tourists 
keep on coming to the place she calls home.”23 In the same fashion, those visiting more traditional, 
pastoral communities to marvel at their ‘backward’ practices or ‘inferior’ quality of life may bring 
economic wealth to the region but at the cost of the humiliation, alienation, and degradation of the 
local community. Even at the Huaorani Ecolodge in Ecuador, an operation that seems to be doing 
many things right, ecotourists pose with and photograph the tribespeople stricken with polio or 
physical disfigurements.24 In addition to this zoo-like exoticization, the Huaorani have complained 
that the ecotourists seldom leave tips for photos or pay enough for the traditional crafts they 
painstakingly make.25 A proper application of ecotourism would thus be one that monitors and 
limits this kind of belittling visitation while also ensuring fair prices or the expectation of 
reasonable compensation.  
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Environmental Dangers 
Though the name ‘eco-tourism’ and its professed attentiveness to conservation intuitively 
absolve the industry of environmental harm, no form of tourism is without its environmental 
impacts. Habitat disruption, litter, trail deterioration where applicable, and light, noise, and 
physical pollution all contribute to environmental degradation, even when confined to designated 
ecotourism areas that are often just as vulnerable as the more strictly-protected sections.26 In part, 
ecotourism’s allure promises the access to pristine, ‘hidden’ environments, but developing these 
untouched refuges exploits them anyway, undermining the very thing many ecotourists seek. 
Furthermore, much of ecotourism’s potential takes place in developing countries, and the focus of 
the government on more pressing issues like providing adequate nutrition, security, healthcare, 




The economy can foil ecotourism’s aims in other manners too. Tourism is a rather variable 
and vulnerable industry that depends on tourists’ willingness to participate, which fluctuates based 
on everything from seasonality to the global economy to international politics. Investment in the 
sector does not allow stakeholders to recoup much if operations go under, and this imperils the 
livelihoods of the local communities and the ecotourism businesses. Even when ecotourism is 
thriving its success can negatively affect local communities. Through the importation of foreign 
goods, the involvement of large international tourism companies, and other factors, “The World 
Bank estimated in 1988 that 55 percent of gross revenues for all tourism in the developing world 
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eventually return to industrialized countries.”28 This is a distressingly high percent of profits 
dissipating from where it is spent and where it is supposed to bring prosperity. The presence of 
foreign investment, the concomitant inflation, and the influx of migrant workers drawn to the 
promise of employment in a lucrative industry all further detract from the economic benefits that 
would otherwise land squarely in the local communities.29 These drawbacks go to show how 
crucial it is to require participation from all actors, particularly local ones, to attain ecotourism’s 
desired sustainability and other positive attributes.   
 
Potential  
While these issues complicate the application of ecotourism, they do not preclude it. 
Ecotourism still brings several benefits to the table and, if executed properly, can meet its grand 
aspirations. In the same three realms, sociocultural, environmental, and economic, examples of 
successful ecotourism operations abound.  
 
Sociocultural Promise 
In Nepal, women often face lower literacy rates, access to resources, and decision-making 
powers than men, but the Langtang Ecotourism Project has sought to even this imbalance by 
bringing Nepalese women into the planning and management of the operation while providing 
them with opportunities to supplement their income via cultural performances and the sale of 
crafts.30 Although the Australian government originally administered Mutawinjti National Park, 
the local aboriginal populations protested until they were included in the process and they now co-
manage the park in conjunction with the National Parks and Wildlife Service, all while running 
every tour in the area through a company that provides their guides with professional training to 
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build on their traditional knowledge of the area.31 Similarly, Fiji Rivers, an eponymous ecotourism 
company, directs a large portion of its funds to education and training the local population, 
capitalizing on profits and tourist philanthropy to offer classes on conservation, swift water rescue, 
nature guide interpretation, first-aid and CPR, and other marketable skills.32  
 
Environmental Capacity 
Environmentally, achievements can be as simple as sustainable construction, like with the 
Crosswaters Ecolodge in China whose construction materials are almost entirely recycled, local, 
and renewable materials like bamboo. The designers of the lodges used a mixture of GIS mapping, 
feng shui principles, and input from academic and industrial ecologists to minimize its impact on 
the habitat.33 More ambitious achievements include that of Frégate Island Private in the Seychelles 
where plantation agriculture had depleted 90% of native flora and fauna: the eco-resort has 
completely rid the island of pesticides and rats to protect its endemic bird species, established a 
nursery reviving many near-extinct native plants, and funded a nursery that witnessed a 1300% 
increase in the giant tortoise population in just two decades.34 Communities in Cambodia were 
able to conserve mangrove forests despite the high start-up costs and other impediments to 
initiating REDD+ programs by instead harnessing their collective might in Community Protected 
Areas to set up ecotourism projects that incentivized preservation while compensating the families 
dependent upon tree-cutting.35  
 
Economic Potential 
This compensation is an integral part of the economic triumph of ecotourism. The Hidden 
Valley Inn Reserve in Belize hires the majority of its unskilled labor from local villages, buys fresh 
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produce from outlying markets, and even outside of its tours runs a coffee cultivating and roasting 
business that supplies additional income for the company and the local economy. The Tambopata 
region of the Peruvian Amazon, which, as noted earlier, leaves locals with the lion’s share of 
ecotourism profits, also poses a unique advantage. One study considered competing land uses in 
the area, namely ecotourism, logging, cattle-grazing, and gold mining industries, and weighed the 
various potential economic benefits of all. They found that, without exception, ecotourism 
provided the greatest net economic benefit of any alternative, without even taking into account its 
social benefits or positive externalities.36 
 
The Twin Case Studies: Jordan & Oman 
Ecotourism is clearly an expansive term, one that encompasses a diverse group of actors, 
various countries and cultures, and a whole host of success and failures. Keeping in mind the 
theoretical understanding and insight thus far gained in this paper, undergirded as it was by 
numerous, real-world examples, the discussion next focuses on two Middle Eastern countries, 
Jordan and Oman. With the previous section situating the reader in the ecotourism field, turning 
the attention to Jordan and Oman will shine more light on the specific challenges and triumphs of 
both. From this analysis will come lessons about both that bear relevance for the ecotourism 
endeavors of other countries, notably those also in the Middle East.  
 
Jordan 
Jordan enjoys a variety of different biomes and habitats, ranging from the forested north to 
the wetlands in the east to the rocky desert in the south. This heterogeneity has not gone unnoticed, 
and the monarchy founded and funded the Royal Society for the Conservation of Nature (RSCN) 
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to harness and conserve Jordan’s great natural resources.37 Though established by the state, RSCN 
is an independent NGO tasked with a public mandate to protect Jordan’s environment, and it also 
spearheads many of the major ecotourism operations in the country. Other smaller businesses have 
filled the lacunae RSCN left, creating a patchwork of ecotourism actors that blurs the lines between 
the four categories outlined earlier. Nonetheless, these actors have earned Jordan the reputation of 
being one of the more innovative, environmentally-conscious, and committed ecotourism leaders 
in the region. Altogether, while Jordan faces some difficulties in its quest to build a sustainable 
tourist sector, it has realized many more accomplishments, and both categories mark it out as 
valuable case study from which to learn ecotourism.  
 
Challenges 
As a pioneer in the ecotourism game in the Middle East, Jordan started tapping its potential 
relatively early. Unfortunately, its eagerness in rapid change led to some hasty, haphazard 
decisions that have since negatively impacted its ecotourism prospects. Notably, in and around 
Petra—one of the seven wonders of the ancient world and a massive tourist destination for 
Jordan—this development has resulted in a few longstanding issues. The construction of more 
permanent trails, paved roads, and other accessibility-oriented alterations ate away at much of the 
habitat for the local juniper trees and other flora, and the streamlined corridors now intensify the 
effects of the seasonal flashfloods that visit the site.38 Ironically, the government constructed a 
brand-new Archaeology and Tourism Faculty Building on land that not only had been considered 
protected, but had retained the last vestiges of greenery in the area.39 These kinds of mistakes have 
lasting effects but are quite preventable and require simple foresight to avoid. Although it is too 
late to apply this lesson in the already established ecotourism sites in Jordan, it proves valuable 
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when approaching the creation of new projects across the country so long as thoroughness in 
planning is prized over haste in development. 
Another area in which Jordan has room for improvement lies in education. Particularly, 
two separate realms of education could be improved upon, and they are in the education the general 
populace and the education and training of a skilled workforce. First is educating the public and 
Jordanians about the benefits of ecotourism to raise awareness, instill a conservational ethos, and 
encourage further participation in and support for the ecotourism industry. The author noted during 
time spent in the country volunteering with RSCN in 2017 that there seemed to be a disconnect 
between the work the NGO was performing and the interest of average citizens.40 Though proud 
of the environmental and cultural heritage of the nature reserves RSCN administered, many of the 
Jordanians the author spoke with were unclear about what exactly the organization did, why habitat 
stewardship was crucial, or what benefits ecotourism could bring. Others have remarked on this 
lack of awareness, saying that “…there is a low level of awareness, both within and outside the 
tourism industry, of the environmental impacts of tourism and of alternative approaches like eco-
tourism.”41 Thus, through school curricula, social media campaigns, informational materials, and 
events, both state and non-state entities in Jordan could further educate the populace on the role of 
ecotourism in their country. 
Though strides are being made in this direction, Jordan still suffers from a dearth of 
professional, skilled, and well-trained tourist staff.42 This arises in part from hiring staff members 
for ecotourist projects from local communities, which, although it benefits the economic 
development and inclusion of the local population, can result in an unskilled workforce. This is 
not inevitable however, and it would be wise for ecotourism companies hiring in this fashion to 
invest in their staff by training them and even certifying them to be guides. RSCN funded several 
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Jordanians to acquire “nature guidance qualifications and accreditation from the Field Guide 
Association of Southern Africa in 2014.43 These individuals, however, were only four in number. 
Jordan stands to gain from increasing this number and adding to their ranks of professional staff, 
since the increasing popularity of the nation’s ecotourism scene will only merit more world-class 
guides.  
Another challenge to ecotourism in Jordan is, paradoxically, the success of the industry 
itself. In Wadi Rum, a desert nature reserve in the south of the country, the local Bedouin tribes 
live in and run ecotourism camps. Using interviews and surveys, one researcher investigated the 
impacts of ecotourism not on the physical environment, but on the sociocultural milieu of the 
Bedouin communities. He found that the allure of easy profits to be made in operating tours and 
the draw to provide for one’s family led to “the creation of an incentive to not finish schooling and 
begin working in the industry as soon as is possible.”44 This phenomenon had taken such a hold 
that 100% of the study’s participants said they had dropped out of high school or had not 
progressed beyond high school.45 Furthermore, the capitalist structure of the reserve and the 
multitude of camps from which tourists can choose has created unhealthy competition between 
Bedouin camps and their families, leading to the deterioration of friendly ties, kinship, reciprocity, 
and hospitality.46 While these findings are confined to Wadi Rum, it is not difficult to think of 
parallels across the country, like in the Dana Biosphere Reserve where Bedouin communities are 
similarly employed.  
 
Successes 
Yet, portraying Jordan’s ecotourism scene as a network of difficulties and missed 
opportunities would be both unjust and inaccurate. There are numerous projects that have earned 
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recognition for their sustainability and positive impact, and the industry has been smart in building 
up its potential. In 2012, 18% of Jordan’s GDP came from tourism alone.47 More interestingly, 
while the largest portion of these tourists, 27.6%, came from foreign countries, the next largest 
portion, 24.5%, came from other Arab countries.48 This distribution of tourists is an asset for 
Jordan, as demonstrated during the plummet in all tourism revenues for Middle Eastern countries 
during the Arab Spring due to concerns about stability.49 The tourists from other Arab countries, 
especially the Gulf, prefer Jordan for its “extremely favourable price-performance ratio and its 
comparative liberality.”50 The diversity in tourist demographics allows Jordanian ecotourist 
operators to cater to different markets accordingly: should issues of political instability dissuade 
European and other Western tourists, Jordan can still rely on intra-regional visits, and should oil 
prices plummet and jeopardize the ability of these Gulf citizens to visit, then Jordan can turn to 
more global markets that conversely are more willing to pay for travel.  
Another way in which Jordan can capitalize on this interplay of divergent elements is in 
stressing its attractive climate. Jordan shares with its neighbors that idyllic Mediterranean climate 
thought by some to constitute the world’s most popular tourist destination, with more than 120 
million visitors each year since 2005.51 As a result, Jordan does a good job of depicting itself as a 
winter getaway for colder, northern climes. Simultaneously, its more northern location in regard 
to the Gulf promises cooler climes and even the presence of snow in some parts, a rarity for Saudis, 
Emiratis, and others. Though, as noted above, these Gulf Arab tourists appreciate the relative 
liberality of Jordan, its status as a Muslim-dominant, Arab nation make it the perfect balance 
between an exciting getaway and a familiar friend, reinforcing its appeal. Between the differently-
inclined markets to its south and north, Jordan can diversify its reliance on any one tourist 
demographic and thus enjoy a more robust ecotourism industry.  
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More specifically, Jordan has found success in individual operations, like that of RSCN’s 
Feynan Ecolodge in the Dana Biosphere Reserve. This lodge is entirely solar-powered and is lit at 
night with candles made on-site, helping reduce light pollution in the process, while it further 
reduces waste via the composting of biodegradable trash and the burning of charcoal made from 
discarded olive pits for warmth.52 The entire staff of the lodge consists of people from the local 
villages, many of whom are women who otherwise seldom find work outside the home, and the 
camp drivers are all Bedouins who supplement their income with this part-time position.53 
Furthermore, as is repeated in some of the camps in Wadi Rum and elsewhere in Jordan, RSCN 
offers chances for tourists to work alongside the Bedouins so they can do more than observe. This 
leads to the retention in Bedouin life and the appreciation of foreigners for activities like herding 
and the making of bread, candles, hair tents, and traditional eyeliner.54  
Additionally, while locals make and sell these crafts on site, RSCN has tapped into its 
nation-wide structure to move and sell these products throughout the country. Thus, whether made 
by women in the Dana Biosphere Reserve, the Ajloun Forest Reserve or anywhere in between, 
tourists can purchase these fruit rolls, olive-oil soaps, teas, calligraphy items, silver jewelry, 
organic herbs, ceramics, biscuits, jams, at any of RSCN’s locations, even its Wild Jordan branch 
in the capital city, Amman.55 In this way, RSCN is able to preserve the traditional methods and 
craftwork behind these products while opening up new markets and increasing profits for the 
communities creating them. While as a singular example the Feynan Ecolodge is exceptional in 
many regards, RSCN has replicated a similar model in its other reserves, demonstrated by its craft 
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Oman 
Though both Jordan and Oman are Arab, predominantly-Muslim, and monarchical countries 
in the Middle East, they vary markedly. For one, Oman, unlike Jordan, is oil-rich, and the 
extraction of fossil fuels is the backbone of the economy. Nonetheless, tourism plays an 
increasingly important role, especially as a lauded alternative to diversify Oman’s economy and 
reduce its dependency on oil.56 Oman gravitates to ecotourism in particular as a means of 
sustainable development, and the country boasts a strong record for environmental stewardship, 
having established “more than 15 natural reserves and protected areas stretching over an 
approximate area of 30,000 square kilometres”57 while also signing and abiding by the Convention 
on Biological Diversity and the Convention on the International Trade of Endangered Species.58 
Both in name and actuality then Oman has taken great strides in providing the institutional and 
legal framework necessary for ecotourism to flourish. The Omani Ministry of Tourism and 
Ministry of Environment and Climate Affairs, which together combine the roles of two ecotourism 
actors, the authorities and the private tourism industry, have supported much of this progress. Their 
collaboration and engagement with ecotourism is in recognition of the country’s great array of 
natural resources that include world-class diving locations, beaches, oases, mountains, and unique 
wildlife like the Arabian Oryx and several endangered species of sea turtles. While Oman sports 
this great environmental diversity, the literature has not kept apace, and few studies have 
thoroughly covered the state of ecotourism in the country. Even so, we can witness the great 
success Oman has found with sea turtle conservation, its potential for further ecotourism progress 
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Challenges 
Unfortunately, Oman has encountered a few challenges to ecotourism development that 
has prevented the industry from living up to all these aspirations. Buerkert et al. discuss the case 
of the oasis village of As Sawjarah, which is somewhat similar to Misfat al-Abryeen in its 
continued production of traditional farming and livestock practices, though it lies in the mountain 
area of Jabal al Akhdar and thus utilizes a unique type of terrace-based agriculture.59 Noting the 
increasingly feeble returns on agricultural sales and residents’ expressed desire to abandon the 
oasis, Buerkert et al. proposed a radical transformation of the village into an ecotourism project 
wherein residents would be trained to work as guides, leading tours and engaging visitors in 
traditional activities like fruit-harvesting, grain-grinding, livestock-tending, bread-baking, and 
making of handicrafts like baskets or walking sticks.60 They called for this culturally and 
ecologically sensitive development as an alternative to the country’s otherwise large-scale, 
industrial, and non-educational tourist industry.61 Unfortunately, when the author here visited As 
Sawjarah in the summer of 2018, no major steps had been taken in this direction and, conversely, 
the exact large-scale, industrial style of tourism Buerkert et al. advised against had taken root just 
across the canyon.62 It did so in the form of Anantara Jabal al Akhdar Resort, a “fortress-style” 
compound sporting 115 rooms, tennis courts, a spa, biking, an Italian restaurant, and even an 
archery range.63 A far cry from the sustainable, culturally-attuned model of ecotourism, this 
property goes to show that the fight for better tourism in Oman is not yet won.  
This occasionally anemic commitment to ecotourism has manifested itself in another 
lamentable fashion in Oman. The government established the Arabian Oryx Sanctuary in the 
1980s, creating a refuge for “Nubian ibex, caracal, Arabian gazelle, sand gazelle, sand cat, the last 
wild breeding population of the Houbara bustard in Arabia and a great number of other animals,” 
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as well as sites of great geological and archaeological interest.64 The sanctuary even included an 
information center, as well as tour guides run by the local pastoral tribe, providing economic 
benefits and environmental education both.65 Alas, the government shrank the sanctuary to one 
tenth its original size in 2007 after the discovery of oil in the region, spawning a decline in Oryx 
numbers from 450 in 1996 to 65 in 2007.66 In this individual case, competing priorities led the 
Omani government to undermine the integrity of the ecotourism venture for the economy’s sake. 
Clearly, steadfast dedication to the guiding principles behind ecotourism, behind “responsible 
travel to natural areas that conserves the environment, sustains the well-being of the local people, 
and involves interpretation and education,” is missing from some of these projects.67  
One other stumbling block Oman faces in its pursuit of ecotourism is the composition of 
its labor force. Migrant labor issues are common in the Gulf, and Oman is no exception. In the 
tourism industry alone, “expatriates represented 88.40% (112,144 out of 126,857) of the workforce 
in this sector, which is 7.6 times higher than the local employment.”68 It is difficult to engage with, 
deliver benefits for, and include local communities when the overwhelming majority of the staff 
in an ecotourism operation come from other countries. In this case, migrants predominantly from 
South Asia come to fill unskilled labor roles and typically lack the interpretive training and lingual 
skills to be adequate ecotourism guides. Indeed, many ecotourism sites, especially those run 
without support from or coordination with the public sector, suffer from a paucity of qualified 
guides trained in general tourism issues, conservation principles, and context-specific sociocultural 
understanding.69 It is unlikely Oman will witness a sudden surge of Omanis desiring to work in 
the ecotourism sector unless action is taken to either decrease the flow of migrant labor or to 
incentivize this work for citizens. Efforts made towards the latter also help combat the attitudes of 
farmers and villagers like those in As Sawjarah, where incomes come mostly from non-agricultural 
78




 79 of 277 
activities, familial remittances, and government subsidies, encouraging movement to urban centers 
in lieu of ecotourism development.70   
 
Successes 
Despite these setbacks, Oman has done a great many things right in establishing its 
ecotourism sector. The country is home to substantial populations of multiple sea turtle species, 
including loggerheads, green turtles, hawksbills, and olive ridleys.71 By both establishing the Ras 
al Jinz Turtle Reserve around the coasts where the animals nest and building a resort there that 
sources tours to view the laying and hatching of eggs, the Omani government has promoted a 
popular and profitable activity; even in its early stages in 1997, the reserve grossed over $100,000 
USD in revenue and visitors have continued to increase since, with an average annual growth rate 
of  21.53% between 2010 and 2015.72 During the author’s stay at the reserve in the summer of 
2018, tourists came from everywhere from China to Scotland to the U.S. to view the hatching of 
the eggs, although many too were Arabs from other Gulf states. Moreover, the government has 
incorporated education into the resort, supplying an information center as well as knowledgeable 
guides.73 The author’s own experience attests to the efficacy of these programs, observing the great 
detail and accessibility of the multimedia information in the resort’s museum-esque sea turtle 
center.74 The guides that conducted the tours to see the turtles laying eggs at dawn and dusk were 
incredibly proficient, alternating instructions on how to avoid disturbing the turtles with interesting 
facts about their reproduction habits, lifecycles, migration patterns, and more.  
Even beyond this realized success, Oman offers much more potential for ecotourism 
growth. Mountain oases, hotspots of agriculture, biodiversity, culture, and beauty, are a promising 
avenue. One such oasis, Misfat al-Abryeen, is devoted to agricultural production on a small scale, 
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using the traditional Omani aflaj irrigation system.75 Although no ecotourism operation currently 
exists, many tourists, the author included, have visited the oasis to observe and enjoy this 
intersection of picturesque surroundings and living history. In fact, Zekri et al. argue that the 
positive externalities generated by the farms exceed $360,000 USD annually, and that if a simple, 
minimal entrance fee were charged, that farmers could achieve between 6-21% higher profits, even 
with the accompanying loss of some tourists unwilling to pay. In this case the local communities, 
i.e. farmers, are already doing what an ecotourism project would anyway by maintaining a cultural 
and ecological heritage, and all that remains is to capture the economic benefits of this activity. In 
tapping this ecotourism potential and others across the country, Oman also has the luxury of 
providing strong, state-backed investment. The oil wealth of the country will not last forever, but 
so long as it does, it can be directed to fund longer-term, more sustainable ventures precisely like 
those in the sector of ecotourism.  
  
Conclusion & Recommendations  
There is no doubt that Oman and Jordan both face their own set of ecotourism challenges 
and successes, and each is uniquely defined by its physical, economic, and cultural context. While 
issues remain with labor, luxury development, and the balance of competing priorities in Oman, 
the realized achievements and further prospects for environmental protection and diverse and 
sustainable economic growth are staggering. For Jordan, though progress could be made in 
educating the public, investing in guide-training and other ecotourism infrastructure, and 
cautioning the easy growth of capitalist ecotourism, the country’s marketing to a diversity of 
tourists, capitalization on its natural climate, comprehensive ecotourism model, and innovative 
commercialization of crafts are accomplishments worthy of both praise and replication. As nations 
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that have devoted considerable resources to developing an ecotourism industry, both can impart 
lessons to other countries in the Middle East.  
Nascent ecotourism sectors have begun to arise in Tunisia, Lebanon, Israel, Egypt, the 
U.A.E., Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iran, and Turkey.76 Few, however, can match the ecotourism efforts, 
environmental diversity, and political stability of Oman and Jordan, all contributing factors in their 
preeminence in the region. Oman’s tourism industry remained relatively unaffected after the events 
of the Arab Spring, with arrivals growing 8% in 2013, and although Jordan saw a decrease of 5% 
in the same year likely due to its proximity to Syria, it still outpaced Egypt, Lebanon, and the 
averages for the Middle East and North Africa regions.77 Meanwhile, critics have found fault with 
Iran, Turkey, and the UAE for over-exploitation and unsustainable development of their 
ecotourism industries. More specifically, Iran remains a small player in the global scene while 
some of Turkey’s forest are quite mismanaged.78 
 So, what exact lessons can be learned from Jordan and Oman? Both enjoy a strict set of 
regulations that provide a legislative and institutional backbone to conservation efforts and 
ecotourism development. The Omani government ratified the Convention of Biological Diversity 
in 1994, while in 1995 Jordan passed The Law of Environment Protection no. 12 to fortify possible 
weakness in other legislation pertaining to environmental conduct.79 In the same vein, both 
countries have a string of nature reserves that sport unique tourist opportunities, whether its hiking 
in Jordan’s Ajloun Forest Reserve or watching loggerheads lay eggs in Oman’s Ras al Jinz Turtle 
Preserve. These reserves ensure the conservation of the physical constituents of ecotourism, 
allotting greater resources and attention to the involvement of local communities, the perfection of 
sustainable operations, and the maximization of healthy economic growth. While Jordan has been 
on occasion too eager to develop quickly, sometimes not giving sufficient thought to future side-
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effects as mentioned earlier in the case of Petra, it appears to have kept a sustainable pace of 
development overall. So has Oman, despite its relatively late entry into the world of ecotourism.80 
This would be a good standard by which other Middle Eastern countries in an incipient stage of 
ecotourism can abide so they do not develop too quickly and find themselves confronted by issues 
that could have been avoided with prior planning or moderation.  
Though unfortunate, it is likely that future political unrest of some sort or another will erupt 
again in the Middle East and that it will inevitably impact other nations in the region, if only by 
virtue of their proximity, like during the Arab Spring. Hence, it is wise for countries to seek, as 
Jordan and Oman have done, to diversify their markets and attract tourists from within the region 
or other areas of the globe. This way, if tourist arrivals from one collection of nations, like the 
‘West,’ suddenly plummet, the industry is not crippled. Again using Jordan as a template, 
incentivizing traditional craftwork and arts among local communities by selling their goods on a 
national level without impacting the production processes would work well anywhere such 
craftwork, a staple of Middle Eastern merchandise, is prevalent. Both Oman and Jordan also 
emphasized the importance of education in their ecotourism projects. They did this in structured 
ways like through Oman’s information centers at its sea turtle resort and elsewhere, but also more 
experientially like through Jordan’s chances to work alongside Bedouins in performing their daily 
tasks. Both could still stand to further professionalize and train their ecotourism guides and staff, 
and this poses an exciting realm of unexplored opportunity for other Middle Eastern nations 
looking to improve on their models as well.  
More recommendations can be drawn from additional study of the examples provided here, 
and it is the author’s hope that this paper inspires some to think critically about approaching new 
ecotourism developments in the Middle East. Ideally, the great number of parameters by which to 
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define ecotourism, its actors, aims, pitfalls, and potential adequately prefaced the nuances of this 
analysis for a lay reader. Given these parameters, the difference of experience between examples, 
even between two good examples like Jordan and Oman, goes to show that there is no one right 
way to approach ecotourism. Indeed, it goes to show that the field remains heterogenous and ripe 
for innovation. Countless ways to improve upon conventional tourism in the Middle East exist. 
Hopefully, the above discussion has given some idea as to just what they may look like. 
Though at times it seems like attempts at ecotourism face similar criticisms as those leveled 
at conventional tourism, they are few and far between, and the successes of said attempts, however 
problematized, still helps push the field in the right direction. Ecotourism presents a far more 
sustainable model of tourism development by paying mind to its community, environmental, 
economic, and social impacts. These are all imperative, as the U.N.’s advocates, in the larger quest 
for tourism to promote “1. Inclusive and sustainable economic growth 2. Social inclusiveness, 
employment and poverty reduction 3. Resource efficiency, environmental protection and the fight 
against climate change 4. Cultural values, diversity and heritage 5. Mutual understanding, peace 
and security.”81 These aims, linked to the U.N.’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, span 
beyond ecotourism and possess great importance for both the world at large and for future 
generations. They are, at their core, goals for humanity. Despite this grandeur, ecotourism, and 
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Abstract 
 This paper delves into the characteristics and political actions of Korean Christian churches 
in the 1970s and 1980s to explore their influence on the societal transition to democracy. Much of 
the scholarship on this period has pointed to the various actors who took part in the pro-democracy 
movement. However, it is equally important to explore the ties between these organizations, 
facilitated by the church as a social institution. While scholarship has examined official joint-
declarations and coalitions made by religious institutions, this paper seeks to explore how aspects 
of the Protestant and Catholic Church themselves created interpersonal networks among protesters 
and shaped their political action, not just as Christians but as members of the other major groups 
identified with the pro-democracy protests as well.  
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Introduction 
The set of movements in South Korea from the late 1960s through the 1980s that called for 
establishment of a democratic government encompassed a coalition of societal groups, including 
religious groups. Both Protestant and Catholic Christians joined the movement in protest of the 
authoritarian regime. These churches briefly served as the face of the movement, publishing 
admonitions of the state of Korean society and occasionally organizing protests in order to criticize 
the regime. 
However, the churches’ role extended beyond declarations. As social institutions, the 
churches had a broad influence on the movement and the various groups that constituted it. 
Through both formal and informal connections, the churches had influence over, and were 
influenced by, other activist groups. Some of these influences were intentional, as groups within 
the churches formed community engagement organizations that directly connected the churches 
with Korean society’s disadvantaged actors. Others were less obvious. The churches’ influence on 
people as members of denominations, as youth within their ranks, and as civically engaged 
members of society helped create the conditions for anti-governmental action by different societal 
groups. 
The quality underlying the churches’ influence was social capital. As institutions that 
fostered unique social interactions, the churches influenced how a number of Koreans related to 
one another. Specifically, this organizational influence imbued Korean citizens with certain 
community organizing skills, as well as networks that helped initially foster pro-democracy activist 
groups, protect those groups from government repression later on, and develop linkages between 
those groups.  
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Authoritarianism in South Korea 
With Korea’s liberation came its division. Due to political vacuum, competition, and the 
influence of strong global powers (the US and USSR) partitioning Korea, the division between 
North and South became clear and extreme. These tensions spawned a brutal civil war (1950-53) 
that decimated virtually the entirety of the country. The violence used to establish control at this 
time framed leadership in the following decades.  
In South Korea, the US desired one quality in a leader: vehement opposition to 
communism. As a result, it placed Syngman Rhee into power, partly due to the fact that Rhee had 
spent time in the US and established trust with Washington decisionmakers who understood his 
commitment to fighting communists. Rhee’s government was decidedly Christian: he was a church 
elder, his vice president and acting prime minister were church ministers, a quarter of the National 
Assembly was Christian, most of them church leaders, and an estimated 40% of all political 
positions were filled by Christians, despite the fact that Christians made up around 10% of the 
population.1 After coming to power, Rhee steadily chipped away at democratic institutions to 
ensure his continued reign. In 1959, Rhee forced the legislature to allow him to run despite having 
reached his two-term limit. Moreover, he executed his primary political opponent. After winning 
his 1960 election, students protested en masse in the 4.19 student uprising, which, after a severe 
government crackdown, sparked nationwide insurrection. With the military losing faith in his 
leadership and with pressure from the US, Rhee abdicated in 1960. 
Rhee’s abdication led to chaos within South Korea. As a result, in 1961 General Park 
Chung Hee took power via a quiet military coup. In 1963, he was officially elected president, and 
then re-elected in 1967. While some initially hoped he would liberalize the country after Rhee’s 
rule, he instead continued Rhee’s example and seized power for himself. In 1969, he forced a 
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Constitutional amendment that allowed him to run for a third term. In 1972, he extended this reach, 
eliminating the democratic constitution in favor of the Yusin Constitution, effectively 
institutionalizing authoritarianism.2 Park’s iron grip extended beyond politics to Korean society 
itself. His government aggressively regulated its people’s lives, implementing a curfew and 
regulating hair and clothing style. 
Park enjoyed some support for his actions that the public would not have tolerated from 
Rhee due to Park’s economic policy. With state control of banks, the state effectively dictated the 
entire country’s economic policy. Park focused on industrializing the nation, exploiting cheap 
labor and using the state to help grow a small handful of companies at the expense of free market 
competition. This industrialization process led the government to recruit thousands of workers, 
including many young women, away from their agricultural jobs in the country to industrial jobs 
in the city, changing the makeup of the nation. Part of this economic control was state control of 
labor, politically demobilizing unions and allowing exploitative working conditions. Despite this 
harsh rule, many people looked up to Park for creating this ‘economic miracle’ that reversed the 
poverty and ruin the country suffered from the war. 
Segments of society did, however, protest his rule. After he amended the Constitution to 
allow for him to run for a third term in 1969, students began to speak out. In the 1970s, the protest 
movement diversified, with intellectuals and professors, journalists, lawyers, workers and those 
associated with the labor movement, and Christian political activists joining the fight. In particular, 
Christians played a large role in the mid-1970s, before the movement truly diversified and society 
more broadly began to vocally protest Park’s rule. This diversity of protestors created a diversity 
of issues about which the movement was concerned, a diversity of demands upon the state, and a 
diversity of protest tactics used. 
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In 1979, the head of the KCIA, Kim Jae-Kyu, assassinated Park; in 1980, General Chun 
Doo Hwan took power and instituted martial law. In the same year Chun took power, students 
protesting his rule created the Kwangju Uprising (or the 5.18 Uprising), in which the army fired 
into a crowd of students and attacked the citizens of Kwangju. As Chun’s government became 
increasingly repressive, the democracy movement became more radical and more covert. In the 
late 1980s the middle class also became more vocal, and international attention due to the 1988 
Olympics increased pressure on the regime to liberalize. As a result, a reform in 1987 allowed for 
direct presidential elections. Chun was succeeded by Roh Tae Woo, another General, after two 
progressive candidates split the progressive vote. However, the democracy movement became 
better established and institutionalized, and by 1993 Korea elected its first non-military leader.  
 
Christianity in South Korea 
Unlike its introduction to most other East Asian areas at the time, Christianity started on 
its own internally rather than being introduced by outsiders. Reform-minded Shilha Confucian 
Scholars encountered Western religious texts and explored them to better understand the world. In 
1631, Chong Tu-won sent an envoy to China which brought back the first Catholic missionary in 
Korea, Matteo Ricci. Again, the interest in Christianity was mainly academic at the time. In the 
1780s, Yi Song-hun traveled to China, was baptized, and then returned to Korea with religious 
texts. The beginnings of Christianity in Korea sprouted from these texts, with Koreans performing 
the practices they found in these texts, incorporating them into traditional Confucian practices, all 
without the presence of missionaries. As a result, a Korean indigenization process shaped how 
Christianity emerged in Korea. 
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Soon thereafter, a slow trickle of representatives of the church entered Korea. Chinese 
priest Zhou Wen-mo arrived in 1795. A half-century later, in 1844, the first two clergymen arrived 
in Korea. Over this period of time, the church experienced rapid growth, with an estimated 4,000 
Korean Catholics in 1795 and 10,000 in 1801; moreover, by 1910, Korea had 69 churches and 71 
priests, including 15 Koreans. At this time, the religion was primarily practiced by the yangban 
class. 
In the mid 1800s, a religious thinking which incorporated aspects of Catholic thinking 
arose, called Tonghuk. In 1894, this thinking led to the Tonghuk Uprising, in which Korean 
peasants rebelled against the Choson dynasty. Due to its relation to Tonghuk, its emphasis of 
loyalty to God over loyalty to king, and its tenets that challenged traditional Confucian customs 
such as ancestor worship, Christianity the Choson dynasty began persecuting Christians. 
Protestantism arrived later than Catholicism, with John Ross visiting the Korean border 
from China in 1874 and 1876, then translating the New Testament into Korean in 1882. In the 
same year, the Treaty of Amity and Commerce with the US opened Korea so missionaries could 
enter as representatives of diplomatic legations or charitable organizations. At the end of the 19th 
century and the beginning of the 20th century, the Protestant Church took on a global focus of 
missionary work, which helped to spread Protestantism in Korea. Missionaries entered Korea, and 
as part of their work, they began the tradition of establishing primary and secondary schools, 
universities, religious schools, and hospitals. By 1905, the Protestant Church had baptized an 
estimated 9,000 Koreans. Part of this growth was due to political cover; the Choson dynasty 
supported limited Protestant church action as a result of Horace Allen saving the life of Queen 
Min’s nephew after the Kapsin Coup in 1884. Moreover, it appealed to the lower classes in Korea’s 
rigid social structure, offering them religion, education, and medicine. One important factor of its 
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growth was its material focus: due to the indigenization process combining it with shamanism and 
Confucian ideas of prayer, Christianity in Korea had a strong this-worldly focus. This 
characteristic of the church exists to this day, with the church owning millions of dollars’ worth of 
assets and many still praying for material prosperity. 
Japan’s occupation of Korea posed a new challenge to Korean Christianity. In 1910, the 
Japanese empire began persecuting Christians in Korea, signified by the Conspiracy Case of 105. 
Specifically, the occupation Japanese government fabricated allegations that Korean citizens, 
many of whom were Christians, had been plotting assassinations attempts, and sentenced 105 
Koreans in an unjust trial. This event stoked anti-Japanese sentiment in the Christian community 
in Korea, and Christians played a disproportionately large role in the March 1, 1919 independence 
movement, both in terms of leadership and proportion of the population arrested. In the war 
mobilization years of occupation, the Japanese government mandated that all Koreans perform 
Shinto shrine worship to the Japanese Emperor, sparking a fierce debate among denominations 
over whether or not to refuse and risk persecution. Moreover, the ‘colonial regime created a state-
controlled church, or Kyodan,’ further stoking anti-Japanese sentiment.3 In short, the Colonial 
period introduced the Christian church to the role of combatting an overbearing government. 
The Protestant church saw a second explosion of growth after the end of World War II. In 
South Korea, the new US-controlled government reversed the suppression of religion and created 
a climate for Western religions to flourish. At the same time, in the north, the Soviet-influenced 
government increased religious persecution, spurring an exodus of Christians to the south. As a 
result of the war, many refugees joined the well-organized church, which provided material and 
social support.4 In fact, due to its organizational strength and relation to the West, the church 
became a primary network for distribution of post-war relief aid.5 This growth culminated in 
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‘between seventy and one hundred denominations and other groupings within the Korean 
Protestant church in the 1970s.’6 
The Protestant church in this period was strongly tied to the authoritarian governments in 
charge. However, a number of liberal Protestant denominations, as well as many Catholics, took 
part in anti-government protests for democracy. Specifically, they entered the movement in the 
1970s, with involvement peaking in the mid 1970s and continuing to a lesser degree into the 1980s, 
as measured by the number of protest events by Christians over that time period. Many believe 
that General Park Chung Hee’s successful attempt to amend the constitution in 1968 to allow for 
him to serve for a third term sparked the beginning of this growth of church involvement.7 
In the political arena after liberation, a disproportionately large number of Korean leaders 
were Christian.8 This dynamic helps explain why the Protestant church was so close to the 
authoritarian government. After the war, the US government supported the church as a social 
organization because it had become a critical conduit for funneling aid to rebuild the nation. As a 
result, those with economic and social capital assumed both church and political leadership. Thus, 
many of the leaders of the church were invested in the government starting under the rule of 
Syngman Rhee. This also created a dynamic where leaders of denominations competed with one 
another, which occasionally engendered factionalism in denominations.9 This dynamic explains 
why ‘only 542 pastors and 831 churches out of 11,582 clergy and 17,793 churches in the Protestant 
community were involved in this activism against the regime.’10 In the context of the pro-
democracy movement, then, the Protestant church as a whole took a passive stance. However, a 
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Social Capital and the Churches’ Organizational Impact  
Today, relational trust in Korea is quite weak. In a measure of generalized trust based on 
survey responses to the question ‘Most people can be trusted,’ only 26.5% of the population 
exhibited positive responses. Of nine sample countries, this rate was second-lowest; for 
comparison, China’s generalized trust rate was 60.3%.11 This demonstrates an important aspect 
about Korean society: most people regard others with suspicion, which both demotivates creating 
coalitions and broad networks and solidifies closed networks. This lack of generalized trust was 
even greater during the post-war era and under Park’s leadership: ‘Traditional rural communities 
were dismantled during the rapid industrialization process, yet the drastic social change was not 
accompanied by a corresponding development of organizational principles suitable for urban and 
modern life.’12 Traditionally, many groups such as local villages outside of the capital provided 
such organizational platforms; however, with industrialization, they could no longer play this role. 
The church filled this vacuum of organizational influence and trust-building institutions. 
In Korea, both Catholicism and Protestantism had a marked impact on social capital. First, 
Catholicism emphasizes charity and philanthropy, thus creating involvement in local communities. 
Protestantism traditionally does as well, though due to its material focus in Korea many 
denominations do not emphasize it to as great of an extent (nevertheless, a subset of denominations 
does emphasize it heavily). Second, both religions have high levels of institutionalization. In 
addition to the incredibly high number of denominations, churches, and members in Korea in the 
1950s-1970s, the churches possessed vast organizational networks. The Protestant church 
controlled around 75% of all colleges and universities, a quarter of high schools, around 100 
hospitals, and radio broadcasting, newspapers, and television stations; the Catholic church had a 
similarly extensive reach. Finally, the Catholic church had significant autonomy from the state, 
98




 99 of 275 
providing the organizational platforms for activism (the Protestant church did not enjoy similar 
autonomy due to its strong ties to the state).13 
General sociological reasoning supports this conclusion that religious institutions influence 
social capital. A meta-analysis of studies of religions in America found that religions create 
organizational environments that teach and put into practice community organizing and leadership 
skills. In addition, as social institutions they foster trusting networks both among youth, and 
between youth and other members of society. Finally, they provide religious organizations that 
focus on specific causes and/or issue groups, creating networks between church members 
(especially youth) and social causes.14 In Korea’s case, these organizations were directly linked to 
the other major groups of protesters: students and labor. Significantly, the historical factionalism 
within the Protestant church created such a large ‘constellation of civil society organizations’ that 
the government struggled to exert total control over pro-democracy activity.15 
This form of autonomy played a particularly important role in shaping pro-democracy 
demonstrations. Due to heavy state repression, many other groups (students, labor, etc.) could not 
access institutions free from the repressive state apparatus. While the Catholic church possessed 
the most autonomy, the Protestant church’s organizational structure also lent it to pro-democracy 
political activism. Historically, church leadership divided the country by region and assigned 
missions to each region, creating divisions between different mission societies as they developed 
identities that in part reflected their local areas as part of the broader indigenization of 
Protestantism in Korea. They were influenced by the broader historical factions such as north 
versus south and political center versus the periphery. The Shinto shrine worship controversy 
further stoked factionalism. The divisions were accentuated after the war because different groups 
– stoked by tensions from historical regional divisions, power changes among church leadership, 
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and the Shinto shrine worship controversy – established their own separate denominations, 
including divisions among educational institutions. As a result, despite the Protestant church’s 
closeness to the government writ large, smaller units of the church had their own forms of 
autonomy from the larger church structure, and thus the state.16 
Other historical events also helped create the dynamic in Korea where the church was 
unique in its role in facilitating social capital necessary for the pro-democracy movement during 
the crackdown in the 1970s. Despite the lack of generalized trust within Korea, church 
denominations created social spaces to develop trust. Moreover, after the war, most international 
relief was channeled through the church, imbuing it with legitimacy in local communities and 
creating networks of people. 
The church was a uniquely important political organization. During the period of intense 
social and political regulation, the church not only provided the space, but also the training, for 
community action: ‘Koreans joined the Protestant church and practiced “Korean politics” … [the] 
church organization attracted politically active Koreans more than other forms did because it 
encouraged the participation of lay members in its pastor-elder sessions, presbyteries, and general 
assemblies.’17 Because the church actively involved the working class, it thus disseminated 
community organizing skills and created networks between members of the working class and 
members of other sectors of society. 
One illustration of the church’s ability to foster trust was the Rhee regime itself. Rhee’s 
government was solidly Christian. The US was only concerned with getting political leadership 
that opposed communism, and not specifically getting Christian leaders in charge. The fact that 
they favored Christians was merely corollary, as many Korean Christians’ were vehemently 
opposed to communism.18 Moreover, the US government simply did not have the capacity to instill 
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Christian leadership to the extent that it existed within the Rhee government. Rather, Rhee’s 
regime favored Christians due to its leadership’s foundation in the church. Because the 
authoritarian rulers could trust the people they knew from the church, they were able to put them 
in power and create an authoritarian regime that would not splinter internally. Again, the church 
as an institution created social networks and trust which spilled over to political organization.  
 
Church Relationships with Students and Youth 
Students made up practically the entirety of the pro-democracy movement in its 
beginnings. The church’s relationship with students and youth influenced how the democracy 
movement grew, including how the church came to take up the cause in the mid-1970s. As 
mentioned earlier, the church provided unique organizational contexts that educated youth, trained 
them in skills like leadership, public speaking, and community organizing, and created social 
networks imbued with trust, thus laying important groundwork for the movement to later arise. 
Moreover, during the period of demonstration the church provided autonomy necessary to continue 
anti-government activity during a period of severe repression. 
Beyond creating the organizational conditions within church activities, the church also 
created broader social conditions that helped give rise to youth social organization. It can certainly 
be said that without the great contributions of the Protestant and Catholic churches in Korea, higher 
learning institutions in the country would not have been as numerous or as autonomous in the 
1960s and 1970s. These ‘schools...and their alumni associations are civil society institutions… 
institutionalizing loyalties and obligations that are far beyond the control of the state.’19 
Many of the church’s programs helped foster such social capital, preceding and during the 
movement. For example, the Ecumenical Youth Council (EYC) demonstrates how church-
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sponsored organizations fostered inter-religious coalitions among youth groups. The EYC is a 
great example of how the church's status made it subversive due to its autonomy, existing outside 
of traditional spaces of protest and legal status. Its creation was distinctly political; its mission was 
to ‘draw upon the potential power of students and youths while moving their activities away from 
the campuses to avoid restrictions set by ED number 4.’20 Other examples of church organizations 
developing ties among youth and between youth and the church are the Korean Student Christian 
Federation, the YMCA, the Seoul District Youth Association of the Presbyterian Church, the 
Christian Church Youth Association, and the Intervarsity Christian Fellowship. Additionally, the 
church fostered social capital among young women, specifically with organizations such as the 
YWCA, Korean Coalition of Christian Women, and Korean Church Women United. This 
development helped broaden relational ties among politically active church members and increase 
political participation. 
The youth social organization the churches fostered in turn spurred their direct involvement 
in the movement because they defended the students from government crackdown. For example, 
in 1975 the government demanded that Dr. Park Tae Sun step down from his post as the head of 
Yonsei University. This action caused church members to join in and support protests by students, 
showing the link between the church and student groups in society. Indeed, Dr. Park expressed his 
gratitude toward the United Board for Christian Higher Education in Korea in New York ‘for all 
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Church Relationships with Labor  
 Many of the church’s labor-associated groups expressed political purposes. For example, 
the Urban Industrial Mission (UIM), a unit of the Protestant National Christian Council, was 
expressly ‘aimed at protecting workers from abuse.’22 These alliances helped the church funnel 
resources - particularly human capital - to the more political groups in the democracy movement. 
As with its relationship with student groups, the churches’ relationship with these organizations in 
turn caused them to become more politically involved in the protest movement due to the relational 
networks they created: ‘Urban Industrial Mission (UIM) ministers and church leaders first 
indirectly learned of the situation from the laborers themselves who attended their churches. They 
then obtained manual labor jobs in order to work alongside laborers and help them organize.’23 
This example shows how the networks formed within the church led to a broadening of the pro-
democracy movement in the form of information dissemination and the church and its members 
getting more involved. Other examples of church organizations developing ties between labor and 
the church are the Seoul Metropolitan Community Organization, the ‘Street Learning Place,’ the 
Social Development Corps of Christian Students, and the Young Catholic Workers. 
The Seoul Metropolitan Community Organization had close ties to the church and 
protested crackdowns on it, again demonstrating the societal web between the church and various 
social groups. This organization, designed to involve church members with lower class issues, 
fostered the human capital necessary for later pro-democracy action because members ‘helped to 
organize the community in order to protect the rights of the poor.’24 This organization fostered ties 
with student groups as well because many Christian students joined the group. The Seoul 
Metropolitan Community Organization exemplifies the ways in which the Church’s organizational 
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structure fostered inter-group solidarity and the human capital necessary for pro-democracy 
protest.25 
Many of these associations with labor also created intersections with youth activists. Night 
schools exemplify this inter-group alliance building. For example, Hyunje Church ran a night 
school, called ‘Street Learning Place.’ With night schools, the church created organizational 
connections not only among students, but also laborers for whom night school was the only option 
for group organization, discussion, deliberation, and interaction. Moreover, this focus on education 
meant the church developed the labor movement’s human capital. 
The Christian Academy is another example of how the church created organizational 
networks and invested in human capital. It was initially created to assist with reconstruction after 
the Korean War (with a specific focus on establishing educational and social programs), again 
demonstrating how the church developed social capital among Korean citizens who would later 
engage in the democracy movement. Moreover, as participation in the democracy movement 
began to include more labor activists, it focused on assisting citizens negatively affected by 
industrialization. Thus, the organization played the role of a support network during the protest 
movement, assisting other groups in their work through both boosting morale and organizational 
support. The director of the organization, Pak Kyongso, explained that the group ‘trained laborers, 
farmers, youth, women, and ministers in the church… [to] raise awareness about democracy for 
all groups in society.’26 This explicit political focus on helping the disadvantaged groups calling 
for democracy shows how the church served as a training ground for grassroots organizing, 
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Societal Subversion: Public Awareness, News Media, and Peaceful Protest 
 Beyond labor and youth, the church influenced grassroots organization via its role as a 
distinguished social institution. In the fight against the government, the church played a vital role 
in countering its propaganda war. Due to both churches’ strong association with anti-communism, 
the government lost its best weapon to use against its enemies: labeling them communists and 
arresting them on the grounds of national security. In addition to imbuing the movements with 
which it was associated with credibility, the church used this reputation to criticize the government 
and perform political activism in such a way that would gradually turn broader segments of society 
against the regime. Many of the subversive tactics the churches employed parallel those taken they 
took during the colonial period, when they provided a platform for nationalists to organize and 
criticize the colonial government.  
 The churches, as institutions, constituted vast informational networks that could be used to 
sway public opinion. As groups such as labor associated with and exerted influence on the policies 
of the churches, they could better politically mobilize. For example, the Christian Broadcasting 
system helped spread stories about repressive labor policies in order to build support for, and 
demystify the fear of, the labor movement.27 Moreover, such informational networks established 
a human rights discourse that framed how people thought about the movement and expressed 
themselves against the regime. 
The churches’ social capital formation, creating social relations and trust, in turn created 
informal informational networks that played this same role as the more established information 
distribution networks. The Human Rights Mission ‘quickly became the central node in the 
Christian network that linked together a variety of other groups, thereby expanding the 
organizational infrastructure of Christian activism.’28 Moreover, it was due to ‘the Thursday Prayer 
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Meeting, the Human Rights Mission, and other Christian organizations, such as the Association of 
Family Members of Prisoners of Conscience, that Christians were able to publicize the stories of 
political prisoners and state torture to the larger public,’ demystifying activists and eliminating 
fears propagated by the regime.29 
Another tactic used by the church to change public opinion and give credibility to labor 
and youth activists was allowing the arrests of its members. Triggered by non-violent modes of 
protest by leaders in both churches, these arrests ‘led to solidarity among many protesting groups 
(who all coalesced around demanding the release of the church leaders) and broadening the base 
of the protest movement by winning the favor of many indifferent members of society who were 
horrified to see the arrests of these peaceful church leaders.’30 Equally important, these protests 
helped to further develop social capital because, as exemplified in the case of the arrest of Bishop 
Daniel Chi, ‘all Catholics automatically became involved… we got much educating done at the 
almost biweekly prayer meetings. In church is where most Koreans learned… about their 
government.’31 These prayer meetings involved testimonies from political prisoners and the 
distribution of the Human Rights Committee’s Human Rights Newsletter, helping educate 
members about various groups involved in the movement. With each arrest, the church provided 
a base of organizational networks to coordinate a public pressure campaign to protest the arrests. 
Moreover, due to the degree of inter-denominational autonomy within the church, the government 
struggled to prevent local communities which had organized in their churches from then 
mobilizing after these arrests in the form of prayer meetings and taking part in the vast 
organizational networks connecting the church to labor and youth. 
An important aspect of this subversion is the physical capital the churches provided. The 
government could not attack worshipers in the same way it attacked student or working-class 
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protesters in the streets. Under the guise of, or in tandem with, religious worship, church members 
could attack the government despite its severe repression. Due to their being powerful institutions, 
the churches provided physical space for other activist groups to meet and organize, as well as 
develop more substantive alliances with other anti-government groups.32 Moreover, many 
churches and cathedrals, most notably the Myŏngdong Cathedral, served as physical sanctuaries 
for protestors fleeing police violence. Beyond direct contact with students and workers, then, the 
churches helped foster anti-government political action due to their institutional structures and 
resulting influence on social relations and information.  
 
Discussion 
The Christian churches, both Protestant and Catholic, played pivotal, changing roles 
throughout the movement. In the mid-1970s, the churches took up the pro-democracy fight when 
the state began to effectively repress the student movement; by the late 1970s, the churches then 
stepped back from this role as the visible face of the movement as it diversified. 
However, in addition to this more visible role making declarations during the 1970s, the 
churches played a substantive role as a support network that helped lay the conditions for, as well 
as greatly assist other groups in, protest. The churches were never the most powerful anti-
governmental force; after all, only a small portion of the Protestant church participated, and the 
Catholic church alone did not have the capacity to exert enough pressure on the regime. In terms 
of anti-government action, the churches alone were extremely limited as one large unified 
institution of Korean society, but their organizational structure helped to facilitate a much broader, 
if weaker, effect promoting the democracy movement at a time when the government was 
succeeding in stamping out the other manifestations of protest. 
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Despite this broader failure to engage in pro-democratic activism, the churches made a 
positive impact on the movement because they fostered social capital, creating networks among 
people, emphasizing civic engagement, and building trust. This dynamic helped shape who the 
protesters were and how they organized. Moreover, these networks spilled over to connect 
components of the movement and protect them during periods of harsh state repression, keeping 
the movement alive and laying the groundwork for its diversification. More specifically, they 
fostered conditions that helped give rise to the student protest preceding their involvement, then 
helped protect students as the government responded. They also helped develop other groups of 
activists, such as labor, and foster intergroup alliances to strengthen the democracy movement. 
Finally, they broadened the movement’s message and helped anti-government groups earn 
society’s trust, creating the conditions for broader public involvement.  
Church-created social networks kept the protest movement alive when a crackdown could 
have otherwise extinguished public activism. In addition, they created ways to keep other societal 
groups involved such that they could continue their fight. These groups then went on to exert more 
pressure in the late 1970s and 1980s after surviving the introduction of the Yusin government 
thanks to the churches. This web of church organizations and informal relations thus played an 
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Abstract 
 According to Dr. Tricia Bacon’s and Dr. Elizabeth Grimm Arsenault’s, “Al Qaeda and the 
Islamic State's Break: Strategic Strife or Lackluster Leadership?,” the “strategic differences 
between Al Qaeda and ISIS were not sufficient to cause the split.” The strife that ensued between 
al Nusra and ISIS caused this complex alliance to rupture.  In “ISIS and al-Qaeda—What Are They 
Thinking? Understanding the Adversary,” Dr. Bernard Haykel states that the jihadi militant 
movements are consequential to the Sunni revivalism experienced in the brutalized Arab politics 
of domestically repressed states from Algeria to Iraq, with groups seeking to empower Muslims 
against Islam’s enemies. Haykel later describes the relationship between ISIS and Al Qaeda as one 
of contentious competition for resources. Motivated by the work of Dr. Bacon and Dr. Haykel, the 
author uniquely addresses the remaining question of whether or not, and under what conditions, 
umbrella networks: ISIS and Al Qaeda, could attempt a merger.    
To ascertain the pragmatism of a potential coalition, various alliance literature has been 
applied into three paradigms; with the first, assessing party coalitions and culture, the second 
addressing the alliance framework from a business perspective, and the third concentrating on 
partnerships and mergers. Moreover, the paper focuses on the aforementioned paradigms and 
various militant group case studies, with a lens that addresses the relational exchange between ISIS 
and Al Qaeda.  
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Introduction 
At its zenith, ISIS’s forces controlled a territory the size of Britain, with approximately 10 
million captives.1 Under encampment, captives, most notably the Yazidis of Iraq and Syria, were 
murdered and enslaved. In 2017, the Iraqi Federal Police reclaimed the city of Mosul, a major 
jihadi encampment. In early February of 2019, Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) 
vowed to dismantle the remaining caliphate. With help from the U.S.-led international coalition, 
numerous warplanes and mortar barrages struck the stronghold (see figure 1). Now, with the last 
Syrian city of Baghouz under siege by the SDF, optimistic citizens may be naïve enough to assume 
that war on the global jihad is over. As CNN Journalist Ben Wedeman notes, “While some may 
be tempted to celebrate what is seen as ISIS’s demise, the fertile soil in which ISIS grew and spread 
is still there.”2 With a large base of online followers, potential lone-wolf attackers, and militants 
working underground to conduct hit-and-run attacks and bombings in Iraq and central Syria, the 
fight is far from over. One question remains, will the caliphate’s setback be enough to reunite long-
term, rivals: ISIS and Al Qaeda?  
To better understand whether ISIS and Al Qaeda will likely re-unite, various alliance 
literature has been applied and assessed into three paradigms; with the first, assessing party 
coalitions and culture, the second addressing the alliance framework from a business perspective, 
and the third, concentrating on partnerships and mergers. According to the party coalitions and 
culture literature, ethnic groups are more likely to coalesce when they have shared cultural history, 
while the business alliance framework suggests that mergers are formed through delicate 
cultivation of synergy and pragmatic power-sharing. Moreover, the partnership and merger criteria 
claim that alliances are formed when groups converge on the basis of ideology. With this 
understanding in mind, the paper assesses the various paradigms and case studies of militant 
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groups with a lens that addresses the relational exchange between ISIS and Al Qaeda. Referring 
to the aforementioned literary framework, the findings indicate that diverging operational 
structures and a failure to coincide ideological goals, prevents ISIS and Al Qaeda from reuniting.  
 
Background: The Partnership’s Initial Demise 
In 1996, Osama bin Laden announced the first fatwa against the U.S.  A synthesis 
conducted by the RAND Corporation has highlighted that a recent “switch from hard to soft targets 
and from mass casualty to smaller, but more frequent attacks; an increased focus on the economic 
impact of attacks; [and] greater efficiency in the utilization of loose networks,” has characterized 
Al Qaeda’s strategy.3  Subsequent to the 9/11 attacks, Al Qaeda lost its secure base in Afghanistan 
underpaid protection by the Taliban. Its senior and mid-level commanders were targeted due to 
increased security, creating a catch 22, whereby future planned ‘spectaculars’ would become 
unparalleled. As explained by Rabasa et al. in “Beyond Al-Qaeda: The Global Jihadist 
Movement,” Al Qaeda depends heavily on the subcontracting of militant groups as a de facto force 
multiplier, “a consequence of the aforementioned loss of haven and leadership—al-Qaeda has been 
forced to increasingly rely on other terrorist groups who are in some way connected to the network 
to conduct its attacks.” 
According to Rabasa et. al, these outsourced and ongoing attacks, sponsored by 
subcontracted militant groups, “ensure that the group continued to be viewed as both vibrant and 
relevant, they also helped to underscore an image of the network as being able to strike at will 
around the globe.” Under the patronage of the Taliban, Al Qaeda received a safe haven to train 
militants, indoctrinate them, and simultaneously conduct effective attacks. However, the strategic 
transition from an identifiable operative core to a loose network of subcontracted militants is in 
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part reflective of less capable assets and infrastructure (see figure 3). Al Qaeda has now reverted 
“to other established terrorist affiliates to conduct attacks but also to operate in a more 
decentralized, cellular fashion.”3 More recently, Rabasa found that the creation of the virtual jihad 
and various urban training camps has allowed this network to prevail, igniting a second-generation 
“wave of terrorism in Morocco, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, [and] Turkey [that]… is still able to 
conduct effective attacks despite the loss of training bases in Afghanistan (p. 43).” In addition to 
using American and European converts for their passports and undetected access through security, 
Al Qaeda has diversified its resource base beyond the financial assistance it receives from states 
within the Gulf. Apart from receiving donations from jihad’s numerous supporters, Al Qaeda also 
commits online fraud and infiltrates charities.  Prior to the U.S.’s international coalition against 
terrorism, Al Qaeda’s central core of senior elites would engage in years of operational planning 
for ‘spectacular’ attacks. In place of conducting these large-scale, complex ‘spectaculars’, strikes 
have become smaller and more localized attempts to resuscitate the jihadi cause as part of a global 
franchise. Al Qaeda’s affiliates have enough endowment to “make operational decisions on their 
own,” employing shortened planning cycles and bombarding soft targets.”4 
There were many similarities between ISIS and Al Qaeda, as they are now both parent 
organizations. However, it was not until drastic disagreements in strategy, approach, and 
recruitment, initiated their split in the wake of 2014. It was under the mature mediation of Al Qaeda 
leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri that relations between Al Qaeda and the then-AQI branch were 
beneficial. Today, the two rival entities compete within the same network of donors, suppliers, and 
resources for the “soul” of the jihadist movement. To understand what caused this stringent divide, 
we must assess the fundamental differences in tactics between the parent organizations. Osama 
bin Laden’s effective leadership aligned a terrorist network that amassed rebel groups for the 
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global jihadist cause. As the radical son of Saudi elites, Osama bin Laden sought to unite a network 
of independent, dilettante jihadist fighters with the greater goal of removing their foreign enemy, 
the United States, from the Middle Eastern region. Militant groups, subdued by oppressive 
regimes, were swept under Al Qaeda’s umbrella with a myriad of assets, weapons, expertise, 
training, and funding. However, the death of bin Laden would prove detrimental to the unity of 
this terrorist network. Unlike bin Laden’s elitist goal to destabilize the West, Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi believed the principal enemies of the jihadist movement were Shiites for their false 
interpretation of Islamic theology and Sunni apostates for their support of the West and corrupt 
Arab rulers. 
At the pinnacle of the U.S.’s invasion into Iraq in 2003, bin Laden lent money to Abu 
Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the initial Iraqi Islamic Caliphate, with hopes that he would join Al 
Qaeda’s network (see figure 2). Although initially reluctant, Zarqawi fastened to bin Laden’s 
network and formed Al Qaeda’s Iraq branch or “AQI”. From the initial phase of this partnership, 
there were immediate differences in perspectives, while Zawahiri and bin Laden focused on an 
anti-West agenda, Zarqawi saw more promise in fighting sectarian wars and Sunni Muslim 
apostates. In public, bin Laden and Zawahiri embraced this relationship, but it was clear Al Qaeda 
had absorbed more than it could handle. This became evident when AQI’s violence towards Sunnis 
provoked their backlash and subsequent partnership with American ground troops. Bin Laden was 
advised by Al Qaeda spokesman, Adam Gadahn, to sever its ties with AQI, “because of the group’s 
sectarian violence.”5 When the Syrian civil war broke in 2011, then-AQI leader, Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi, sent fighters to Syria to establish a base organization. Although AQI’s strategic move 
to send operations to Syria had revived their Iraqi jihadist movement, it ultimately prepared for 
their secession from Al Qaeda’s main leadership. In charge of connecting the then-parent and child 
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organizations, Zawahiri let AQI take the reins and build its own name in Syria. When the former- 
AQI sect coined the name “Jabhat al-Nusra,” Zawahiri tried to correct the situation by claiming Al 
Qaeda’s affiliation, but Baghdadi refused, causing the inevitable demise of the partnership in 2014.  
Almost overnight, Baghdadi’s forces gained significant territory in Iraq, including strategic 
access to Syria, hydroelectric dams, and lucrative oil refineries. By July of 2014, Baghdadi 
renamed his operations as the Islamic Caliphate. Perplexed, Al Qaeda member branches were 
declaring their support for ISIS but Zawahiri understood that Al Qaeda would no longer take 
center-stage in the global jihadist movement. Primarily, Al Qaeda believed apostate killing sprees 
were inconclusive to extracting the “root cause” of the Middle Eastern problem, the U.S. Al Qaeda 
believed that the U.S.’s continued support for corrupt regimes within the Middle East prevented 
the necessary uprisings for regime change. Essentially, while Al Qaeda focused on the “far 
enemy,” ISIS prioritized the “near enemy,” such as the Assad regime in Syria and the Abadi regime 
in Iraq. Additionally, while Al Qaeda collaborates within and outside its terrorist network, the 
Islamic Caliphate chose to spearhead its organization and remain independent. ISIS uses amateur 
lone-wolf attackers, targeted by jihadist propaganda to incentivize recruitment. While ISIS 
consolidates power through expanding territories and coalesced armies, Al Qaeda believed a 
caliphate was a long-term goal only to be initiated with popular support. Since ISIS originated its 
power during the civil uprisings in Iraq and Syria, it takes a militaristic approach with mass forces 
and artillery. Using fear-enticed displays of public beheadings, rape, and crucifixions, ISIS 
terrorizes populations into their compliance and conversion. Keeping in mind these distinctions, 
it’s clear that Baghdadi grew tired of Al Qaeda’s slow and steady pace. Moreover, the age 
difference between the leaders of the two organizations spans the length of twenty years. In 
addition to differences in tactics, approach, and strategy, ISIS utilizes Twitter, Facebook, and 
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Instagram to attract the attention of younger, distraught Muslim males. The Islamic State has 
become the deviant successor group that stemmed and evolved from Al Qaeda but ultimately 
changed its mission, utilizing brutalist militarized warfare and modernized methods of recruitment. 
According to Byman and Williams, “ideologically, the sectarianism [ISIS] foments is worsening 
Shia-Sunni tension throughout the region. So the Islamic State is a much bigger threat to Middle 
Eastern stability than Al Qaeda ever was.”6 
 
Consulted Literature 
According to Dr. Bernard Haykel’s, “ISIS and al-Qaeda—What Are They Thinking? 
Understanding the Adversary,” the jihadi militant movements are consequential to the Sunni 
revivalism experienced in the brutalized Arab politics of domestically repressed states from 
Algeria to Iraq, with the two groups seeking “to empower Muslims against what they describe as 
Islam’s enemies, both external and internal.”7 Haykel describes the relationship between ISIS and 
Al Qaeda as one of contentious competition for resources. As Haykel explains, though the two 
groups initially split through differences in approach and, “despite some ideological and 
operational differences, both Al Qaeda and ISIS tap into a deep vein of resentment, 
disillusionment, and disenfranchisement, specifically among the Sunni Arabs.” Haykel laments 
that Al Qaeda’s more elitist view on jihadism’s radical crusade over the West was less relevant to 
Zarqawi’s Sunni followers, who were mobilized on the ground. Over time, Al Qaeda’s lack of 
reoccurring ‘spectacular’ threats dimmed its extensive vision, making it “less appealing over time 
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Party Coalitions and Culture 
In Okamoto’s article, “Organizing across Ethnic Boundaries in the Post–Civil Rights Era: 
Asian American Panethnic Coalitions,” she discusses the creation of a pan-ethnic Asian American 
Alliance due to initial insensitive threats towards Chinese Americans. Over time, these remarks 
were marketed as a threat to all Asians, allowing for the larger goal of collective movement 
activity. This shared alliance was first used to combat high-levels of imposing anti-Asian violence 
and sentiment. Eventually, the shared cultural history was utilized to broaden pan-ethnic Asian 
issues, forming a cross-ethnic coalition. As Okamoto explains,  “cross-ethnic coalition events 
demonstrate that organizations with different interests, goals, and histories can effectively 
coordinate their efforts for a common cause.”8  
Okamoto outlines the various conditions that encourage groups to form organizational 
alliances across ethnic boundaries. The conditions include broadening social forces, sharing racial 
ideology, influential leaders molding group interests, powerful counter-movements with restrictive 
legislation, and threats to these organizational movements. Additionally, Okamoto explains the 
“Resource Hypothesis and Competition Theory,” whereby a coalition will form only under 
noncompetitive conditions when resources are plentiful. She clarifies that “when racial groups are 
in competition for scarce resources, racial boundaries are heightened, and coalitions, between 
different Asian ethnic groups should be more likely.” To test this hypothesis, Okamoto uses a data 
set of 393 collective action events involving Asian-Americans in thirty metropolitan areas from 
1970 to 1998. The author defines a cross-ethnic coalition as a “coordination of efforts between two 
or more organizations that serve different ethnic populations in the Asian American community.” 
In relaying Okamoto’s research to this paper, her “Resource Hypothesis and Competition Theory” 
are instrumental in setting the groundwork for Al Qaeda and ISIS’s potential alliance and 
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competition framework. If this is correct, ISIS’s current setbacks and loss of its caliphate could 
level the ‘playing field’ for a coalitional occurrence between the two rival organizations.  
 
Business Alliances 
According to Wiklund’s and Shepherd’s article, “The Effectiveness of Alliances and 
Acquisitions: The Role of Resource Combination Activities,” the potential value of an alliance or 
acquisition that combines resources, “depends on the ability of the firm to discover and conduct 
productive resource combinations.”9 The authors list examples wherein the alliance or acquisition 
was short-lived or less profitable than first assumed. One such example includes the strategic 
alliance between Apple and IBM in 1992 to create a joint operating system, called Taligent. 
Despite intentions of success, the alliance dissolved after failed attempts to merge. Although, 
“examples of alliances and acquisitions that fail to deliver on the intended synergies are mounting, 
yet they are vigorously pursued by companies around the globe.”10 Not only do firms differ in their 
resource portfolios but they vary in their ability to achieve the synergistic benefits of bundling 
resources. Moreover, resource-sharing significantly impacts the alliance framework, “the value 
creating potential of the resource portfolio increases when the resources acquired are 
complementary to the existing ones—the joint use of existing and acquired resources can yield a 
higher total value than the use of each set of resources independently.”11 Therefore, achieving 
synergy takes more than complementary resources, it requires a realized valuation and full 
exploitation of the resource. A streamlined focus on value creation is an incomplete understanding 
of the complementary resource’s potential performance. For their study, Wiklund and Shepherd 
focused on the integration of resource bundling “to realize the potential value of the 
complementarities.” As they explain, “…productive performance outcomes [depend] on the extent 
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to which management engages in activities that [bundle] them together within the firm’s resource 
portfolios.”  
Wiklund and Shepherd arrived at three hypotheses, whereby one demonstrates the 
comparable application to the expounding research on terrorist network alliances. According to 
the authors, “The more an international firm conducts resource combination activities, the more 
positive the relationship between (a) engaging in international alliances and performance, and (b) 
engaging in international acquisitions and performance.” To test their hypotheses, the authors 
investigated 319 small firms and assessed their resource combination activities to ascertain the 
effectiveness of alliances and acquisitions. With these hypotheses in mind, the employment of 
successful resource sharing activities could resemble the inner-workings of a vast terrorist 
network.  
In the “Five Principles to Business Alliances,” Hughes and Weiss outline five key aspects 
to keep in mind when aligning and merging business organizations. Their first point emphasizes 
describing the desired relationship, “focus less on defining the business plan and more on how 
you’ll work together.”12 This includes a detailed business plan and contract, deciding how the two 
organizations will interact to better clarify the nature of the partners’ working relationship. In terms 
of collaboration, firms must know how their counterparts operate, including organizational 
structure, policies and procedures, and cultural norms to later ensure mutual trust and respect. The 
second point explains that firms should “develop metrics pegged not only to alliance goals but also 
to alliance progress.” Frameworks for alliances should include shared goals such as: increased 
revenue, reduced costs, gains in market share, and the like. Alliance performances should also be 
measured in terms of “ends” and “means.” The “ends” measurement indicates financial value 
while the “means” measurement includes the various processes necessary to conduct information 
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sharing, speed of decision making, and the development of new ideas. It is also essential to 
highlight the differing expectations and qualitative measures of alliance progress in monthly 
audits. Without measuring these pay-offs, resources such as time, effort, and investment may be 
better deployed elsewhere.  
The author’s third point suggests that “instead of trying to eliminate differences, [firms 
should] leverage them to create value.” According to Hughes and Weiss, “companies ally because 
they have key differences they want to leverage—different markets, customers, know-how, 
processes, and cultures.” By minimizing the conflict of highlighting differences, companies can 
focus on reaching agreements. Oftentimes conflict “arises from deep discomfort with differences 
and assumptions that the same management strategies would work with external partners.” Firms 
should utilize these unique competencies to “leverage complementary strengths and assets.” The 
authors also explain that firms can sometimes be indecisive “bureaucratic dinosaurs,” upsetting 
more “nimble” operational types. Although these behavioral differences can become incompetent 
and untrustworthy, once these firms acknowledge their areas of strength and weakness, they can 
effectively respect their differences in a power-sharing structure. Moreover, firms should “go 
beyond formal governance structures to encourage collaborative behavior.” By nurturing and 
fostering collaborative behavior throughout the chain of command, firms can promote equal 
accountability, whereby the firms “develop dispassionate analysis of how both parties contributed 
to problems that arise in the interdependent relationship.”  
Lastly, the authors explain that “companies are not monolithic, yet alliance advice tends to 
gloss over this basic reality and treat partners as if they were simple, homogeneous entities.” The 
largest barriers to effective alliances include, “mixed messages, broken commitments, and 
unpredictable, inconsistent behavior from different segments of a partner organization.” Firms 
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should devote time to understanding their counterpart’s business culture and “defining the rules of 
engagement for guided interactions.” Additionally, firms must ensure that different branches don’t 
have varying levels of willingness to invest and cooperate with the counterpart.  In an example, 
the authors discovered that most executives negotiate firm alliances but “true buy-in from other 
parts of the enterprise had never been secured.”  
In referencing, “Five Principles to Business Alliances,” it is important to keep in mind, that 
both ISIS and Al Qaeda have different bureaucratic structures, which initially ignited their split. 
While Al Qaeda is more of a “bureaucratic dinosaur,” calculably planning and weighing the pros 
and cons of ‘spectaculars,’ ISIS appears to be nimbler with its usage of ‘lone-wolf’ attackers. This 
represents a difference in strategy that would have to be considered in terms of creating a power-
sharing structure.  
 
Partnerships and Mergers  
In “Approaching Merger: The Converging Public Policy Agendas of the AFL and CIO, 
1938–1955,” Cornfield and McCammon assess the eventual merging of the AFL and CIO despite 
initial apprehension on both sides. The Labor Federation was known for promoting its broad public 
policy agenda on social welfare, labor law, employment policy, international trade, public 
education, and other public policies in federal and state legislatures. Both federations subscribed 
to these public policy objectives before the merger, as evidenced in the wide-ranging resolution 
introduced at their conventions. In converging their ideological goals, “the merger was expected 
to concentrate, rather than to disperse, efforts in support of favorable legislation.”13 In citing 
Gregory Maney’s, “Transnational Mobilization and Civil Rights in Northern Ireland,” the authors 
argue that the combined working unity of the groups was achieved due to the initial “ideological 
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congruence between movement organizations.”14 Moreover, “for coordinated action to occur, 
groups must have a certain degree of overlapping interests, goals, and core beliefs.”15  
As Steven Barkan explains in his 1986 Civil Rights Movement study, “groups with 
pronounced disagreements over policy goals will rarely come together and work jointly to achieve 
social change.”16 Interestingly enough, before the eventual merging of the AFL and CIO, the two 
parties had incomparable differences in organizational structure that led to unsuccessful 
partnership efforts. “In the years before the 1950s, conflicts between the AFL and CIO over 
organizational philosophy, union jurisdictions, membership recruitment, and public policy goals, 
as well as personality conflicts among labor leaders, led to several abortive merger efforts 
(Seidman 1956).”17 By studying the agenda from organizational conferences, Cornfield and 
McCammon found that “…a shift in the ideological orientation of one of the groups that entailed 
a broadening in the AFL’s policy agenda and its widening embrace of the emerging New Deal 
welfare state set the stage for organizational merger.” In layman’s terms, the AFL widened its 
policy agenda to pave a path for the CIO’s shift in ideological orientation. Moreover, the authors 
discovered that prior to the merger, the AFL had been increasingly criticized for its lack of 
aggressive organizing and less inclusive model, in comparison to the CIO’s “industrial unionism, 
in which all production workers of a single industry, regardless of occupation and skill level, 
belonged to one union.” It appears that years of insurgency within the AFL’s structure led to the 
eventual merging of the separate groups in 1955. During the period of tension that lasted from 
1938 to 1955, the legislative goals of both the AFL and CIO had increasingly coincided. Overall, 
Cornfield and McCammon note that “the growing convergence in the public policy goals of the 
two federations resulted mainly from a broadening of the range of public policy domains of interest 
to the AFL.” 
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 In assessing this source for its application to the terrorist alliance framework, there exists 
a connection between organizational structures, combined working unity, and ideological 
congruence, to determine the merging of ISIS and Al Qaeda. When comparing ISIS to Al Qaeda, 
it appears that one may have to relinquish its bureaucratic structure and less nimble approach to 
provide for the acquisition of the other, unless coinciding goals are identified.  
 
Research Design 
In comprehending the conditions for merger among militant groups, case study 
applications have been utilized to provide a historical context to this qualitative research study. By 
honing in on these applications, one can better understand the situational rationale that causes 
radical groups to unite and join forces. For the purpose of this study, two militant group networks, 
the HuJI and HuM of Pakistan and India and the FARC, ELN, and EPL of  Columbia have been 
analyzed and applied to the aforementioned literature with the goal of ascertaining the conditions 
in which ISIS and Al Qaeda would likely unite.   
 
Militant Group Case Studies 
The HuJI & HuM Militant Groups 
According to Dr. Haykel, despite the recent loss of territory, "reuniting would mean that 
IS members have to give up on the idea of the caliphate." However, after consulting various case 
studies, it appears that militant groups capriciously end and mend their relationships, proposing a 
deviation from the pragmatism suggested by the business alliance literature. Upon completing a 
case study for the HuJI and HuM militant groups of Pakistan, Khurshchev Singh’s article, “HuJI 
in India: An Assessment,” explained that the mujahideen forces were “created by the United States 
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and Pakistan to fight against the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan during 1979–1989.”18 In 1985, 
the Harkat-ul-Jihadi Islami or HuJI splintered into two groups, the HuJI and the Harkat-ul-
Mujahideen (HuM), led by Fazlur Rehman Khalil. After Soviet withdrawal in 1989, the HuM’s 
predominant focus was on the annexation of the Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) regions, aligning with 
the radical Deobandi teachings of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, which advocates for a strong pan-
Islamic ideology in India.19 In 1993, Pakistani General, Pervez Musharraf helped to unite HuM 
and HuJI, forming the Harkat-ul-Ansar or HuA. “While HuM was fully involved in terrorist attacks 
in J&K, the HuJI was not that active,” causing their eventual split again, in 1997.20 Additionally, 
multiple subgroups were formed as different networks and recruits were identified in various areas 
across Southeast Asia.  
By 1992, “HuJI-B” or the Bangladeshi subgroup, was supported by the efforts of Pakistan’s 
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Al Qaeda under the leadership of Osama bin Laden. 
Subsequent to Farooq Kashmiri assuming leadership of the HuM in February of 2000, former 
members established an off-shoot group, Jaish-e-Muhammad, led by Maulana Masood Azhar (see 
figure 4). According to Peter Chalk, an expert on terrorism at the RAND  Corporation, “although 
these groups remain organizationally distinct and exhibit subtle ideological and theological 
differences, they are characterized by an overlapping membership that variously reflects personal 
ties, a common anti-Indian agenda, and shared experiences in overseas militant training camps.”21 
In addition to being offshoots, various external groups, including the “LeT, JeM, and HuM – have 
been directly linked to bin Laden’s transnational terror network.”22  
In terms of goals and operations, Khurshchev Singh explains that because the group has 
various subunits in different countries, multiple objectives and activities have been identified. 
Although the HuJI was initially created to serve Afghan mujahideen camps during the Soviet-
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Afghan War; today, their general mission is to provide defense for Muslims, spread destabilizing 
terrorism, and wage jihad in captured territories with the hopes of establishing Islamic rule.  While 
their various outfits differ in operation within their respective locations, HuJI –Pakistan, HuJI-
Bangladesh and India, don’t appear to clash in their general objectives, as they are operating from 
separate locations. Moreover, although the various subgroups have well-developed networks and 
donors, they do not look to outbid each other. This is unlike the competitive behavior of the ISIS-
Al Qaeda relationship, which has been witnessed within the scholarly community and previously 
mentioned by Dr. Haykel.  
 
Símon Bolívar’s CGSB and Member Guerrilla Groups: FARC, ELN, and EPL  
The Armed Forces of the Columbian Revolution, or FARC, originally formed in 1966 as a 
communist consolidation of proletariat defense militia, whose groups dated back to the prior 
decade.  The FARC-dominated territory became known as an “independent republic,” under 
President Guillermo León Valencia, who coined the term “Tirofijo,” to describe the rogue state 
that was predominantly “neglected by the national government and plagued by general 
lawlessness.”23 During La Violencia, the Colombian Civil War that waged between the 
conservative and liberal parties between 1948 and 1958, the FARC strengthened its ties with the 
Marxist-led Communist Party based on its disillusionment with the liberal party. Due to the 
deliquesce of the Soviet Union, the FARC received a major truncation in its financing. Moreover, 
its reliance on Marxism provoked a rather anachronistic reputation. Therefore, the FARC began to 
rely heavily on the guerrilla warfare tactics of kidnapping for ransom, receiving protection rents 
for illegal drug development and extorting businesses. As Harvey F. Kline explains in “Chronicle 
of a Failure Foretold: The Peace Process of Colombian President Andrés Pastrana,” this strategy 
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merely funded the militant group’s efforts and expansion; however, it “did not win them new 
sympathizers (Kline, 2007, p. 11).” 
The promotion of FARC’s Marxist ideology lost touch with public support as the U.S. 
government increased its sponsorship of the Colombian military, however, this did not negatively 
impact its enlargement of territory and recruitment. FARC began attacking soft targets, “engaging 
in actions that harmed civilians, such as land mines and the notoriously inaccurate gas-cylinder 
bombs, hijacking commercial jets, assassinating elected officials, murdering peace activists, and 
attacking an upscale family recreation center in the heart of Bogotá.”24 Moreover, at its zenith 
FARC drew in a profit of approximately $600 million from its illegal drug trade, kidnappings, and 
extortion schemes.25  
When the Army of National Liberation or ELN was officially formed in 1964 by a group 
of left-wing radical Catholic students, they were inspired by Marxist ideology and the Cuban 
Revolution. The ELN included a democratic approach to structure, instituting operational meetings 
to elect position-holders. Initially, the ELN refrained from interfering with the drug trade but after 
witnessing its lucrative value, the ELN began engaging in kidnappings and the pilfering of oil 
pipelines. According to Kline, “some of the group asked for and obtained military training and 
began a series of discussions about a foco (focus) strategy for Colombia.”26 Moreover, the ELN 
focused on targeting the coal and oil sector through its kidnapping and extortion stratagem. In the 
1990s, ELN suffered from a loss in territory due to increased governmental security. Additionally, 
U.S. interference in the Colombian military and investment of its energy sector impacted the 
ELN’s funding and recruitment.      
The Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL, Popular Liberation Army) was established in 
1967 as an armed and Mao-influenced subsect of the Colombian Communist Party. Akin to the 
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ELN, the EPL also operated out of Santander, “an area of the country traditionally affected by 
disputes over land between landless campesinos and large landowners,” rendering it vulnerable to 
extortion.27 By the 1970s the EPL utilized kidnapping and extortion efforts to finance its militant 
endeavors. Within the same decade, the M-19 was formed by recusants dismissed by the 
Communist Party and the FARC. Although the M-19 was initially considered a subsidiary urban 
guerrilla group, its kidnaping and murder of the National Labor Federation’s leader in 1976 
established its claim to fame. By 1990 both the EPL and M-19 entered into peace talks with the 
Colombian government, allowing for demobilization and disarmament. As a result of this 
agreement, the former guerrilla groups became legal political parties. The M-19 became the 
Alianza Democrática M-19 and the EPL became Esperanza, Paz y Libertad, although a minority 
of its members maintained militancy. 
Under President Belisario Betancur in 1984, a Peace Commission was formed to address 
the guerrilla group activity. According to Kline, Betancur believed involvement in guerrilla groups 
was “the product of objective circumstances of poverty, injustice, and the lack of opportunities for 
political participation.” Although Betancur reached an agreement between the FARC and EPL, the 
ELN had not signed the peace treaty.28 The next year, in 1985, “the peace was punctuated by 
breaches of the ceasefire committed by both sides.”29 In 1987, subsequent attempts by the 
government under then-President Barco had failed to reach an agreement that would result in the 
disarming and dissolving of the militant groups. Under President César Gaviria, the FARC, ELN, 
and EPL “entered a coalition through a Coordinadora guerrillera Símon Bolívar (CGSB, Simon 
Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinator) in 1987.”30 The CGSB banded together within the same Communist 
agenda, operating within Colombia to attack lucrative oil rigs.”31 The coalition mainly formed 
based off akin doctrine and the collective objective of expanding monetarized and militarized 
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support. Moreover, the groups stem from the same recruitment of the rural poor to combat 
Colombia’s wealthy class and oppose U.S. influence. It’s important to keep in mind that the FARC, 
ELN, and EPL formed relatively around the same time period of the 1960s with a fundamental 
Communist agenda. While the ELN was more politically motivated and ideologically focused due 
to its founding by Catholic students, the FARC initially took a more militant and guerrilla warfare 
based approach. Although the FARC is considered less unified, it does incorporate a central 
command despite having various factions due to the different operating areas.32  
In a similar fashion to Al Qaeda’s more recent subcontracting of rebel groups in homage 
to the jihadist global mission, the FARC, EPL, and ELN relied on recycling their militant recruits. 
The CGSB was an effort to consolidate the various groups under one potential power-structure. 
Had it not been for U.S. sponsorship of the Colombian military and the repeated governmental 
efforts for peace treaties, the CGSB likely would have remained. However, while the global jihad 
expands over countries from Afghanistan to India, the militant groups aligned within the CGSB 
only operate in one country. However, these militant groups do form their own de facto states 
within conquered territories, acting as separate entities within Colombia.  
 
Expositions 
In a brief interview with the Director of the Institute for Transregional Study of the 
Contemporary Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia at Princeton University, Dr. Bernard 
Haykel, answered questions that addressed the framework for a possible merger between ISIS and 
Al Qaeda (AQ) forces. In response, he stated that he sees “AQ and IS as competitors and reuniting 
would mean that IS members have to give up on the idea of the caliphate, which is not easy to do. 
Certain individuals in IS might reunite with AQ and give up on the institution of the caliph, but 
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both organizations have been severely weakened and incapacitated. This is because so many of 
their members have been killed or imprisoned and also because their political projects have failed 
to bring about the victory that they keep promising to deliver. In my mind, the constitutive elements 
that feed global jihadism are still very much present in the region (the poverty, overpopulation, 
environmental degradation, lack of opportunity, high expectations and relative deprivation, state 
brutalization and the overall disenfranchisement of Sunni Arabs in Iraq and Syria), but at the same 
time countries like Saudi Arabia have given up their funding and support of all forms of Islamism 
and are now engaged in a campaign of suppression of these activists.” As outlined in Haykel’s 
quote, there is a contentious competition between ISIS and AQ for resources within the region. 
Various operational goals have been identified, which prevents the two jihadi militant groups from 
attempting a merger.  
Mr. Asslan Sayyar, the Defense Program Director for South Asia at the United States 
Central Command (CENTCOM), has reviewed and provided his perspective on the paper’s 
research question. In his comments, he agreed with Dr. Haykel that ISIS and Al Qaeda engage in 
continuous outbidding with each other for resources, making themselves more attractive to 
potential donors and recruits. The groups compete to gain maximum exposure and funding. Mr. 
Sayyar believes reuniting likely will not be an option unless ISIS was immensely desperate. He 
claims that although the physical caliphate is in the process of its eradication, the mental and more 
virtual platform is one that’s still very much present. Upon acknowledging the aforementioned 
business alliance literature, Mr. Sayyar argued that “mergers tend to happen when survival is more 
important than growth and for ISIS, it’s not there yet.” Therefore, the research findings now beg 
the question: has ISIS been defeated enough to concede and join forces with Al Qaeda, similar to 
the amalgamation between the AFL and CIO? 
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Analysis 
In applying the aforementioned literature to terrorist network research, Al Qaeda and ISIS 
are both international organizations, having multiple franchises in different areas throughout 
Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and the Maghreb. The effectiveness of their umbrella networks 
should be assessed based on how well they incorporate resource endowments and moderate their 
independent branch activities. The initial demise that limited the working relationship of Al Qaeda 
and its branch in Iraq (AQI), rests in the fact that Bin Laden assumed the homogeneity of the two 
groups. Bin Laden surmised that AQI, under Baghdadi’s leadership, would support Al Qaeda’s 
strategic operational structure and its overall view to destabilize the West. However, time would 
prove that Al Qaeda and its branch in Iraq, which later reassembled to form modern-day ISIS, had 
differing “ends” and “means,” referencing to the aforementioned business alliance literature. For 
Al Qaeda, its “means” of steady information-sharing for strategic mission operations justified its 
securement of an “ends” in financial support, increased recruitment, and dynamic network 
structures. However, ISIS subscribed to a more incompatible and stark nature, whereby its 
“means” of brutal and terrorizing attacks, fortified an “ends” of increased Islamic territory and on-
ground impairment of corrupt Arab regimes and Sunni apostates. In referencing Okamoto’s, 
“Resource Hypothesis and Competition Theory,” wherein coalitions form under noncompetitive 
conditions with plentiful resources; as Haykel explains, conditions are competitive and resources 
are dwindling. Not only have these operational differences become more apparent through the 
application of the literature but both groups maintain different working structures. Moreover, while 
ISIS’s network remains loose and nimble, Al Qaeda is more bureaucratic and disciplined in nature. 
Therefore, a potential coalition is not likely to form under the party coalition and business alliance 
standpoints. 
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Through careful inspection of the literature, the business alliance framework relevantly 
compares to the intertwining networks and motivations of terrorist organizations. One contention 
lies within the party coalition literature, which suggests that groups of similar cultural background 
would be most compatible for a potential merger.  Although ISIS and Al Qaeda are predominantly 
Sunni organizations, they’ve previously targeted operatives on both sides, potentially damaging 
the grounds for a working relationship. Therefore, in accordance with the literature, pertaining to 
business alliances, partnerships and mergers, and party coalitions, ISIS and Al Qaeda still differ in 
their goals, operations, and approach, failing to coincide ideological goals and operational 
structures. While ISIS prefers brutally terrorizing civilians to amass territory for an Islamic 




As discussed and referenced in the business alliance literature, Al Qaeda initially failed to 
assess for shared goals within its acquired branch in Iraq, or AQI. Al Qaeda assumed ISIS would 
utilize the same strategies and operational tactics when it first assumed Baghdadi’s group in Iraq. 
While some alliance frameworks may assess these jihadi militant organizations as homogeneous 
entities, they ultimately differ in their operational nature, as supported by the business alliance 
literature. Although ISIS and Al Qaeda may stem from the same radical Islamic network, they vary 
in their “ends” and “means” approach to the goal of the global jihad. While Al Qaeda utilizes 
precise and calculated decision-making operations to increase network expansion and financial 
sponsorship, ISIS employs brutalized guerrilla warfare tactics under a centralized hub to expand 
territory and recruitment. Most recently, ISIS, under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, has 
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released propaganda videos through social media in attempt to revitalize the jihadi network despite 
the recent loss in caliphate due to increased security in the region.33   
In conclusion, while Al Qaeda utilizes its calculable operational planning cycle to 
effectively engage in offensive attacks, ISIS prefers on-ground, brutal warfare tactics to amass 
territories.  This diverging operational structure, paired with a failure to coincide ideological goals, 
maintains that the two terrorist organizations will not likely reunite. In the example of the HuJI 
off-shoots from Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh, these groups do not compete as they are operating 
and recruiting from separate locations. In a similar fashion, the FARC and ELN did not compete 
despite their fundamental communist agenda because they recruited members from different socio-
economic classes. While the FARC recruited destressed campesinos from the rural parts of 
Colombia, the ELN focused on urban, educated dwellers. Moreover, the CGSB was able to 
converge these akin doctrines under a centralized power-structure due to this initial lack of 
competition. Unlike the FARC and ELN, regional conditions between ISIS and Al Qaeda have 
been competitive as resources continue to dwindle. They continue to outbid each other for scant 
resources, funding, and sponsors, provided by supporters of the jihadist global movement within 
the Gulf states. Moreover, Al Qaeda uses calculable operational planning cycles for offensive 
attacks while ISIS utilizes on-ground, brutal warfare tactics to increase Islamic territory. With 
these findings, ISIS and Al Qaeda have not converged their diverging operational structures nor 
have they concentrated their ideological goals to prepare for a potential merger. Furthermore, their 
continued rivalry in the recruitment of militants, suggests that assets and infrastructure within the 
terrorist network are diminishing due to an increased crackdown on jihadi franchises.   
135
Editorial Board: DUJPEW Issue II 2019
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2018
 
 




Figure 1.  
The Islamic Caliphate  















Figure 2.  
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (left) and Osama bin Laden (right) 
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Figure 3. 
Al Qaeda’s Network of affiliates and subcontractors 
Courtesy of RAND  
138




 139 of 275 
 
Figure 4. 
Al Qaeda’s South and Central Asian Clusters 
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Figure 5. 
Militant Group Merger Analysis  
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Abstract 
The decision to declare a district for a specific cause is a critical policy decision; making 
an area an official office park or designated cultural site means it will attract specific types of 
residents and businesses and require specific amenities. This paper reviews the impact of 
designating a cultural district as a place-based policy, specifically by developing a measure of 
neighborhood stability and applying a stress test of neighborhood stability in cultural districts 
during the Great Recession. The model underpinning the neighborhood stability measure is an 
optimal stopping time model which frames neighborhood rents as a Brownian motion with drift. 
This structure imposes minimalist assumptions and develops two reduced form parameters which 
describe individual preferences for how long to live in a neighborhood. This analysis is in the 
style of Alvarez et al.(2015). The parameters are then used to test neighborhood stability, with 
the result that neighborhoods designated specifically as cultural districts are far less likely to 
experience negative stability (e.g., large amounts of residential outmigration and thus shorter 
residency spells) with a causal effect size four times larger than the effect size of a recession 
itself. However, such neighborhoods are also more likely to experience an influx of newer higher 
income residents after designation, implying the beneficiaries of the new stability may be those 
who priced out the original creators of the neighborhood's cultural capital. 
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Introduction 
Urban revitalization efforts have played a major role in the much-documented millennial 
movement back to the city.1 One of the common toolkits of the urban revitalization planner is the 
creation of special districts, such as the Avenue of the Arts in Philadelphia or NoDa in Charlotte. 
These designations are essentially place-based policies which then serve as signals to 
entrepreneurs and potential residents that these districts are the intended center of specific 
economic or social activities. Residents seeking identity-specific (such as in gayborhoods) or 
industry-specific amenities (the arts district) are more likely to settle in these areas due to the 
perceived benefits of consumption and production agglomeration, respectively. As a particular 
example, the Avenue of the Arts in Philadelphia was a major initiative on the arterial Broad 
Street in the Center City District whose motivation was entirely to condemn blighted housing in 
the district and replace it with creative industries to drive vitality in a new central business 
district.2 Importantly, these districts are a city-level policy, usually the product of a department 
of City Planning initiative. Such decisions tend to come from one of two sources: the generally 
higher rate of occurrence of relevant businesses already in the area (an agglomeration pathway) 
or the occurrence of a political demonstration or relevant exogenous event which is being 
memorialized in the designation (studied in this paper).  
Special districts are often loci for high rates of minority entrepreneurship, and the 
designation as a district can act as a way to send a clearer signal to new, less informed consumers 
about the neighborhood’s business and residential communities. This formal designation is thus a 
critical policy measure that in a sense “brands” a neighborhood to potential consumers. A 
famous example — the formal designation of the South Beach, Florida Gayborhood was a 
landmark moment in LGBTQ+ migration into the region. While South Beach was certainly a 
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queer space before this designation by the city, new in-migration from queer folks who were not 
South Beach residents remarkably increased after designation.3 A 1 percentage point increase in 
the number of same-sex coupled households is associated with an almost 2% to 3% increase in 
the probability of gentrification.4  
However, such designations can also attract external, higher-income residents to 
previously highly local neighborhoods, causing pre-designation residents to get priced out as 
rents and local amenity prices rise. Then, there is a classic real estate investment cycle problem, 
where revitalization comes at the expense of current residents. What sets this policy apart from 
other place-based policy design is persistence of the special district amenity. The designation of 
a special district is often more lasting than a passing place-based economic policy like a tax 
abatement.5 As a result, while an industrial park subsidy displaces one generation of buyers,6 
cultural districting policies could drive a more continuous rate of neighborhood turnover as the 
wealthiest consumers within the relevant cultural group turnover the cultural district itself.7  
The question of how “stable” designated cultural districts like Gayborhoods, Chinatowns, 
or Arts Districts truly are is not, therefore, a straightforward question. On the one hand, one can 
argue that the designation acts as a time-persistent amenity which anchors individuals of a 
specific “type” to that district.8 On the other hand, one can argue that such districts because of 
their high profile after designation may tend to experience a consistently higher rate of instability 
as residents and entrepreneurs remain in flux with new tastes, trends, and income brackets. With 
limited land supply in urban areas, a potential cycle of displacement results.  
This paper investigates the question of designated cultural district (DCD) stability, and 
evaluates whether designation as a special district comes at the cost of long-term neighborhood 
instability. The extent to which the long-term cost is desirable in the name of urban revitalization 
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from a purely economic standpoint (admitting the shortcomings of such an analysis) is then 
discussed. I develop a reduced-form distribution to model the decision-making problem faced by 
residents of a special district on considering when to leave the district. The model frames leaving 
the district in terms of an optimal stopping time problem with the operative decision being when 
to leave conditioned on a stochastic process which models neighborhood rents (a Brownian 
motion with drift).  
I thus provide the following contributions to the field: (1) I develop a direct corollary to 
results in unemployment dynamics to methods of neighborhood choice. (2) I discuss the creation 
of a measure of neighborhood stability and the challenges this poses. On this, I develop a 
measure which controls for individual preferences by developing a measure of the “type” of an 
individual from the model which gives contribution (1), allowing full identification of the impact 
of neighborhood features on the resident’s expected lifetime in a neighborhood. (3) I argue that 
designation as a cultural district contributes to robustness of a neighborhood against exogenous 
shocks using the Recession as a case study, extending expected resident lifetimes despite the 
shock by an effect size 3 times as strong as the effect of the Recession itself. However, DCDs 
also likely raise rents and price out previous residents, so it is an open question as to for whom 
the neighborhood is more stable; the original creators of the culture of the district, or new, 
potentially displacing forces.  
This paper uses data from RentBureau, a credit bureau dedicated to the multi- family 
industry which collects rental histories from a network of apartment owners and managers. 
Individual rental terms are observed, including collections, rental amount, and final payment 
dates, as a census. This dataset is available from January 1997 until June 2010.  
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I provide further background 
on the DCD and literature which mirrors the methodological choices of this paper. The theory 
and structure of the model is built out in section 3, with some comments on the individual model 
provided in Appendix A. I begin to develop a notion of a mathematical description for 
neighborhood stability. Brief data summaries follow in Section 4. Section 5 provides results and 
discusses the development of a policy model which uses the individual-level reduced form 
parameters to isolate the causal effect of DCDs on neighborhood stability, isolating a precise 
definition here as well. Section 6 summarizes our key conclusions.  
 
Literature Review 
New residents of a neighborhood who do not leave after the first year are more likely to 
stay in the neighborhood for a long period of time.9 A marketer might suggest a loyalty effect 
sets in and keeps residents in their neighborhood. The sociological anchoring effects of 
community back up this explanation as a potentially causal story.10 A game theorist may argue 
that individuals arrive in neighborhoods with imperfect information, and that those who sort out 
in the first year are those who discover that their information was incorrect to the point that the 
neighborhood was suboptimal.11 Both likely hold some grain of truth, suggesting that the hazard 
rate of migration out of a neighborhood is a mix of heterogeneity and duration dependence. This 
paper uses the labor model of an optimal stopping time problem for hazard rates in- and out of 
unemployment and applies it to the resident’s optimal out-migration time problem. We develop 
nonparametric decompositions of heterogeneity and duration dependence in the manner of.12 The 
predecessor to this paper, they frame the decision to take a job as an optimal stopping time 
problem. They cast wages into a Brownian motion with drift, and I intend to do the same with 
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local neighborhood rents. Their derivation also allows decomposition of the job-finding hazard 
into heterogeneity and duration dependence, while developing a nonparametric estimation for a 
paper of latent sufficient statistics. Studies of separation into unemployment have used this 
structure to analyze whether recall expectations (expectation of re-employment as in the case of a 
temporary layoff) muddle duration-dependent signals.13 Generally, the nonparametric mixed 
hazards model has been used with time-varying covariates because it is quite easily identified.14 
The method across the literature generally devises a structural evolution for key individual-level 
parameters, popularly including individual discount rates and some stochastic or fixed 
formulation for reservation wages. Spinnewiin introduces biased beliefs in to the classic two-
period model of unemployment, obtaining sufficient statistics from a modified Baily formula. 15 
He proves that in this setting identification of two moments of the individual utility problem is 
sufficient for policy design. Generally, sufficient statistics approaches estimate wage elasticity to 
a parameter of interest, such as uninsurance benefit rates.16 
The sufficient statistics is also quite present in the neighborhood choice literature, to 
which this paper makes its contribution. The search for such sufficient statistics is in particular 
still a topic of discussion. Segregation levels, for example, are not able to characterize racial 
sorting impacts on income and education.17 Wealth has been estimated to be a key driver for 
neighborhood relocation and churn (in a model, notably, which does not account for multi-period 
savings or consumption).18 I argue that generally, churn is a more apt sufficient statistic than 
rents alone in the place-based policy literature because such policies tend to price out existing 
residents and gentrify neighborhoods.19 Indeed, rents primarily benefit city government tax 
budgets and those who afford to own local housing capital; gentrification imposes costs by 
pricing out non-owning, often low-income, households, causing loss of efficiencies from accrued 
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local knowledge.20 Owners on the margin, who can afford to own property, can be driven out by 
higher taxes. Thus, quantifying churn is of major interest when thinking about efficiency. A 
persistent threat of asset loss can impose well-being effects and generally make individuals less 
likely to use credit, affecting their ability to make own-optimal consumption choices.21 
Generally, measures of demand for skilled labor is sufficient to estimate tract demographic, 
population skill-levels, and housing prices.22 When analyzing impacts, on displacement, the 
sufficient statistics tend to come from rents or are indirectly derived from a rent-based measure.23 
This is the perspective this paper will adopt and subsequently defend. This is consistent with 
literature on neighborhood choice from other perspectives as well. For example, models of 
private provision argue that an “impatience rate” can be viewed as the source of heterogeneity in 
deciding to privately provide a public good.24 Then, the individual level decision in the literature 
tends to be driven (akin to in the labor literature) by two factors; a timing problem and a rent 
level.  
The experiment in this paper is an impulse response (exogenous shock) experiment which 
uses changes in hazard rates during a recession to test differences across neighborhoods. A study 
of the Great Recession on the long-term unemployment rate uses a similar decomposition into 
duration dependence and heterogeneity to compare pre-Recession and post-Recession hazards.25 
Another paper uses the exogenous shock of plant closures to determine whether there is a 
significant signaling effect in unemployment duration. Their model is a simply proportional 
hazards specification with a single-term estimator, however - not a fuller structural approach. 26 
The final relevant literature is the discussion of the anchoring effect of cultural districts. 
Amenities can act as anchors which fix neighborhoods to certain income levels with less 
volatility over time when they are persistent. Empirical results on the topic are mixed.27 This 
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paper questions whether designating an area as a cultural district can act as an anchor point for 
higher income members of the targeted communities. Actual empirical results around the 
stability of cultural districts, however, are mixed. An exercise in South Beach, Florida suggests 
that the queer community before and after the designation of the gayborhood has become more 
geographically dispersed, and that queer entrepreneurs were gradually priced out by in-migrants 
from other cities who have taken over the strip.28 Theoretically, however, cultural districts like 
ethnic enclaves should promote agglomeration by overcoming language barriers and work-rule 
differences in immigrant populations which result in underemployment in other neighborhoods.29 
City planners have long discussed the merits and drawbacks of anchor-based development which 
creates anchor institutions that can help prevent fragmentation of communities after 
development. In the status quo, however, the location of affordable housing is not correlated with 
proximity to institutional and neighborhood amenities, where anchor-based revitalization is 
targeted.30 This suggests that as an experiment, there is indeed a clean treatment effect when 
considering specialty districts as possessing potential anchors in the status quo, as opposed to 
neighboring districts.  
 
Theory 
I re-formulate the structure set forth in Alvarez et al. (2015). My novel contributions in 
this theoretical section are formulating and individual choice framework which re-contextualizes 
this structure to the neighborhood choice setting (Section 3.1) and to aggregate the individual-
level data to construct neighborhood-level distribution function variables which make it possible 
to conduct this analysis with less dense micro-data (Section 3.3). This theory is developed to set 
forth reduced form parameters to characterize the individual choice problem of determining 
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when to move out of a given neighborhood. These reduced form parameters, when aggregated to 
a neighborhood-level distribution, can be used to evaluate neighborhoods on the types of 
individuals they attract and the relative “stability” of a neighborhood given the mix of renter 
lifetimes observed in that neighbor- hood. Only once these measures are derived with a fully 
specified structure can I begin to craft a causal argument. With this motivation of defining 
stability as a mixture of individual parameters, I devise the individual choice problem.  
 
Individual Choice Problem  
I first develop a stylized model of how the resident, i, values neighborhood- specific 
goods (amenities) and all other goods (numeraire consumption). Amenities include cultural and 
social benefits in designated neighborhoods. The model does not a priori assume higher amenity 
value in such districts, and this piece of the narrative is not tested in this paper. This individual-
level set-up will, however, allow us to derive a set of parameters around individual preferences 
for neighbor- hoods later in the paper.  
Residents maximize an objective utility function across neighborhoods each period, 
determining where they choose to live. Greater expenditure on rents implies lower expenditure 
on consumption, and with greater expenditure on rents tends to come a higher utility from 
amenities (because one can spend more, access is more likely to neighborhoods with tailored 
local amenities). Tailoring of local amenities occurs through the gradual supply response to shifts 
in the consumer population of a neighborhood (a lagged Tiebout model of public and private 
goods provision). This tradeoff is not absolute a low rent can still lead to a decent value of 
amenities, so I adopt the following relatively flexible utility function for the individual 
maximization problem.  
153
Editorial Board: DUJPEW Issue II 2019
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2018
 
 
 154 of 275 
 
The last equation refers to the fact that individuals demand some world-clearing 
nonnegative amenity value at minimum. For the purposes of this paper, we assume that income 
is equivalent across neighborhoods j. This is obviously not the case, as some individuals will 
have specific skills that only earn wages in the vicinity of certain workplaces, but one can craft a 
skill-adjusted measure of amenities to adjust for such a consideration. This model ignores 
intertemporal income dynamics induced by savings, and does not permit borrowing. In such a 
setting, the maximized utility should correspond to  
 
Imagine now the rent-setting problem. Developers charge the individual a rent which 
should increase in the value of local amenities with a fixed baseline price according to the land 
value of the neighborhood. A hedonic component that should correlate with income also comes 
into play; individuals with higher income are more likely to buy homes with the extra bathroom 
or bedroom. So, willingness-to-pay for rent should adopt a potentially linear form that mirrors 
the following  
 
One can adjust for imperfect local competition by adding a markup to this rent function 
which varies with land supply tightness (ρj) or a local cost of new construction that might be 
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connected to land use policies. This markup can be absorbed by the coefficients and components 
of rent in (5).  
Therefore, residents will choose a neighborhood based on the amount of amenity 
received for rent. Of course, if rents themselves are a function of amenities present, then we can 
obtain a marginal utility of amenities in a closed form.  
 
Then, individuals will choose to leave a neighborhood for some maximal amenity (which 
drives a maximal rent an individual is willing to trade off before consumption gets undercut). 
The notation for this value is 𝑅Oijt. Now we borrow a convention from labor economics, however; 
individuals will not choose a neighborhood unless it meets some minimal level of amenity (and, 
in turn, rent), 𝑅ijt . This can correspond to some world-clearing price of a home, the amenity 
value of the last neighborhood the individual was in, or some other measure of an amenity floor. 
In labor economics, this is the benefit received during unemployment. This is weakly greater 
than 0.  
We tackle a system with N neighborhoods. In a neighborhood with an amenity level Ajt , 
if an individual pays rent on housing of Rijt , denote the present value of the neighborhood to the 
resident as E(A)−E(R). For convenience, we will drop the subscripts in this section, where the 
subscripts may clutter the analysis.  
Individuals will move into the neighborhood as long as E(A) ≥ E(R) and R ≤ θ for income 
θ . Further, there exists a R, a lowest-possible rent for living in a neighborhood. Residents choose 
A, the lowest amenity value at which they will live in a neighborhood, which determines an R in 
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(5). The highest rent is given by 𝑅, corresponding to the rent at which utility from consumption 
will start to decrease to a suboptimal level if rent rises at a fixed amenity value. Structurally, each 
individual has an unobservable A and a (thus unobservable) reservation rent derived from this 
amenity level. They also have an unobserved ceiling rent level, 𝑅.  
 
Structure  
Now that the individual level decision problem has been established, consider the market 
for rents. A complete economic model of neighborhood choice will describe not only how 
individuals choose where to live but the price response of where they live. Consider the 
following: an individual resident is in state j(t) corresponding to which neighborhood they live in 
in period t. They experience a state-dependent stochastic process that drives the evolution of 
individual potential rents over time.  
 
for standard Brownian motion B(t). The residential state is described by neighborhood and 
potential log rent. A worker can choose to enter a neighborhood at some fixed cost ψ. Workers 
are risk-neutral with discount rate r > 0.  
To ensure that the problem is well behaved, apply the condition r > μj(t) + σ2j(t)/2 for 
each possible state j(t). If this is violated for some j(t), the expected value of staying in this fixed 
neighborhood will be infinite. I discuss this restriction further in the appendix and prove it is 
necessary for stability of the rent process.  
The resident will remain in a neighborhood while j(t) = j and Rijt < 𝑅, but will churn out 
the first time this condition is violated. In this way, the above stochastic process can be 
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connected to the underlying individual decision-maker’s problem. The derived condition is strict 
as long as ψ is strictly positive. This encompasses an interpretation of voluntary movement, but a 
reinterpretation where developers have price setting power will demonstrate the profits for the 
developer earns a profit Ri jt − 𝐴 (𝐴 is the amenity level that is used to determine the reduced- 
form 𝑅, corresponding to a level of utility from out-of-neighborhood amenities) and can attract 
new residents for a fixed cost ψ - then, this can also capture forced eviction and developer-driven 
mobility.  
Residents are described by discount rate r, base amenity utility 𝐴, and the parameter 
space governing the stochastic process for their potential rents. In reduced form, we obtain two 
parameters, 𝑅	and 𝑅 . The distributions are entirely arbitrary across the population.  
To determine the length of residency, note that the residency will occur once rents breach 
the lower threshold, 𝑅. The log-rent will follow the set stochastic process and the residency spell 
continues until the log-rent breaches the upper threshold, 𝑅. The residency spell is thus the first 
passage time of this Brownian motion with drift, an inverse Gaussian with density f according to  
 
where α=μj / σj and β = (𝑅 −𝑅)/σj. The former varies over the reals, while the latter is weakly 
positive. For nonnegative α, the resident almost surely churns out of the neighborhood in 
question. But, if α is negative, they have a probability e2αβ < 1 of leaving the neighborhood and 
therefore may never do so.  
The shape of the inverse Gaussian is fairly flexible. There are specific characteristics that 
are worth noting. Hazards at move-in (t = 0) are always 0. It achieves a maximum value at a 
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finite time t, then declines to a long-run limit α2/2. The expected duration of residency is β/α, 
with a variance of β/α3. Asymptotically, the remaining duration of residency approaches 2/α2 
(note this can be larger or smaller than the expected residency time at move-in depending on α, 
implying both positive and negative duration dependence on possible). The flexibility of possible 
behaviors associated with a longer duration of residency allows modeling a dynamic selection 
problem, where developers in new neighborhoods are likely to cater first to individuals with the 
highest reservation rents, then the next group, and so forth. This analysis will assume that 
parameters are time-invariant at the individual level.  
To summarize thus far, in order to derive measures of how stable cultural districts are, we 
have modeled first the decision process of the individual renter choosing a neighborhood. We 
then show how an arbitrary (Brownian motion) rent process can induce a particular resident to 
choose when to enter or leave a neighborhood based on an inverse Gaussian distribution. The 
parameters of this distribution serve as a reduced form description of individual preferences for 
the neighborhood, and can be used to create a mathematical description of neighborhood 
stability. In particular, the asymptotic time of residency serves as a way to determine how long a 
resident is likely to stay in a neighbor- hood once they have moved in, suggestive of a notion of 
“retention rate” as in the marketing literature.  
 
Integration: From Individual Parameters to Neighborhood Distributions  
As with any model of behavior, this model of individuals and the associated rent market 
problem must be falsifiable given data. If a population is observed where each individual has 
some fixed structural parameters (r,ψ,𝐴,𝑅,μj,σj), the model outputs some reduced form 
parameters (α, β). If each individual is only observed for a single residency in the neighborhood, 
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the model is non-falsifiable and thus non-testable because a single-spell data-point is perfectly 
explained by assuming that, if d periods are spent in j, then σj =0, μj =(𝑅−𝑅)/d. This would 
imply α, β → ∞ and β/α → d.  
Unfortunately, unlike in the labor literature, where one observes repeat unemployment 
spells with nonzero probability the likelihood of observed two spells of residency in the same 
neighborhood infrequent at best. Such individuals become part of a selection problem as they are 
likely to have stronger attachments to local communities or resources than those who do not 
repeatedly enter a community.  
This is where this paper diverges from the previous labor literature which motivated the 
structure of the previous section. Rather than estimating individual optimal stopping times and 
hazard rates out of neighborhoods, we integrate the distribution of optimal stopping times across 
all individuals in a neighborhood to determine what the neighborhood-level distribution of 
hazards looks like. We can then estimate neighborhood-level survival functions rather than 
individual-level hazards. Then, each neighborhood has structural parameters which are each a 
distribution of individual-level parameters, (r,ψ,𝐴,𝑅,μj,σj)and reduced-form parameters (α , β). 
While in some cases, this neighborhood-level aggregation proves an inconvenience, in the case 
of neighborhood-level comparisons of the impact of a specific designation policy, the 
aggregation is merely an inconvenience to statistical power.  
 
Testing the Model  
The model’s falsifiability can be described by two conditions. These conditions will 
determine whether the inverse Gaussian distribution is an adequate descriptor of the individual 
resident’s propensity to leave a neighborhood. This is important in my results; only datapoints 
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which pass this test should be analyzed, and if too little of the data passes this test, then my 
model will not suit this particular problem of determining the effect of a DCD.  
Now, say we have a sample of residents of size M from neighborhood j whose durations 
correspond to an observed vector 𝑡 of dimension M. Each has some set of structural parameters 
as above. Now, their reduced-form parameters are drawn from a joint neighborhood-level 
distribution g. Then, the density for time of residency (alternatively, the residency “spell”, to 
mirror the labor literature language):  
 
This differs markedly from the approach of labor economists whose work originates this 
model. Rather than identifying these individual-level parameters with any fineness, this approach 
acknowledges this is not possible with repeated renter data and pools across observations.  
Allow φ(i) to denote the derivative of φ with respect to ti. From the functional form of the 




There is a degree of precision in the previous incarnation of this model that is lost in the 
aggregation process. Rather than having the ability to estimate a distribution for α and β for the 
individual, this model must sacrifice the individual-level inference. This is a quirk of residential 
data; the estimation is unstable otherwise. However, the conditions for model testability are the 
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same. Both expectations in (12) must be nonnegative. For a constant hazard rate of residency h, 
so that the density of completed spells is these will be  
 
Then, E(α2|ti) violates nonnegativity when the sum of duration times across individuals, 
 or one and a half times the mean duration. Then, constant hazard rates cannot be 
generated for just any set of residency spells.  
If the constant hazard is now unfixed, with a distribution in the population G then the 
density of these completed spells is .Then, E(α2|ti) is negative if the ratio of the 
third moment of h to the second moment is positive. Each moment of the joint distribution of 
(α2,β2) can be obtained through the kth partial derivative. For the exact procedure, refer to 
(Alvarez et al., 2015).  
 
Nonparametric Identification 
Another consideration of the model demonstrates how to identify the distribution of the 
reduced form parameters α and β. Once the data is tested, the model must be able to solve for the 
exact distribution of theses parameters. Otherwise, the model has been a mathematical hattrick 
which provides minimal interpretable results.  
Using the aggregated densities across individuals observed in the neighborhood, I 
nonparametrically identify the joint distribution of (α2,β2) across individuals. Identification is 
equivalent to identification of the joint distribution of (|α|,β). The joint distribution of (α2,β2) can 
be nonparametrically identified by comparing results across multiple neighborhoods with 
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residents who experience a fixed vector 𝑡 (with at least 2 residents being observed in each 
studied neighbor- hood). One can compute the joint distribution gˆ(α2,β2) according to  
 
This could be inverted to solve for this joint distribution gˆ(α2,β2). This test should not 
depend on the sample	𝑡R⃗  used to derive the distribution gˆ(α2,β2), a fact which can be used to test 
sensitivity of the model.  
Alternatively, in a more applicable estimation process which mirrors a Newtonian 
procedure, one can assume a starting distribution of types g(α, β). For each of these types, the 
model provides a density f (𝑡, α, β) which produces the density of actual durations φ(𝑡). In a 
setting with finitely many types N = card{(α,β)} and sets of durations T = card{𝑡}, this is the 
linear system φ = F·g for likelihood matrix 𝐹 ∶ 𝐹	 ∈ 𝕄WXY and g ∈ ℝN a vector which indicates 
the share of each type in the population. This gives φ, the vector of share of each duration in the 
population. As long as F is invertible, the model is identified. If we assume momentarily N = T 
(as the other cases will yield many or no solutions), identification is a matter of the rows of the 
likelihood matrix being linearly independent. As the density of realized durations for one 
neighborhood is not a linear combination of the density of realized durations for others, the 
model is identified. In other words, it is unlikely that direct linear dependence is to arise in a 
highly randomized setting with a large variety of duration types.  
 
Decomposition of Changes in the Hazard Rate  
As a final feature of the model, I argue it is helpful to separate how much of the 
neighborhood-level density of hazards (e.g., the distribution of times at which residents are 
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leaving neighborhoods) can be described as (1) an artifact of heterogeneity, meaning differences 
are due to differences in some latent aspect of a person that is not described in the model (e.g., 
individual characteristics rather than neighborhood ones) or (2) an artifact of the structure of the 
model itself - attributed to the structure of amenity distribution across neighborhoods. Define 
as the fraction of type (α,β) residents with spells longer than t periods. 
Then, the distribution of types among those same workers is: 
 
The density of residual move-out durations for a given type conditional on the unemployment 
spell lasting at least t periods,  
 
Finally, then, the density of residual residency duration lasting at least t periods is  
 
The expectation of this density will be denoted Dr(t). This can be computed directly once the 
joint distribution of the reduced form (α , β) are identified. Now, if we want to decompose the 
change in expected durations into the effects of heterogeneity and duration dependence. The 
contributions of heterogeneity and duration dependence are then:  
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A similar decomposition can also be constructed on the hazard rates. The hazard rate 
. This decomposition gives a term for structural duration 
dependence and a term for heterogeneity, respectively, as:  
 
 
Figure 1: Descriptive histograms for resident move-out times in the entire universe of the dataset. 
The right panel shows an overall view, while the left compares the hazard rate of residents before 






Tenureship data is obtained from the RentBureau dataset. This Experian-produced 
product contains payment and residency records for 13 years (1997-2010) for an apartment 
company’s residents across many zip codes. The data includes rent amounts (which allows 
testing the underlying rent-based derivation of the individual preference variables) and records of 
when a resident enters and exits their apartment. The data also presents a detailed account of 
payment, non-payment, and collections by month through the lease. The dataset excludes 
subletters and Airbnbs. We consider these both as part of the prevailing renters’ tenure in the 
current model, acknowledging that this excludes a set of residents from this analysis. Residents 
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may move within zip codes. Such observations are flagged and removed. The actual population 
set of city residents therefore will have preferences for shorter term stays in the city than the data 
suggests.31  
I provide a dataset-level histogram of survivals in the Figure2. Note that survivals are 
censored at the two-year mark (24 months on the x-axis), so we must develop a right-censoring 
correction. The histogram suggests that a large number of individuals churn out at the two-year 
mark, but the truth is that part of this large bar contains entries which have resided in their 
apartments for at least two years, not exactly two years.  
The second subplot compares survivals in the period of the Great Recession, defined to 
begin in September 2008, to those which occurred beforehand. Off- hand, we generally see the 
shapes as relatively similar, simply with fewer observations during the recession. I also report the 
overall joint distribution of pairs of tenures across neighborhoods in a surface plot in (2). Some 
key observations:  
 
Figure 2: Joint distribution of pairs of tenure lengths (length of residency) within zip codes. 
 
first, note the joint distribution is generally convex, which reflects the declining hazard rate 
(likelihood to move out) at longer durations (ignoring the peak at 24 due to right-censoring). 
Second, the joint density is noisy. This does not appear to be primarily due to sampling variation. 
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Rather, there is clear persistence of a yearly tenure-ship drop off as this is the likely duration of 
the average rental lease. The extremely high joint frequencies of multiples of 12 suggests that 
this is being replicated in the data. This is very much an artifact of the data, and it can be dealt 
with in two ways. The first; it can be smoothed out using a spectral analysis technique. The 
second; it can be allowed to remain as is and the model will simply be judged on the surface plot 
shown for measures of likelihood. Both methods are discussed in the calibration section.  
The dataset’s breadth includes several DCD zip codes which are used in this study:  
1. Atlanta: Gayborhood, 30318 and Chinatown 30341 
2. San Diego: Gayborhood 92103 and Chinatown 92104 
3. Los Angeles: Gayborhood 90012 and Koreatown 90005 and 90006  
4. New Orleans: The Garden District 70119 
5. San Francisco: The Castro, 9411 
6. New York City: Riverside District, 10069  
7. Tampa: River Arts District, 33602  
 
Figure 3: Comparisons of tenure and log-rent distributions by allocated control (FALSE) and treatment 
(TRUE) groups. The right compares length of stay, while the left compares log-rents. 
 
We use these cities as experimental areas, with the DCDs as treated zip codes. There are 2391 
zip codes in the total dataset, from which we extract 123 zip codes. Of these, taking proximity 
effects into account, the zips listed above and any zip codes within a 2-mile catchment are 
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assigned as treatment. Each zip code has an average of 1340 different residency records. To 
summarize, I present a simple comparison of log rents and tenure distributions across treatment 
and control groups in Figure (3).  
Generally, there are some initially visible differences across designations in both the 
tenureship distribution and the rent price distribution. Rent prices appear to be less skewed 
slightly, in treated districts. The tenure time of a resident appears to follow a similar decrease in 
skewness. Note that this runs countervailing to an a priori presumption of decreased 
heterogeneity in treated districts due to cultural similarity. In particular, a homogeneous district 
is likely to have more unimodal, concentrated distributions. This is clearly not the case. Further 
exploration and calibration may help to elucidate why this might be happening. With the data in 
mind, we move to calibrating the model.  
 
Calibration 
Testing Compliance  
To look at whether the model is able to be fit onto the data, and further whether it is 
rejected by the data for lack of falsifiability, I conduct a two-stage compliance  
procedure. I test two possible smoothing algorithms on the data and discuss why I end up 
rejecting both methods in B. Then, I conduct the tests described in 3.4 to obtain a complete 
picture of what subsets of the data can be fit with the stochastic model.  
 
Optimization Procedure  
The data displays heavy nonlinearities and seasonality, suggesting it is not clean enough 
for a simple pass through an off-the-shelf convex optimization procedure. I detail the process of 
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finding a minimum-distance estimator here. First, argue that for a neighborhood with unspecified 
numbers of residency records, we can obtain a robust estimator of the aggregate density function 
of αj and βj, g, by estimating 𝑔\	on a subset of the possible residency data-points. Rather than 
using all of the data-points in each neighborhood then, we sample 30 timings from each 
neighborhood (the cutoff from the common rule derived from the central limit theorem) and 
estimate gˆ in this space. Note that the density at this point should be relatively stable, and that 
we should expect to estimate the same density save some sampling variation for various subsets 
of 30 residency spells. Then, this mirrors the practice of truncating variable-timespell panel data 
before analysis to a common timespell, but with a sample size across observation areas.  
The data exists as some distribution . The distribution of our parameters, 
 can be constructed as:  
 
for every such  . This is an inner product, so φ = Fg for positive, linear F . This is a 
likelihood function; it is essentially an M × N positive matrix whose columns add to 1. Each 
entry, Fij is the probability . 
Then, the objective function of the quadratic optimization problem which falls out of the 
procedure is  
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To compute g consider the following pre-processing measures: 
1. Symmetrize the likelihood so that φ(t1,t2) is the average of the density of (t1,t2) and (t2,t1).  
2. The grid for α is entirely positive as we can only identify the absolute value of α.  
3. Calculate the likelihood at the final bin as the right-censored likelihood; the likelihood of 
a residency time greater than or equal to 24 periods.  
4. Relax the problem so that we do not require g to have only positive elements and the 
constraint that the elements sum to one. Scale positive elements of g and have them sum 
to 1 so that the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions will be satisfied after an iteration.  
5. Throw away pairs of (α,β) with density below 1 basis point.  
We do not require some of the other algorithmic constraints in Alvarez et al. (2015) because 
of the right-censoring of the data (25 is a relatively low dimensionality for number of periods). 
The above, particularly symmetrization, are required to avoid some of the pitfalls of the noisiness 
of data.  
 
Results and Discussion  
Summary of Model  
I compile summary statistics of model calibration by treatment and control in Tables 2 
and 1, respectively. These treatments are pooled at the label level; in other words, the model does 
not train on yearly or by-locality groups in these initial tables. I do this for statistical power. At 
first glance, the estimates do not appear to differ heavily. Generally, there is not excessive 
heterogeneity; the standard error of α and β is not particularly high compared to the mean in any 
of the groups. However, there is a great deal of heterogeneity in the mean stay itself; standard 
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errors are generally twice the mean. Note that the mean stay in the treated areas is about half a 
year longer in raw value.  
The cross-sectional variance of the mean duration is also not variable in aggregate; it is 
around 40 in each group, with the standard error being around 16 (18 amongst the treatment 
group). The proportion of the variation in realized durations due to individual variation is then 
around 40 percent (43 percent in the treatment group). The asymptotic duration of a residency 
spell is about 7.5 months in control areas and 8.2 months in the treated areas. Then, if the 
individual has lived in an area for a significant amount of time already, there is a negative  
 
 




Table 2: Means of several key statistics across treatment areas, across all time periods. 
 
 
duration dependence (e.g., they are expected to stay longer the longer they have already stayed). 
This timeframe is one-third of the total timeframe observed for each record, suggesting the 
duration dependence effect is quite strong in our data.  
I show the fit of the mean type across all neighborhoods on the durations histogram for 
all observations in New Orleans in Figure 4. The fit is not the best here (nor should it necessarily 
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be), but notice that the symmetrization has caused the mode to ignore some of the nonstationary 
behavior around the 12th month of residency. Then, the convex optimization procedure has 
produced a principled, not overfit, model.  
A sample likelihood surface is shown in (5). Clearly, the likelihoods for individual values 
has a fairly regular shape after the pre-processing above is conducted. This suggests the 
calibration is comfortable. In an assessment of the goodness of fit, the city-level fits had an 
average chi- square p-value of 0.403, implying we can comfortably accept the model as a good 
fit. The variance on this statistic across neighborhoods is 0.199, suggesting that we are generally 
comfortably within model acceptance standards across individual localities. The asymptotic 
duration shows differential responses to rent across assignment as well. 
 
Figure 4: Fit of mean probability distribution (orange) on the  
New Orleans aggregated data (blue). 
 
 
Figure 5: Surface plot of a sample likelihood. 
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Figure 6: Comparison of effect of increasing rents on the  
projected asymptotic duration of a neighborhood. 
 
Designated cultural districts tend to have a higher estimated asymptotic duration in 
wealthier neighborhoods as compared to control groups, suggesting in particular that treatment 
groups are likely to be income-sensitive. This suggests one of two things is occurring: (1) areas 
which are of a higher income before designation are more likely to be designated or (2) 
designated cultural districts are more likely to attract high income residents upon treatment. 
While we do not have data on this, the inclusion of immigrant communities like Chinatowns and 
Koreatowns and a Little Puerto Rico seems to suggest that (2) is the more likely explanation, as 
such communities are generally more likely to have settled with a lower income. Higher-rent 
treatment areas also generally demonstrate lower proclivity to have heterogeneity, suggesting 
areas homogenize as these new arrivals enter the neighborhood.  
Variance Decomposition  
I now conduct the exercise described in the theory section which decomposes residual 
duration of residency into a component explained by the heterogeneity in residents and one 
explained by duration dependence (negative in this case). Again, I start by comparing these in 
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the overall dataset for all periods. Figure (7) compares these. Generally, heterogeneity appears to 
explain a larger component of the asymptotic variance of residency across neighborhoods.  
I map the differences across treatment and control groups by comparing the proportion of 
variance explained by duration dependence as asymptotic duration dependence increases. These 
are simple linear estimators. See that the treatment  
 
Figure 7: Comparison of durations explained by  
heterogeneity and duration dependence across the entire dataset. 
 
groups tend to have a larger positive duration dependence after the first year, implying that once 
the first year has passed, the neighborhood is estimated to extract significant more loyalty effects 
from residents. This also implies that most of the heterogeneity “shakes out” during the first year 
– as this is when the proportion of variance attributed to heterogeneity is at its highest point – 
suggesting a compositional sorting of unlike types out of the neighborhood after the first year.  
Yearly Cohorts  
In the next section, I discuss isolating comparisons to same-year and same-city treatment-
control groups, whereas the statistics reported in this section are all pooled. This was done 
because the results in this section are able to share statistical strength across experimental 
groups, which overcomes the smaller sample size of the treatment group relative to the controls. 
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The next section is certainly more sample-dependent, so I use bootstrapped variances and 
standard errors while reporting.  
I report the summary statistics of these yearly city-level cohorts in a style mimicking the 
tables above here in Table 3.  
The estimated values of the raw pools are fairly similar, indicating our pooled analysis 
was likely a decent approximation of the true underlying patterns. In particular, proportion of 
variance attributed to heterogeneity remains around 40% and the standard errors are similar on 
most counts.  
 
 
Figure 8: Increase in variation attributed to duration dependence with increasing estimated 
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Neighborhood Stability: Causality  
Thus far, much of this paper has been a replication of the previous work of Alvarez, 
Borovickova, and Shimer. The novel contribution of the previous sections was simply a matter of 
building a context for the application of their model within the experiment of residency spells 
and neighborhood choice. I now contribute the second novel piece of this paper, the application 
to measuring the effect of a designated cultural district’s anchoring amenity on the hazard rate 
out of a neighborhood. I will use this to test whether cultural districts have a significant impact 
on out-migration during an overall period of increased outmigration, the Great Recession. While 
the previous sections present enough nuance to develop some conclusions about potential impact 
of DCDs on neighborhood stability, a more causal argument is possible given the Recession as 
an evenly applied exogenous shock (though perhaps not evenly deep across its application, as 
some cities and zips were hit harder than others - more on this momentarily).  
Defining “Neighborhood Stability.”  
The distribution g(α , β ) encapsulates and expresses in reduced form the distributions of 
neighborhood-aggregated individual parameters, (r,ψ,𝐴,𝑅,μj,σj). The model for the anchoring 
effects are simple. Then, we can use measures from our reduced form analysis as individual-level 
terms. In particular, we can define a notion of neighborhood stability if a neighborhood tends to 
attract individuals for a longer period of time (conditioned on them staying for some mean 
duration - this is the definition of the asymptotic duration quantity reported in this paper). Note 
that by using this definition of asymptotic duration, we can be flexible on a cutoff by 
neighborhood; if a neighborhood has a lower baseline mean duration, it can still have a high 
asymptotic duration for individuals who survive that mean duration. This is a good measure of 
stability because it emphasizes two points: (1) local tunability, and (2) robust estimation of 
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heterogeneity across individuals. However, it faces a critical flaw; there is no estimator for 
people who wish to leave a neighborhood but cannot due to the fixed costs associated with 
moving. Put more succinctly, it does not capture financial entrapment due to structural 
differences in access to credit across space.32  
We can use the asymptotic duration as a measure of neighborhood stability with an 
important caveat. Asymptotic duration of a residency spell may be significantly determined by 
wealth of an individual, as wealthier residents are less likely to be priced out. This poses a 
problem as to whether the neighborhood’s amenities are a causal force for the outcome of 
stability or whether the individuals they attract are; attracting more stable individuals might be 
less attractive as an indicator of neighborhood stability as it is more subjective to time-varying 
tastes. Then, it is difficult from our data alone to identify the source of stable neighborhoods as a 
demand-side or supply-side push, but we can identify stability itself with some degree of 
comfort. There is a second problem with identifying treatment effect as well, namely that 
treatment alone may capture the effect of differences in provision of time-varying amenities 
across neighborhoods. To address this, the use of an aggregated rent term is advised. However, 
rents can be seen as endogenous to treatment. I discuss this in the modeling process.  
Arriving at a Causal Model. 
 Design a simple model of difference-in-differences which assesses how well treated 
(DCD) neighborhoods weather the impulse shock of the Great Recession  
 
where c (j) is a city-level fixed effect that captures spatial differences in tenure- ship patterns, 
and τk are differences caused by time dynamics which do not get captured in evolving individual 
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traits. R is the variable representing the onset of the recession. k is a cohort-level subscript, to 
account for changing distributions over time. Cohorts are defined as individuals who move into a 
zip code in the same year for the time being. I capture expectation of local amenities and local 
conditions through the logarithmic mean of rent prices, Pj for the time being; though it is an 
imperfect measure far and away, it is highly correlated with most local amenities.33 In this way, 
it forms a natural fixed effect measure for zip-code level variation. Then, δ2 serves as a fully 
identified difference-in-differences measure after local fixed effects are taken into account. I 
argue this differencing is necessary primarily due to the use of rent alone as the controlling 
covariate. I report the coefficients in table 5, as well as some associated measures of the model’s 
appropriateness and goodness of fit. The difference-in- differences estimator is not significant in 
this regression; the treatment with designation does not significantly protect individuals from the 
effects of the recession on their asymptotic duration. Interestingly, the recession is also not 
particularly significant in this regression. However, the coefficient on the treatment effect is 
significant at the 10% level. This is interesting in the sense that it reinforces the significance of 
the treatment, but it does not tell us that the treatment itself is a causal response in the face of a 
recession. 
I try two more models which are somewhat nested by this model. The first removes the 
time dummies to test whether they are too redundant given inclusion of the recession variable. 
The condition number of the covariance matrix for the first model is particularly high, suggesting 
the time dummies (largely insignificant, admittedly) are too collinear with the recession variable 
given the sample size. The second variation on the model also eschews time dummies. This 
version further relaxes the assumptions of parallel slopes (already partially satisfied by the 
inclusion of a rent-correlated fixed effect). Heterogeneity in the neighborhood might be an 
177
Editorial Board: DUJPEW Issue II 2019
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2018
 
 
 178 of 275 
important source of information as neighborhoods which are less uniform in their responses to 
shocks will have different outcomes post-recession.  
Looking at the model reports in Appendix B suggests the most viable model from a log-
likelihood perspective is that without time controls but with a control for heterogeneity. This 
model suggests that in fact, the DD estimator and the estimator for the treatment area both 
amount to an insignificant effect. The heterogeneity, however, dominates this regression. This 
suggests that an unconditional analysis of the asymptotic residency duration relies primarily on 
the heterogeneity of the locality.  
I present one final causal analysis, in which I conduct a two-stage procedure. In stage 1, I 
regress the asymptotic duration on the estimated mean E(β/α) of residency spell types in the zip 
code within cohort k:  
 
In this case, we know the theoretical slope of this regression, but variation κ can be entirely 
attributed to non-individual effects on the asymptotic duration. In other words, conditional on the 
type of the individual, I extract the component of asymptotic duration whose variance is not 
explained by any measure of individual preferences for neighborhood features. This measure κ I 
now regress against the same second-stage linear model as performed best in the previous 
analysis:  
 
By this, I suggest that these uncorrelated components of the asymptotic duration are 
determined by zip-level added “loyalties” derived from homogeneity, local culture, and the city 
itself. Argue that this component is no longer endogenously determined with rents. While rents 
may affect the mean type of individual to visit a neighborhood, they are not determined 
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simultaneously with the residual duration of an individual type. This model is not comparable off 
of log-likelihood to previous models as it is not nested. However, notice that here the recession 
now has a direction that intuitively makes sense - it decreased the de-individualized component 
of asymptotic duration by 0.25 months on average, significant at 10%. The DD estimator is now 
nearly significant at 10%, with an increased expected asymptotic duration of 0.81 months. This 
suggests that the effect of a designated cultural district must be de-individuated. In particular, the 
component of variation corresponding to an individual’s type when conditioned strengthens the 
linear model overall, including significance of local fixed effects.  
The interpretation of this final model is that individuals have some baseline taste for 
amenities and rents, α which determines their individual type as in our original model. To isolate 
how a local neighborhood affects individual decision- making on the margin, we must control for 
their individual tastes for that neighborhood in the first place, represented by this calculated type, 
and look at how the residual varies with observables.  
 
Price Effects  
A counterfactual that could prove not only that the model has the intended result but also 
help analyze a policy situation is to consider how much of price is determined by individual 
tenureship characteristics. In particular, we can look at differences in rents between treated and 
non-treated areas and ask how much of the variation in this difference is potentially due to 
individual sorting as opposed to the anchoring amenity itself. Some key questions include:  
1. Are treated neighborhoods attracting a different type of individual, or are they able to 
keep the same type of individual better?  
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2. Are treated neighborhoods significantly more or less expensive than their non-treated 
counterparts?  
3. How much of variation in price in treated neighborhoods can be explained by individual 
types of people?  
Here we again treat rents as endogenous with conditional expectations of key individual-level 
variables. A simple comparison of mean type across treated and non-treated neighborhoods 
answers the first counterfactual question: individuals who are attracted to treated neighborhoods 
are generally not different in type, as  
E(β/α|DCD)−E(β/α|CONTROL) is not significantly different from zero. This is actually rather 
encouraging; it tells us that both neighborhoods have renters with similar rent response to 
changes in price, but the marginal effects of community we derived above that explain the 
residual duration time of an individual are better explained by treatment effects. This suggests 
that the same type of person is more likely to stay longer in a treated area than an un-treated one.  
Treated areas would seem likely to have a larger rent given the presence of a significant 
anchoring amenity. A quick comparison of means suggests rents are 27% higher in the treated 
sample, with significance at 99% confidence. A quick difference-in-differences that simply looks 
at treatments before and after the recessionary shock indicates there are little grounds for 
causality, however. Then, this may be due to sampling and we do not have a strong case for item 
(2) above.  
The final question is perhaps the most interesting. The counterfactual poses the question 
as to the elasticity of this price volatility to the local type distribution of individuals. In other 
words, how much of local type is responsible for determining prices and how much of price is 
derived from local amenities and the “basket of goods” provided by the neighborhood?  
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In theory, this component of variation should be nonzero as suppliers should be elastic to 
mover preferences. The suppliers are likely to have some prior about reservation rents and 
reservation amenity levels and can use this to create the distribution of offered prices, Pj. This 
distribution is weakly centered in the range mini:i∈I j 𝑅i to maxi:i∈I j 𝑅i - the maximal and minimal 
rent tolerances of a neighborhood’s current residents. Put simply, the distribution of houses 
supplied should be concentrated in the levels of rent with nonzero demand. As the region attracts 
individuals of heterogeneous types, we therefore expect the price distribution to become more 
variable. This supplier elasticity can be an important variable for policy decision-making which 
allows for assessment of supplier responsiveness to consumers. Such elasticities have been used 
to assess consumer protection and predatory lending, as potential examples of applications.  
There are two ways to test transmission of individual types to prices. One is a simple 
variance decomposition of Var(Pj). Another considers the possibility that suppliers uses 
previous-period types to project current-period demand. Consider the simple measure ||∆(Pj)||2 
which describes the magnitude of the change in rents over the course of a year. This is a simple 
measure of price volatility that eliminates the need to predict positive or negative price shifts, 
focusing just on the scale of the shift in prices. We expect that this second measure is going to 
capture a more realistic picture of supplier behavior than the former, as instantaneous variance 
should not be predicted by instantaneous types. Consider first the model for a simple difference 
in price changes:  
 
The model regresses price changes on the mean type of individual in the previous period, 
adding a city-level fixed effect and a recession control. The coefficients are reported in table (4). 
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The model suggests that about 8% of the variation in log-price changes are accounted for by the 
variation in individual types. The table suggests, further, that as the expected mean time 
increases, the rent variability is decreasing, yet as asymptotic duration increases, rent variability 
increases. This seems like a contradiction until one remembers that both are correlated with E(α). 
The analysis suggests that α tends to drive up rent variability - this makes sense, as alpha for the 
individual is driven by the ratio of the drift of their rent stochastic process over its variance. This 
regression becomes a proper test of the model behavior, and the model passes with appropriate 
significance that we can feel comfortable with the stochastic underlying process that defines the 
reduced-form parameters. Further, the model tells us that the proportion of variance 
corresponding to heterogeneity, when rising by a single percentage point, can drive up rent 
variability by 2.5%. This is a significant impact that suggests that suppliers are highly responsive 
to variation in individual types in the previous years as a proxy for rent-setting in the current year 
with an elasticity of 2.49.  
 
Table 4: Model estimated for (25). 
 
This counterfactual analysis thus provides several additional insights: first, that the 
interpretation of the stochastic process is reflected in the data even though rent data itself is not 
used in the calibration of the model. Second, that the individual type of persons across 
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neighborhoods is not different just because of designation. Yet third, that a significant piece of 




The result of the key regression in (24) suggests that designation of districts as a policy 
choice may significantly increase the lifespan of a neighborhood in the face of a recession, if 
only marginally in effect size. The cultivation of this type of loyalty can have significant effects 
on city budgets in moments of crisis by increasing the likelihood of having a stable tax base, and 
can further drive longer-lasting city growth. Yet, this analysis suggests a complexity to the 
narrative of the designated cultural district. DCDs make neighborhoods more robust to 
productivity shocks, in a manner which is masked when they are considered in aggregate (see 
Tables (2) and (1)). Put simply, micro-data and deeper local insights reveal variation that is 
masked in the overall distribution.  
The income dynamics of designation are yet unexplored, however. It is clear that 
designated cultural districts upon designation tend to drive up rents (simple correlation analysis 
suggests a bump of 27% over neighbors) and attract potentially wealthier individuals, which in 
turn helps drive increased asymptotic duration in such localities. However, it is unclear whether 
displacement from DCDs after designation may actually drive out the highest-loyalty residents; 
the counterfactual result as to who drives the response to recession cited above is difficult to test 
without more complete records. If the creators of cultural capital have left post-designation, 
perhaps these neighborhoods would have been even more robust to recession - or less so. Thus, a 
causal tension still persists.  
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An important result of this paper is further the application of the labor economics 
paradigm to the neighborhood choice literature, or a component of the neighborhood choice 
process. The model is robustly corroborated by rental data as discovered in the section discussing 
price effects. This test provides useful elasticity estimation that can suggest how well landlords 
respond to individual renters. By studying when people leave neighborhoods, this analysis 
suggests, economists can learn a great deal about where neighborhoods fail their residents. 
Further, the analysis is conducted on neighborhood-level histograms of micro-data and is still 
able to garner remarkable insight on distributions of important sufficient statistics. This approach 
therefore suggests that the model might be further empowered with more granular and 
descriptive micro-data to get useful individual-level results as well. The additional power can be 
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Appendix 
A Expanding on the Individual-Level Problem  
With the given stochastic process for rents, the present value of rents will satisfy the Bellman-
Jacobi-Hamilton equations:  
 
The solution of this set of parallel equations across all neighborhoods, r.  
 
where the poles have opposite sign and are the roots of the N-dimensional equation r = λ j (μj + 
λj σ 
2
j /2). A solution to this equation should also satisfy the equations:  
 
The conditions require value functions to be continuous and differentiable at the 
boundaries. Finally, we have two conditions which ensure no bubble around employment or 
unemployment:  
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These equations ensure that for an arbitrarily low rent, the value functions all converge to 
the value of moving to another neighborhood and if the rent increases without bound then the 
value function converges to the value of living in neighborhood j.  
The no-bubble conditions (34) imply that all k : k ≠ j in (27), uk = 0. Otherwise, the 
expected value of neighborhood j will diverge relative to other neighborhoods as rent grows 





Then, we end up with 4N − 4 equations in the unknowns (uj,𝑅,𝑅),∀j ∈ {1,...,N} from the 
conditions in (28). The values uj must be positive since it is feasible to stay in one neighborhood 
forever or never arrive in that neighborhood for all time.  
These arguments collectively demonstrate that there exists a unique fixed cost which 
optimizes the width of inaction 𝑅—𝑅 . This section merely extended the initial argument of the 
base paper to an N-dimensional setting with total equivalence across possible classes, rather than 
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having an employment-unemployment asymmetric value function. See Alvarez for more 
information on this.  
 
B Filtering 
High-Pass Filter  
I proposed using a filter in the frequency domain (essentially a high-pass filter around the 
annual frequency to penalize excessive changes in slope) to target one of the specific causes of 
the noisiness of the empirical data. The second proposal comes from Alvarez et al. (2015), which 
is the use of a Hodrick-Prescott filter.  
I start with the Fourier analysis approach. Taking the Fourier transform and removing the 
annual component of the data results in the transformation shown in Figure 9. Recall the original 
histogram shown in Figure 4 for comparison. The filtering operation essentially wipes out most 
of the noise corresponding to the peaks at 12 months and 24 months (minus the right-censoring 
effect at 24 months), though the semi-annual peaks are still present (as we do not filter out in six-
month increments). The data captures the essential patterns of the original histogram  
 
Figure 9: High-pass filtered histogram of frequency of moves. 
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Figure 10: Hodrick-Prescott filtered histogram of frequency of moves. 
without being too noisy. However, cutting out some of the frequencies in the upper range has 
also left some of the other information out of the final analysis; the histogram is less granular and 
I believe the filtering leaves too simplified a model in place. In fact, the slope after the first year 
shows why this filtering operation cannot stand; it is far too steep a dropoff and far too deep of 
one as well. The time domain has lost too much information in the process. Raising the high-pass 
filter barrier does not fix this problem.  
Hodrick-Prescott Filtering  
The second option, the Hodrick-Prescott filter, was used in the study which precedes this 
paper. It has come under immense scrutiny for similar reasons behind the rejection of the high-
pass filtering exercise above; it simply cleans up the data too much to the point that trends which 
may be spurious become emphasized. From (10), this seems to be exactly what results. In par- 
ticular, the filter essentially creates a clean sine wave out of the data. This clean functional result 
is interesting in its own right, but may lead to an easy overfitting by most models and makes the 
censoring corrections less easy to conduct. The filter embeds this information directly into the 
trendline, so using the trend seems disingenuous.  
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I rejected both of these procedures before conducting the analysis, and the following two 
sections discuss alternate ways of ensuring the data is workable while making fewer assumptions 
about the validity of parts of the data or where the information in the data exists. A carte blanche 
filtering operation is likely too liberal given that the structural model already places an assumed 
stochastic structure on the model, but it was important to discuss given preceding literature.  
C Regression Summary Tables  
C.1 Base Model  
 
C.2 Model without Time Coefficients  
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C.3 Model with Heterogeneity Controls  
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Table 5: Table of coefficients for the difference estimator is denoted, “DD.” 
 
Table 6: Table of coefficients for the model in (22) without time coefficients. The basic 
difference-in-difference estimator is denoted, “DD.” 
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Table 7: Table of coefficients for the model in (22) without time coefficients and an added term 
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Notes: 
1 (Couture and Handbury, 2017) 
2 (Bounds, 2006) 
3 (Kanai and Kenttamaa-Squires, 2015) 
4 (Christafore and Leguizamon, 2018) 
5 (Ratiu, 2013) 
6 (Redfearn, 2009) 
7 (Kubrin and Ishizawa, 2012) 
8 (Lee and Lin, 2017) for more on persistent amenities 
9 (Deng et al., 2003) 
10 (Temkin and Rohe, 1998) 
11 (Anenberg, 2016) 
12 Alvarez et al. (2015). 
13 (Nekoei and Weber, 2015) 
14 (Brinch, 2007)(Hobbs, 2015) 
15 Spinnewijn (2015) 
16 (Kroft and Notowidigdo, 2016) 
17 (Bayer and McMillan, 2005) 
18 (Bayer et al., 2016) 
19 (Givord et al., 2013) 
20 (Shaw and Hagemans, 2015) 
21 (Sakizliog ̆lu, 2014) 
22 (Edlund et al., 2015) 
23 (Liu et al., 2017) (Furman and Orszag, 2015) 
24 (Bhattacharya et al., 2017) 
25 (Kroft et al., 2016) 
26 (Becker and Jahn, 2015) 
27 (Lee and Lin, 2017) 
28 (Kanai and Kenttamaa-Squires, 2015) 
29 (Kaplan, 1998) 
30 (Silverman et al., 2015) 
31 (Pedersen, 2001) 
32 (Schuetz et al., 2018) 
33 (Lee and Lin, 2017) 
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Abstract 
Reservations have long formed a fundamental tenet of affirmative action in India. Quotas 
for representation of various disadvantaged groups proliferate across public educational 
institutions and government jobs. However, elections to public office have largely escaped such 
quotas, except those that are caste-based. A shift in this status quo occurred in 1992 with the 
establishment of the Panchayati Raj system of grassroots governance. 34% of all seats under 
Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) were to be reserved for women under the 73rd amendment. 
Another constitutional amendment passed in September 2009 increased PRI quotas for women to 
50%. This paper seeks to examine if the 2009 increase in mandated female representation in 
PRIs from 34% to 50% had an impact on female candidates’ performance in Lok Sabha and 
Vidhan Sabha elections, where there continue to be no quotas for women. I seek to understand if 
reservations indeed change underlying voter behavior—do descriptive changes in representation 
at one level motivate changes at another? Given that largely the same electorate votes for 
candidates at differing levels of government, it is likely that change in attitudes towards 
candidates at one level impacts elections to higher levels of government.  
This paper contributes to literature by examining the upward impact of quotas in PRIs on 
elections to levels of government that do not have reservations for female candidates, thus giving 
a better indication of underlying change in general voter behavior. I found largely insignificant 
or slightly negative effects of female reservation on performance of female candidates in Lok 
Sabha and Vidhan Sabha elections immediately succeeding the imposition of these reservations 
in 2009. Even as female representation may signal the progressive nature of a society, there is 
some evidence of a backlash effect that may go away (or is simply difficult to assess over time). 
There is hazard in arguing the quotas can solve the problems of regressive social norms—
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mandating 34 to 50% quotas in communities where women take up less than 10% of political 
seats can lead to unforeseen effects, and reduce the quota to a form of token, statistical 
representation for women. However, the initial hesitancy and backlash can lead the way to a 
positive equilibrium and more equitable society in the long run, achieving change that would 
have otherwise taken decades to attain organically. 
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Introduction 
 
Reservations have long formed a fundamental part of affirmative action policy in India. 
Quotas for representation of various disadvantaged groups—stratified along lines of caste, 
economic status, linguistic identity and gender—proliferate across public educational institutions 
and government jobs. However, elections to public office have largely escaped such quotas, except 
caste-based ones.1 A major shift in this status quo occurred in 1992, when the incumbent coalition 
government passed the 73rd Amendment to the Constitution, thereby establishing the Panchayati 
Raj system of grassroots governance which mandated 1/3rd reservation of seats for women. The 
amendment institutionalized a third level of governance in India, below the existing national (Lok 
Sabha) and state legislatures (Vidhan Sabhas) (Figure 1).2 Panchayati Raj Institution’s (PRIs) 
major responsibilities were to administer local infrastructure (public buildings, water, roads) and 
identify targeted welfare recipients. [4]  
In a landmark move, 34% of all seats in PRIs were to be reserved for women. The policy 
promised to radically change Indian political dynamics at time when less then 7.6% of Lok Sabha 
members and 3.8% of candidates in the general elections identified as female. Another 
constitutional amendment passed in September 2009 increased PRI quotas for women from 34% 
to 50%. By the general elections in 2014, 19 of India’s 28 states and union territories had 
implemented the 50% reservation (Figure 2).3 
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This paper will seek to examine if the 2009 increase in mandated female representation in 
PRIs from 34% to 50% impacted female candidates’ performance in Lok Sabha and Vidhan Sabha 
elections, where there continue to be no quotas for women. In doing so, I seek to understand if 
reservations indeed change voter behavior. One can expect that reservations for women have a 
positive impact on voter attitudes towards female policymakers, improving female candidates’ 
performance in elections. Given that largely the same electorate votes for candidates at differing 
levels of government, it is likely that change in attitudes towards candidates at one level impacts 
elections to higher levels of government. I will seek to test this hypothesis through my analysis. 
While existing literature on the topic has examined the change in voter attitudes towards female 
candidates at the same level of government (i.e. Panchayati Raj), this paper contributes to literature 
by examining the upward impact of quotas in PRIs on elections to higher tiers of government that 
do not have reservations for female candidates, thus giving a better indication of underlying 
changes in general voter behavior. 
 
Background 
Historically, attitudes towards female empowerment in India, as in most of the world, have 
often been regressive. The medieval ages bore witness to practices like sati—where widowed 
wives were burnt on the pyre alongside their dead husbands—dowry, child marriage, and rampant 
discrimination, compounded by oppressive societal structures like the caste system. 19th and 20th 
century India saw significant strides towards greater female representation in public life. Several 
of the independence movement’s greatest leaders were women. The likes of Sarojini Naidu, Annie 
Beasant, and Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit broke the conventional mold society crafted for women. They 
appeared in public life, campaigned before masses and advocated for Indian 
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freedom from British colonial rule. Upon independence in 1947, the country adopted a 
Constitution more progressive than the society it was drafted for. The Constitution enshrined 
universal adult suffrage, preceding several powerful democracies in the West, and by 1966, Indira 
Gandhi was elected as the first female head of state, an achievement yet to be realised in U.S.A. 
 
However, these singular achievements do not reflect broader trends in society. While 
the status of women in Indian society has progressively improved since independence, 21st century 
India faces several challenges including sexual harassment, female foeticide, and dismal levels of 
female participation in public and professional life. The country ranked 130th on UNDP’s gender 
inequality index, which considers metrics such as female labor force participation, education, 
maternal mortality and representation in Parliament. [11] The female literacy rate is 65.46% 
compared to 82.14% for men. [1] While women form over 80% of the informal sector employed 
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in agriculture and dairy, they account for less than 30% of the population engaged in paid work. 
[9]  
Attitudes towards gender also vary dramatically across the country. This is reflected in the 
range of sex ratios across states (Figure 3). Sex-selective abortion and female infanticide are 
especially rampant in North Indian states. Haryana has only 834 female children per 1000 males—
one of the most skewed sex ratios in the world. Similar geographical discrepancies can be noted 
in the number of cases of dowry deaths reported (Figure 15). [19] India has also gained 
international infamy for incidents of violence against women. A spate of brutal rape cases in 2012 
mobilized large parts of the country to advocate for female empowerment. These social 
movements had political ramifications, with parties tweaking their platforms to appeal to the 
popular mood, and coincided with the institution of 50% reservation in PRIs. Conversation in the 
public sphere on issues of women’s empowerment thus took on a renewed urgency between the 
2009 and 2014 elections. 
Female political participation has increased since independence but representation 
in legislative houses remains abysmally low. The rate of voter turnout among women for Lok 
Sabha elections in 1962 was 46.63% (compared to 63.63% for men) and rose to 65.63% in 2014 
(versus 67.09% for men) (Figure 4). This change occurred as female representation peaked in the 
16th Lok Sabha, elected in 2014, where 11.5% of seats were won by female candidates and 7.6% 
of contestants were women (Figure 4). This places India at the 151st position in the UNDP 
rankings based on proportion of female members of Parliament, behind countries like Iraq, Jordan 
and Senegal, that perform worse on other metrics. [11] However, broader measures of political 
participation, such as representation and engagement at state level elections, as measured by the 
World Economic Forum, place India 9th worldwide, indicating greater overall female political 
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participation as compared to several OECD countries. [6] This may point to some sort of glass 
ceiling for female representation—while female candidates are well received at lower levels of 
government, that often have greater provisions for female affirmative action, they face significant 
barriers in advancing to the highest echelons of power. Considering trends from past elections, one 
can note that while the number of female candidates has risen significantly, more than doubling 
between 1999 and 2014, the number of elected female MPs has stayed relatively stable. The overall 
gender composition of the House has thus not changed. In 2014, only 368 out of 548 constituencies 
saw at least one female candidate contesting, and only 63 female candidates won a seat. However, 
women tend to have a higher success rate, defined as the ratio of the number of winners versus 
number of candidates for each gender. In 2014, 9.4% of all female candidates ultimately won a 
seat compared to 6.3% of male candidates (Figure 6). Given the high barriers to female candidacy, 
it may simply be the case that female candidates are stronger on average than their male 
counterparts which motivates their decision to run in an otherwise fraught environment. They may 
also have greater funds and backing from the parties whose platforms they contest on. 
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Literature Review 
Quotas are a popular system of mandated affirmative action across the world, especially 
with regards to gender. These may manifest in terms of voluntary self-imposed party quotas, 
legislated candidate quotas (which mandate a certain proportion of candidacies are reserved for 
women), and reserved seats (which only women can contest). Of the countries that currently have 
gender quotas, 61% have voluntary party quotas, 38% have legislated candidate quotas, and 20% 
have reserved seats. [10] Gender quotas were first introduced in Nordic countries in the 1970s, by 
setting a 40% target for “representation of both sexes on electoral lists.” This was quickly followed 
by similar schemes in Latin America (legislated candidate quotas) and other Western European 
countries (voluntary party quotas). Such policy measures can have drastic effects in short periods 
of time. For example, Rwanda, where only 18% of members of parliament were female in the 
1990s, introduced 30% quotas for women in 2003. Since the change Rwanda has gone on to elect 
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Parliaments comprised of 56% and 64% women in the 2008 and 2013 elections respectively. [18] 
Most countries in the top 20 rankings for female representation in the national legislature exercise 
some form of quota policy for women. [17] Thus quotas actively change the descriptive make ups 
of legislative houses, which can spur substantive change in policy making as well. In 2018, Clayton 
and Zitterberg found that increased female representation led to greater relative spending on public 
health, and decreased expenditure on military. [16] 
In the Indian context, female political participation has been the subject of much research, 
the large democracy affording a fertile testing ground for regression based analyses. The 1992 
introduction of reservation in PRIs involved randomized allocation of Panchayat seats to women. 
This forms an important largescale natural experiment that can isolate the causal effects and 
impacts of female representation in local leadership. Male and female political leaders often make 
different policy decisions, which can have ramifications for the constituencies that elect them. 
Further literature has examined the impact of quotas for women in female political participation, 
both as candidates and as voters in elections. 
In a report for the World Bank, Rohini Pande (2012) lists popular arguments for and against 
gender-based quotas: [10] 
Pro-quota: 
1. Improves descriptive and substantive representation 
2. Reduces taste-based discrimination, as a result of regressive social norms and 
perceptions in the electorate 
3. Increases information about the performance and competence of female candidates, 
countering prevailing social norms and leading to the role model effect as more women are 
inspired to participate in the political process 
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4. Improves investment in women and education, as female policy makers are more 
familiar with the demands of their constituents 
Anti-quota: 
1. May lead to crowding out of other minorities, as women from the most privileged groups 
stand to benefit 
2. Worsens allocation of leadership positions if female candidates are less competent or 
experienced than male counterparts 
3. Worsens attitudes among voters if they believe their choices are restricted as a result of 
the quota, or severely contradict prevailing social norms. This may lead to a backlash effect 
against female candidates 
 
The election of female policy makers has been associated with increased provision of 
public goods [4], lower levels of corruption [3] and greater investment in education. [2] 
Considering the 1992 reservation, Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) studied the impact of policy 
making by female leaders on the provision of public goods. [4] They noted that investment in 
drinking water and provision of public goods significantly increased in seats reserved for women. 
Female policy makers thus take decisions that more closely reflect issues that are relevant to 
villagers. This indicates that female holders of political office are as, if not more, capable as their 
male counterparts. Clots-Figueras (2012) and Beaman et al (2012) noted that educational 
attainment rates improved in seats reserved for women councilors. [2] [8] They found that the 
“gender gap in adolescent educational attainment was erased” and closed by 20 and 32% in 
parental and adolescent aspirations, respectively.4 
210




 211 of 275 
These positive associations should be able to counter prevailing misogynistic prejudices 
among voters against female candidates. Observing the success of female Panchayat members may 
thus improve information about female competence in policy making and motivate voters to vote 
for female candidates in state and general elections. While exposure may alter social perceptions, 
Rudman and Fairchild (2004) argue that it may also lead to a “backlash effect.” [12] A mandated 
quota may be seen as restricting voter choice or violating voters’ sense of identity with regards to 
a traditionally male-dominated profession. This could lead to female candidates underperforming 
on average as voters react to a policy deemed unfair. However, Beaman et al (2009) note that 
through the exposure effect, in the long-run quotas can improve the precision of voters’ 
information about the expected effectiveness of future female leaders thereby reducing statistical 
discrimination. They write, “mandated exposure can improve the perception of women leaders’ 
effectiveness by reducing the risk associated with electing a woman.” [15] They study this 
phenomenon in PRIs, noting that despite an initial backlash in the first succeeding election cycle, 
after ten years of quotas, women are more likely to “stand for, and win, elected positions in 
councils required to have a female chief councilor in the previous two elections.” They argue that 
exposure to female councilors thus improves perceptions of female leader effectiveness and 
weakens stereotypes about gender roles in the public and domestic spheres. Representation further 
encourages future female candidacy. Bhalotra et al (2011) note that women winning office leads 
to a 9.2% increase in female candidates fielded by major political parties in subsequent elections. 
[13] While they argue that this is a result of incumbent female candidates being more likely to 
contest again (as opposed to an entry of new female candidates) there is also an observed reduction 
in party bias against female candidates. 
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While the literature seems promising these studies have focused on the change in voter 
behavior in successive elections within one level of government—the Panchayati Raj. In this 




I use a regression model to isolate the treatment effect of the implementation of 50% 
reservation in some states after the 2009 and before the 2014 general elections to the Lok Sabha 
(Figure 2). I estimate the following model: 
 
Here, the treatment effect is denoted by δ and gives us the impact of female reservations 
on the dependent variable.  I consider the following three dependent variables: 
1. mean vote share: a continuous variable denoting the percentage of vote share received by a 
candidate in a given race. This can help isolate changes in female candidate’s performance, even if 
the reservation does not actually lead to them winning more seats. As noted below, I modify this 
variable to account for competition in different electoral races by subtracting the mean vote share 
for a candidate in a given election. 
2. Win: a binary variable that takes on values of 0 and 1 depending on whether the candidate wins the 
seat.  I run probit regressions on this variable due to its binary nature. 
3. Position: discrete variable that gives the rank of a candidate in a given race and, like mean vote 
share, can provide a more accurate assessment of performance of female candidates 
γie consists of dummy variables to account for other observed measures and fixed effects, to 
better isolate the effect of reservations. 
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In particular, I include interactions between the female dummy and variables like incumbency 
and turnout to isolate any gender-specific effects. For example, the anti-incumbency effect may be 
stronger against women or female candidates’ performance may change with change in voter 
turnout, as less motivated or politically active members of the electorate exercise their suffrage. I 
also include party interactions with year to account for general voting trends for or against one 
party in a given election cycle.5 For instance, it may be possible that more women win in an 
election cycle. However, if the party that is favored regardless has more female candidates, this 
does not point us to a causal impact of the reservation—more females are elected simply due to 
their association with the popular party. 
This analysis could be made more robust by controlling for socio-economic variables such as 
literacy rate, sex rate, female work force participation etc., which all point to the community’s 
prevailing perceptions of gender norms. However, I was not able to find data that is granular 
enough to improve the model’s fit.6 I thus rely on the assumption that these underlying socio-
economic variables would not have changed significantly over the five-year time span between the 
2009 and 2014 general elections. To ensure that female candidacy did not differ significantly 
before the imposition of the reservation, I further run a differences t-test on the treatment and 
control constituencies before the increased reservation was enacted as a robustness check. While 
the proportion of female candidates is slightly lower in the treatment group, the difference is not 
significant (Figure 7). 
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I further conduct this analysis through three approaches: 
1. a naive regression including all seats contested and candidates winning more than 5% of the vote 
share in the 2009 and 2014 elections 
2. considering only those constituencies that are geographically contiguous and lie on borders of 
pairs of states that did and did not implement the 50% increase in reservation (Figure 16). I 
assume these groups of contiguous constituencies have similar baseline attitudes towards women, 
reducing bias from unobserved differences, and allowing us to more accurately determine the 
treatment effect 
3. while the first two approaches consider the nationwide general elections to the Lok Sabha, one may 
argue that upward impacts of reservations at the Panchayat level may not reach the highest level of 
public office within five years of quota implementation. I thus consider the performance of women 
in Vidhan Sabha elections before and after the imposition of the additional reservation. This 
estimate may be more biased since it is harder to isolate underlying trends from the treatment effect 
of the reservation as all constituencies in a given state experience the increase in reservation and I 
simply estimate the change in performance across the two Vidhan Sabha elections, with some 
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controls.7 It is thus difficult to conclude whether the model captures the causal effect of 
reservations, or simply reflects an underlying trend due to other factors. 
 
Data 
The primary datasets I used are sourced from the Trivedi Center for Political Data at 
Ashoka University. The datasets note all candidates who contested seats in state and general 
elections, and their performance in terms of votes and margins. [5] I carried out some fuzzy 
matching across candidate names to generate incumbency variables. I manually coded in 
geographically contiguous constituencies for the second part of my analysis. The dummy variable 
reservation_50 accounts for all states that implemented 50% reservation for women in PRIs 
following the September 2009 legislation. 
 
Reducing Noise 
Candidates contesting elections in India have to pay a security deposit.8 Candidates that 
fail to secure more than 1.6th of the votes cast in the constituency lose their deposit. In the 2014 
general elections, 84.8% of the 8,301 contesting candidates lost their deposits (Figure 8). Digging 
deeper into the vote share distribution, one can note that over 74.32% of candidates secured less 
than 1% of the vote in the 2014 elections (amounting to 6,169 of 8,301 candidates contesting). 
One can assume that candidates who secure such small percentages of the vote share were never 
serious contenders in the first place. Their performance is largely random and not indicative of 
underlying voter attitudes. I seek to reduce the noise in the data and better isolate the treatment 
effect of the reservations on serious contenders to these positions by dropping all candidates who 
obtain less than 5% vote share. 
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By-Elections 
I only consider candidates running for elections during general elections in 2009 and 2014. 
A small number of seats, comprising 1.3% of candidates in the dataset, are contested through by-
elections between the 2009 and 2014 general elections (Figure 9). By-elections are conducted to 
fill seats that become empty usually due to the death or resignation of the sitting MP. However, 
these are small in number and to keep comparisons consistent, I drop these candidates from the 
dataset. 
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Normalizing Candidate Vote Shares 
To analyze regressions considering vote share as a dependent variable, I modify the 
variable by each electoral race to make the coefficients more comparable, as the difficulty of an 
electoral race may depend on the number of competent candidates contesting (Figure 17, 18). For 
example, a 5% vote share gain in a two-way electoral race implies a differing degree of candidate 
strength compared to a 5% gain in a race with more than four candidates. If there were greater 
number of competent candidates in a race, gaining the same amount of vote share could require 
substantially larger amounts of effort. To account for this, I modify the vote share won by each 
candidate in every unique electoral race (by year and constituency) by subtracting vote share in 
that electoral race from the candidate’s vote share.9 
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Results and Analysis 
Impact of 2009 Amendment for 50% Reservation 
The results from my model yield largely inconclusive or negative evidence regarding the 
causal impact of quotas for women on their performance in Lok Sabha elections. Under the naive 
regression (Table 1), I get insignificant results across my three dependent variables.10 The 
treatment effect on vote share is weakly positive while dependent variables win and position also 
pick up some negative impact of the reservation.11 
The more telling analysis follows from the second, constrained dataset (Table 2). 
Analyzing only neighboring constituencies in the treatment and control groups accounts for 
underlying differences in prevailing social norms, that are not captured by the variables in the 
model. I further include dummy variables to account for the various groupings of these 
geographically contiguous constituencies (Figure 16). These models yield better fit and more 
consistent coefficients. The treatment effect is seen to be negative across the models considering 
vote share and win probability as the dependent variables and positive for the model considering 
position—indicating worse performance by female candidates in states with 50% mandated 
reservation in PRIs. Model (4) yields a significant result at a 5% significance level. Since this is a 
probit model, I compute the marginal effects of the coefficients to enable interpretation (Figure 
21). The marginal effects indicate that female candidates contesting from reserved constituencies 
have a 38.6% lower likelihood of winning the election. However, this significance gets diminished 
once party and geography controls are added, though the coefficient remains negative, indicating 
some degree of backlash effect. It may seem that in geographically contiguous constituencies, an 
increase mandated representation at the PRI level for the treatment constituencies, while the status 
quo is maintained in the control constituencies, leads to a backlash against female candidates 
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contesting Lok Sabha seats in the treatment constituencies, even as underlying social norms and 
perceptions remain largely the same across the two groups. 
Running a naive differences t-test on the treatment group shows a significant 1.07 
percentage point increase in female candidacy between the 2009 and 2014 elections (Figure 10). 
However, this is marginally less than the 1.13 percentage point increase seen nationwide (Figure 
11). This marginal difference concurs with the results of the regression—the effect of the 
reservation seems to be insignificant and marginal at best. However, digging into this change 
further, we see that there is significant fluctuation in changes across the control group, while the 
change in the treatment states is consistently positive (though of smaller magnitude) (Figure 12). 
Much of the control states’ outperformance is driven by an almost 10% increase in female 
candidacy in Uttar Pradesh, which did not implement the reservation but is the biggest state in 
India and holds 80 Lok Sabha seats. 
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Impact on Vidhan Sabha Elections 
Each state in India also holds elections for the state legislature and chief minstership every five 
to six years. However, these elections cycles are not synchronized and multiple states go to election 
each year. I sought to estimate a similar regression model for several states that conducted elections 
before and after the adoption of the 2009 change (Table 4). I carried out these regressions on vote 
share of candidates, to note change in performance of female candidates. The initial results here 
are not very promising—the treatment effect seems largely insignificant and there is variation in 
the sign and magnitude of the coefficient across the states. However, the two models that yield 
best fit, Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh, also have negative coefficients on the reservation 




Change in Female Vote Share and Candidacy Since 1992 
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Current literature on the topic of mandated female representation suggests that quotas lead to 
a backlash effect in the short run (one election cycle) but after ten years the observed effects are 
positive as voters become acquainted with the competence of female administrators and underlying 
biases are altered. [15] The results from my regression based analysis are in agreement with the 
backlash effect though the strength of the effect is hard to isolate due to the several other interacting 
factors when considering voter attitudes between PRIs and elections to higher levels of 
government. The effect has been consistently negative even as the magnitude is hard to determine. 
However, in my earlier analyses I simply consider one succeeding election cycle, that occurred 
within five years of the change in policy. It may be the case that the backlash effect goes away 
after several years and female reservations ultimately lead to a new positive equilibrium. The 
instatement of PRIs in 1992 could thus allow me to examine the impact of reservations over time. 
In 1992, mandated female representation was imposed in PRIs across the country, 
increasing female quotas from 0% to 34%. The impact here would thus also be much more 
profound than a simple increase in already existing quotas of the kind that occurred in 2009. To 
examine this theory, I run Bonferroni tests on the aggregate female vote share, female candidacy 
and female win percentage to note changes across election cycles. 
The first general election after the instatement of the PRI occurred in 1996. The simple 
difference in means indicates that women actually fared worse in these elections (Figure 13), 
garnering lesser aggregate vote share even as the proportion of female candidates contesting 
increased significantly by 48.29% (Figure 14). While this is a naive estimate and does not control 
for many factors, it is telling that the number of female candidates fielded could increase so 
significantly within one election cycle. This result seems to agree with both the role model effect—
female candidates are inspired by seeing other women in strong leadership and are motivated to 
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contest elections—as well as the backlash effect—even as more female candidates contest they are 
able to amass even less of the popular vote share. Over time, the female vote share percentage 
increases significantly, and is up 1.7 percentage points by the 1998 general elections. Interestingly, 
a similar backlash effect is not seen between the 2009 and 2014 general elections, when female 
vote share increases by 2.7 percentage points. However, this naive differences-in-mean estimate 
may simply be picking up general trends towards female empowerment in society. The period 
between 2009 and 2014 general elections was particularly important for the Indian feminist 
movement as noted above. Several incidents of sexual assault sparked off nation-wide protests and 
conversations regarding female empowerment in the country, leading to parties altering their 
platforms to appeal to sentiments in the electorate. 
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Shortcomings 
My main regression model considers the 2009 natural experiment which involved an 
increase in quota from 34% to 50%, and not an instatement of quotas from scratch. The observed 
impacts on voter behavior may thus appear relatively muted since some mandated exposure to 
female policymakers has already occurred due to the 34% reservation that prevailed from 1993 till 
the policy change in 2009. After accounting for this fact, my paper seems to address the question 
of whether an increase in mandated representation further alters voters’ perceptions and prevailing 
social norms. As per the exposure and role model effect theories, and corroborated by the results 
yielded by analyses, I hazard a guess that change in voter behavior due to an increase in quotas is 
incremental at best. 
This paper’s biggest shortcoming is that I was not able to study the 1993 natural experiment 
when quotas for women went from 0% to 34% across the entire country. This would have allowed 
for a more direct comparison of no-quota versus quota scenarios, as well as allowed me to consider 
more election cycles to note the long-term impact of mandated representation. However, I faced 
several limitations in carrying out such an analysis. Firstly, the 1993 policy change involved all 
states and constituencies in India. This makes it difficult to isolate the causal treatment effect from 
underlying societal trends towards female empowerment that would have existed regardless of the 
quotas. Secondly, on a more logistical note (and an issue that can surely be solved with adequate 
resolve), I could not conduct more long-term analyses since I did not have constituency level data 
for variables such as literacy rate, sex ratio, female infanticide rates, female workforce 
participation etc., that would have affected attitudes female candidates as well. I was able to do 
away with this data in the 2009-2014 analysis under the assumption that underlying variables 
would not have changed significantly in a five-year time span. However, any analysis exceeding 
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ten-year or more than three election cycles, must need to control for these socio-economic 
variables. 
Further precision could have been achieved by mapping PRI districts to Lok Sabha 
constituencies and accounting for the exact areas that had female reservation and during which 
election cycles. Female reservation is randomly allocated across PRI seats and often changes 
between election cycles. My analysis aggregated such effects at the state level and thus yields a 
lower magnitude of the treatment effect. This would also allow the analysis to be in line with 
existing literature, which has noted that voters become more amenable to voting for female 
candidates if their PRI seat has been reserved for women over two election cycles. [15] 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I sought to analyze the impact of an increase in mandated female 
representation in PRIs, on the performance of female candidates in elections to the Lok Sabha, 
which does not have similar quotas for women. I found largely insignificant or slightly negative 
effects of female reservation on performance of female candidates in Lok Sabha and Vidhan Sabha 
elections immediately succeeding the imposition of these reservations in 2009. However, my 
analysis does not account for longer run changes in voter attitudes as a result of reservation and 
this forms a compelling topic for future research. 
While the impact of quotas on voter behavior remains unclear, the positive benefits of 
women in policy making, especially in societies where they are historically underrepresented, has 
been empirically proven. India intermittently sees calls for reservation at higher levels of 
government as well, where female representation remains dismal. Even as female representation 
may signal the progressive nature of a society, there is some evidence of a backlash effect that may 
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go away (or is simply difficult to assess over time). In this context, a concept from psychology 
appears particularly pertinent—moral licensing. The term describes a phenomenon in which “past 
good deeds can liberate one to engage in behaviors that are immoral, unethical or otherwise 
problematic, behaviors that one would otherwise avoid for fear of appearing immoral.” [14] Pop 
psychologist Malcolm Gladwell describes moral licensing in the context of the feminist movement, 
noting the sexist backlash against Australia’s first female Prime Minister Julia Gillard after her 
election. [7] He argues that by electing a female head of state, the Australian populace had proved 
its progressiveness and then felt free to go back to its sexist ways. While Gladwell’s argument is 
fraught and several other factors, especially political ones, may have played into Gillard’s 
criticism, this critique did manifest itself in extremely sexist terms. Phenomena like moral 
licensing may thus negate any short run positive gains to be made from mandated female 
representation. There is hazard in arguing the quotas can solve the problems of regressive social 
norms—mandating 34 to 50% quotas in communities where women take up less than 10% of 
political seats can lead to unforeseen effects—and reduce the quota to a form of token, statistical 
representation for women. However, the initial hesitancy and backlash can lead the way to a 
positive equilibrium and more equitable society in the long run, achieving change that would have 
otherwise taken decades to attain organically. The question of whether quotas are indeed the best 
means to increase female representation thus remains open to debate. 
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Notes: 
 
1 85 (15.6%) and 48 (8.9%) seats of 543 constituency Lok Sabha are reserved for candidates from Scheduled Castes 
(SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST) respectively. SC and ST groups comprise 16.6% and 8.6% of the country’s 
population, as per the 2011 national census. [1] 
2 The entire country participates in general elections to the national Lok Sabha, each state has an assembly election 
to a Vidhan Sabha and every municipality has its own Panchayats. 
3 In the same year, the 108th Amendment to the Constitution, proposing 50% reservation of women in the Lok 
Sabha, failed to pass. 
4 However, the authors observed no changes in the female roles and participation in the labor market, arguing that 
the change in attitudes was primarily due to a “role model effect”. 
5 I only include dummies for the INC and BJP here since these are the two dominant parties that contest every seat 
in the Lok Sabha. 
6 Publicly available data can only be obtained from the national census that occurs every ten years (2001, 2011, 
2021) and is available at the state-level 
7 States that have implemented reservation Assam, Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, 
Jharkhand, Kerala, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Odisha, Rajasthan, Sikkim, Tamil Nadu, Tripura, 
Uttarakhand, West Bengal” 
8 amounting to about 25,000 INR or 350 USD for the Lok Sabha elections, and lesser sums for state assembly 
elections 
9 As a sanity check, I looked over the distribution of total sum of vote shares in constituencies (which in theory should 
be 100% in all constituencies). An overwhelming majority of constituencies report 100% votes, with some falling in the 
97-99% range (Figure 19). The discrepancy can probably be attributed to rounding or minor measurement errors—the 
modification of the vote share variable in practice thus matches the theory 
10 Models 3, 6, 9 include state-wise fixed effects 
11 Position signifies rank so a positive coefficient indicates worse performance (i.e. lower rank) as the first ranked 
candidate is the winner 
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Abstract  
 
As access to contraception and family planning becomes more integral to understandings 
of socioeconomic development, discourse surrounding the topic frames women’s ‘unmet need’ 
for contraception as a problem affecting poor, traditionally feminine, third world women. This 
paper will challenge this classic liberal discourse by examining notions of power and capitalist 
goals of development, and through an analysis of twelve major NGOs and IGOs. It will use 
notions of “problem framing” and “solution framing” to construct women in developing 
countries as active subjects capable of choice and creating change. This alternative view 
examines the implicit binary of modern, western women with contraceptive access, and poor, 
tradition-bound, third world women, receiving contraceptives as a gift in order to generate a 
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Introduction  
 
As early as the 1920’s scientists made the transformational discovery of the ability of 
synthetic hormones to prevent ovulation. It was not until the early 1960’s that the contraceptive 
pill, designed for women to control their fertility, entered the market and fundamentally impacted 
the lives of women and the family structure.1 The narrative of the development of the contraceptive 
pill focuses on timelines of biochemical advances and efforts of feminist pioneers such as Margaret 
Sanger.2 However, the mainstream discourse obscures the notable timing of the development of 
the contraceptive pill as occurring concurrently with U.S. involvement in the developing world.3 
As the population of a nation became seen as a vital resource to the state, greater attention was 
placed on the control of which segments of the population were reproducing. As population control 
soon became seen as key to a nation’s modernization and prosperity, contraception became a 
favored tool of development in the global south. The contraceptive pill that had the ability to 
revolutionize women’s control over their bodies immediately became intimately entangled with 
issues of economic development, the modernization imperative, and colonial control.  
Since then, the advent of contraception is commonly understood as a benchmark in the 
development of the socioeconomic well-being of women and their families. The majority of 
studies on the use of contraception focuses on its frequently documented connection to 
socioeconomic development. However, within the literature there are contrasting conclusions 
when delineating the relationship between contraception use and women’s autonomy in fertility 
decisions; some studies show that increased education and economic independence are associated 
with increased use of contraception.4 Other studies counter this; they have shown that even when 
women’s autonomy is increased via socioeconomic development, men often remain in control of 
decisions regarding fertility due to pervasive traditional norms.5 Therefore, studies on the 
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connection between economic development and women’s autonomous choice to use contraception 
are far from conclusive; nevertheless, the presentation of contraception as a socioeconomic tool of 
development holds a consistent presence in the discourse regarding contraception in the 
developing world. Alternatively, an analysis informed by a variety of feminist theories allows the 
use of contraception to be viewed as women’s assertion of autonomy over their reproduction, and 
therefore as an act of resistance in a patriarchal society.  
This alternative view of contraception is essential for recognizing the potential of 
contraception to allow women to reclaim their agency and transform the societies they live in. Yet, 
this is not the way contraception has been presented in discourse. Women’s decisions to limit their 
reproduction have been written about in regard to demographic, health and economic concerns and 
consequences. However, a feminist analysis illuminates an alternative viewpoint that examines the 
resistant nature of a woman’s decision to control her fertility, the conditions that determine whether 
she has the ability to do so, and the implications for making this choice in societies in which 
woman’s autonomy over their fertility is resistant to the patriarchal order. This examination of 
contraceptive use by women in the developing world utilizes postcolonial feminist theory as the 
starting point for analysis. Postcolonial feminist theory destabilizes traditional theories in which 
the colonized subject is absent or rendered inferior, shifting focus to the experience of the 
colonized to articulate and understand the subject’s lived experience.  
Informed by postcolonial feminist theory, along with insights of other feminist theories 
which have enriched and evolved postcolonial feminist thought, I argue that discourse around 
contraceptive use in the developing world must construct women as active subjects and include a 
discussion of women’s individual agency to resist cultural norms in the choice to use 
contraception. While contraception initially presents as an opportunity of liberation for women, I 
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analyze discourse from organizations that advocate for women’s use of birth control in the 
developing world, as well as deliver contraceptive services themselves, in order to uncover the 
dominance of liberal, capitalist assumptions therein. Postcolonial feminist scholarship has exposed 
such assumption for being, at best, inapplicable and, at worst, further oppressive.6 I examine the 
implications of these assumptions within the context of contraception as an act of resistance by an 
active subject.  
I argue that the discourse of economic development stems from a liberal feminist 
perspective that focuses on economic empowerment as a crucial element of gender equality. This 
is significant according to a Foucauldian conception of discourse used in this analysis, which 
reveals discourse to be a mechanism of power, possessing the ability to affect the subject whom is 
objected to it.7 This narrow focus neglects broader elements of a woman’s being. It privileges a 
western, capitalist perspective that ties women’s value to capital production and accumulation, 
further binding them to the patriarchal capitalist system that historically has oppressed women. 
Further, it perpetuates the binary between modern, “liberated,” western women who use 
contraception, and traditional, oppressed women for whom contraception is delivered as a gift 
from the western saviors in their mission to “improve” the developing world by achieving goals 
informed by progressive values. The aim of this study is not to deny that contraception is a 
fundamental human right, as well as an important element of women’s reproductive and maternal 
health. Rather, the aim is to uncover a problematic binary in which contraception is marshalled as 
a defining marker between the “first world” and “third world” woman.8 Discourse around 
contraception in the developing world informed by a feminist analysis must present women as 
active subjects, whose choice to control her reproduction in a world in which fertility choices are 
dominated by men is an act of resistance.  
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Methodology  
In order to expose the liberal, capitalist assumptions in the discourse surrounding 
contraception in the developing world, I engage in a critical discourse analysis of published 
material from eight non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and four intergovernmental (IGOs) 
which provide contraception to women in the developing world (see Appendix). The 
overrepresentation of NGO’s in this selection is a telling representation of the “NGO boom” since 
the 1980s.9 This reflects the way hegemonic neoliberalism has diminished the role of the state and 
government-related institutions, placing greater trust in private organizations such as NGOs. 
NGOs are viewed as market-based actors with greater capacity for efficiency than government-
related IGOs.10 I selected the data set based on the following criteria: each organization has a 
country of origin in the global north, the majority or all of their “target” countries are in the global 
south, and their services include the distribution and/or education of contraceptive methods. These 
contraceptive methods may include oral contraceptives, long-acting reversible methods such as 
the IUD, and abortion, but do not necessarily include all of these methods. The material for the 
analyzed discourse includes published material released by the organization. Most of this material 
was sourced from the website of the organization and includes official published reports as well.  
I divide this published discourse into two broad categories which I have labeled “Problem 
Framing” and “Solution Framing.” Problem framing refers to discourse used to name and describe 
the issue of unmet need for contraception in the developing world. Solution framing refers to the 
discourse describing the organization’s proposed solution and rationalization for its efficacy and 
appropriateness. The analysis is attentive to the three levels of discourse analysis identified by 
Norman Fairclough: discursive practice, text analysis, and social practice.11 Discourse practice 
will inform my understanding of which discourses are called upon to inform these organizations’ 
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perspectives. Text analysis will illuminate how this discourse is translated into agenda-setting. 
Lastly, analysis of the social practice will reveal the impact of this discourse on the construction 
of social and cultural relations and structures in the developing world.  
Problem framing discourse falls under Fairclough’s category of discursive practice as it 
explains how the problem presents in the minds of those thinking about and working on it. Solution 
framing discourse provides the material for text analysis as it describes how the proposed solution 
is translated in the work of these organizations. Solution framing is also the material for analysis 
of social practice as the broader cultural impact of these policies and programs is considered. 
Fairclough’s method frames my consideration of the discourse as it is analyzed with a feminist 
analysis drawing upon a range of contributions to feminist theory. The following section discusses 
the problem and solution framing of contraception using Fairclough’s tools of analysis. The next 
section exemplifies these findings through the case of contraceptive delivery in Puerto Rico. 
Following, I discuss the alternative conception of contraception in the developing world that is 
centered around women as active subjects, for whom contraception is a tool of resistance in a 
patriarchal society. I conclude with summarizing remarks and a call for reconceptualization of 
contraception to guide further policy.  
 
Discursive Framing of Contraception in the Developing World  
Problem Framing  
In this section I use Fairclough’s discursive practice to investigate how the lack of 
contraceptive access in the developing world is framed as a problem, by exposing the narratives 
relied upon to explain this issue in the discourse of western organizations. A lack of available 
contraception is referred to in the literature as women’s “unmet need” for contraception. Unmet 
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need is defined as “nonuse of contraception among women stating a desire to avoid pregnancy.”12 
As a postcolonial feminist, Mohanty problematizes western feminists’ construction of the “third 
world woman” as a homogenous category with uniform challenges and desires.13 Prevalent in the 
discourse is naming of “lack of access” to contraception, with the singular and universal solution 
being access or “met need.” In this way, these organizations’ conception of unmet need contributes 
to the “discursive homogenization and systemization of oppression” of developing world women 
by reducing the explanation of women’s fertility decisions to contraception access.14  
A frequent theme in the discourse revolves around what the World Health Organization 
describes as “cultural or religious opposition” to contraception in the developing world.15 
Population Council also refers to “family or community opposition to family planning.”16 
Similarly, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation speaks of “cultural and knowledge barriers.”17 
While cultural perspectives on the use of contraception do vary, it is problematic to organize those 
variations along a binary that perpetuates what Mohanty describes as the “third world 
difference.”18  Eurocentric assumptions construct a binary between the western and third world 
woman described by Mohanty: 
 
This average third-world woman leads an essentially truncated life based on her 
feminine gender (read: sexually constrained) and being ‘third world’ (read: 
ignorant, poor, uneducated, tradition-bound, religious, domesticated, family-
oriented, victimized, etc.) This, I suggest, is in contrast to the (implicit) self-
representation of western women as educated, modern, as having control over their 
own bodies and sexualities, and the ‘freedom; to make their own decisions.19 
 
This binary is relevant to the issue of contraception when the problem is reframed as 
women’s reproductive control as a tool of economic empowerment and therefore indicator of 
socioeconomic development. Unmet need, in these organizations’ discourse, is framed as a 
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problem of cultural “backwardness” which opposes modern participation of women in the capital 
labor market. A capital-producing, industrialized, liberalized and globalized society is framed as 
the universal progressive ideal, and the problem rests in unmet need for contraception as an 
obstacle in society’s inevitable trajectory.  
Marxist feminist theory is useful in understanding how this framing is problematic as it 
explains how the sexual division of labor produced by capitalism and industrialization contributes 
to women’s subordination.20 For Mohanty, a postcolonial critique of capitalism draws upon 
Marxist feminist theory to explain the way these phenomena situated wage labor as the “real 
‘productive role’” for men. The housewife is relegated to a “maintenance” role which produces no 
exchangeable value in a capitalist society.21 This strand of feminism points to the root of this binary 
in capitalist structures which historically have oppressed women by confining them to the domestic 
sphere, where they cannot produce or acquire capital. In supplement, postcolonial feminism 
explains the necessity of historical and cultural context, which further complicate the narrative put 
forth in the problem framing by western organizations.22 For example, it neglects to explain the 
way being the head of the household may not be an oppressive role for women, instead a choice 
not previously available to them. Therefore, the problem of unmet need is a reductionist 
explanation which positions “met need” as the gateway to modern societal development. This 
imagination should be questioned in light of the way it further entrenches the creation of the 
monolithic third woman in the developing world.  
Another way in which the problem framing of unmet need for contraception in the 
developing world is problematic is the way it creates what Mohanty calls “politics of location.” 
Politics of location refers to the “historical, geographical, cultural, psychic and imaginative 
boundaries” which substantiate political definitions and self-definitions for western feminists.23 
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Politics of location is constructed frequently when feminists are working cross nationally and 
across racial differences and unintentionally reproduce internal power hierarchies. This occurs in 
congruence with a universalization and essentialization of third world women’s needs, desires and 
experiences, as well as the patriarchal societies they inhabit. Consider UNESCO’s International 
Planned Parenthood Foundation’s characterization of “misinformation, prejudice and gender 
discrimination” as well as “violence” at the “community level.”24 Marie Stopes International also 
writes of reducing the “stigma” in these communities and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 
also speaks of “cultural and knowledge barriers.”25,26 Pathfinder International states explicitly the 
need to “talk to male religious leaders, and other key players to eliminate all biases and 
misconceptions.”27 The Population Council describes the problem of women having to “face 
family or community opposition,” similar to the “cultural or religious opposition” cited by the 
World Health Organization.28,29 
These characterizations prove problematic in several ways. Firstly, they construct a 
universal depiction of societies in the developing world which are community or kinship based, 
bounded by tradition, and subject to religious domination. Secondly, these “backward” 
communities are constructed in contrast to the liberal and liberated world occupied by western 
feminists, along with the staff of these organizations.30 In this way, Mohanty’s politics of location 
are in full force. Politics of location are problematic in the way they rely upon collectivities based 
on broad identity categories, eliminating both cultural and historical relativity, as well as the 
agency of the individual. Mohanty argues that “historicizing and locating” this agency is a 
necessary alternative to narratives of gendered oppression which rely upon universal 
characterizations and assumptions.31 In the case of access to contraception, the act of resistance 
taken by a woman choosing to control her reproduction via contraception in a world dominated by 
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patriarchy should be deemed as so. Concerningly, this notion is lost when subsumed under the 
grand narrative of contraception as a tool of development to lead developing societies out of the 
“backward,” traditional conditions described in this discourse. The reconceptualization of 
reproductive control as an act of resistance is explored in later sections.  
 In summary, problem framing provides the substance for what Norman Fairclough labels 
discursive practice. Discursive practice examines the way the text is produced, specifically which 
discourses are called upon in its production. In the discourse examined, the problem of unmet need 
for contraception draws upon a tradition of thought which envisions “progress” and 
“modernization” as achieved through liberal conceptions of the individual, community and the 
state. This is evident through the binary constructed between modern, liberated women in the 
western world who have access to contraception, in comparison to oppressed women in the 
developing world who are denied access to contraception due to “backward” illiberal cultures.  
This viewpoint stems from these organizations’ origins in the western world, in which liberal, 
modern, industrial, secular and capitalist societies are viewed as the goal of historical and 
economic evolution.  
 
Solution Framing  
Solution framing explores the ideas put forward to address the issue of unmet need for 
contraception. I utilize Fairclough’s lenses of text analysis and social practice to examine the 
relationships between the producers of the discourse, subjects of the discourse, and the actions 
these relations are translated into. A feminist analysis often draws upon Foucault’s ideas regarding 
the production of power as Foucault offers an alternative to resource theories of power viewed as 
something men possess, and women are suppressed with.32 Instead Foucault focuses on how power 
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is produced through knowledge and discourse. Foucault describes objects of power, those whom 
power is wielded upon, who possess concepts which describe their distinctive character traits. In 
our setting of contraceptive delivery, the objects of this setting are women who live in developing 
countries. The concepts relating to these objects can be recalled in Mohanty’s description of the 
“Third World Woman”–a woman who is distinctly traditional, uneducated, power, oppressed, 
religious and domestic. For Foucault, modes of authority represent the subjects which wield 
exercised power. In our setting, modes of authority consist of the organizations which promote 
contraception use in the developing world: non-governmental and inter-governmental 
organizations that are involved in the production and distribution of contraceptive tools. 
Importantly, these are the groups which have authority in determining the moral standard regarding 
reproduction. This means these groups, which represent significant economic, political and 
cultural power globally, uphold the belief that controlled reproduction is essential to liberation and 
prosperity.  
Lastly Foucault names the lines of strategic action which define the subjects through which 
power is exercised.33 Foucault sees power as productive, meaning it is able to produce subject 
identities, whom internalize their position.34 In this sense, this is a power which figurately and 
physically transforms people. In our setting, lines of strategic action consist of the ways in which 
contraception is promoted in the developing world: the conception of contraceptive methods, their 
distribution and advocacy in communities it is brought into. Foucault conceptualizes power as a 
force that is deployed to facilitate specific outcomes, processes and practices.35 Further, it may be 
deployed by both dominate and subordinate forces which both possess agency, even though they 
both experience outcomes of exercised of power.36 This provides a framework to view the way in 
which developing world women’s bodies are regulated through fertility control.  
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 Foucault believed that sexuality in modern society has a close connection with structures 
of power, and his “repressive hypothesis” argues that sexuality tends to be oppressed. It is 
important to not equate the repression of sexuality itself with contraception. However, the 
repressive hypothesis is useful in understanding how the control of fertility became a desired 
standard in a modern, liberal society. Nevertheless, contraception is considered here as a tool of 
that Foucault labels “biopower.” He explains biopower has two levels: the first exists on the 
individual level, on which political significance is placed in the defining of medical norms of a 
healthy body. In the case of reproduction, “health” is a major theme of the discourse. Medical 
norms defined by western organizations are translated into controlled fertility. The World Health 
Organization indicates this desirability through its discourse of “[limiting] size of families, “invest 
more in each child” and “slowing unstainable population growth and the resulting negative impacts 
on the economy.37 USAID writes that contraception “mitigates the impact of population dynamics 
on natural resources and state stability.”38 This discourse reveals limited fertility as desirable 
according to this western organization’s values and dovetails into the second level of biopower.  
This level exists at the national level, at which the nation’s population is viewed as a 
“resource” that the nation holds the duty of safeguarding.39 In the case of contraception in the 
contemporary era, the conception of the “nation” as used by Foucault is eroded by the primacy of 
transnational organizations and groups as the subjects wielding biopower in a political era of 
dominant neoliberalism (rather than statism). However, given these groups’ unilateral national 
origins in western countries, the national disparity between countries promoting contraception and 
those nations which become the objects of biopower holds some national significance.  
 The significance of biopower is the way in which objects of its disciplinary control 
internalize its projected norms, resulting in a monitoring of their own behavior and a self-
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formulation of subjects of their own knowledge.40 This is the process occurring in the solution 
framing of discourse around contraception. Foucault himself was hesitant of sweeping teleological 
narratives and instead closely examined tools masked as “inventions of efficiency” which, in 
reality, serve to form a new system of control, the objects of this control being human bodies.41 
The discourse of “efficiency” is prevalent in the solution framing of contraception. This discourse 
resembles elements of what Deborah Stone describes the “market model” of policy. Stone argues 
that the discourse of economics and society as a market is hegemonic in the formulation of policy.42 
The problem with the market model, Stone describes, is the way it reduces relationships to 
individuals trading with one another in pursuit of maximum individual gain. In this way, the market 
model is born out of the liberal conception of individualism, the ideological imaginary that 
dominates the western world. 
As stated, the discourse around contraception consists of the language of market efficiency. 
Consider the language which forms the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation’s solution framing 
around family planning in the developing word. For example, the Foundation places a great 
emphasis on the cost-effectiveness of contraception, stating it is one of the “most cost-effective 
investments a country can make;” citing the fact that “every dollar spent on family planning can 
save governments up to 6 dollars.”43 PSI echoes the assertion of family planning as a “proven and 
cost-effective solution.”44 In this case, we can directly see the imagination of contraception as the 
national level of biopower described by Foucault. Contraception is framed as a market-friendly 
solution to aid the government in achieving this level of social control. 
 The discourse analysis reveals an emphasis on “choices” in the method of contraception. 
Marie Stopes International advocates offering women the “widest range of methods” while 
“reducing restrictions.”45 PSI speaks of “commodity stockouts,” the need to “create demand for 
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family planning and improve service delivery, “[utilize] existing wholesale and retail distribution 
infrastructure” and “[create] franchised networks.”46 AWID writes of the importance of “ensuring 
access to RH [reproductive health] commodities they [women] want when they need them.”47 
Additionally, PATH speaks of “innovative financial models” that focus on digital health and data 
to, as the Population Council would say “prepare the market” for contraception in the developing 
word.4849  
These examples illustrate the concepts of discourses around contraception to be market-
centered. This is a result of contraception discourse of organizations originating in the western 
world’s reliance on capitalist, neoliberal principles. Attentive to Fairclough’s level of analysis 
“discursive practice,” it is necessary to understand which discourses are relied upon to produce the 
discourse utilized by the organizations. As a postcolonial feminist, Mohanty writes that careful 
attention must be paid to cultural and historical contexts. The western and capitalist context utilized 
to produce this discourse is then translated to the methods utilized to wield power. Cooper adds 
“ideology” to the modes of power of knowledge and discipline that Foucauldian feminists 
emphasize.50 In this example, ideology is a powerful force in generating outcomes and processes, 
as it informs the goals and strategies of organizations aiming to deliver contraception. The danger 
of this lies in its neglect of a postcolonial feminist analysis which would reveal that the privileging 
of western, capitalist ideology ignores the cultural and historical context in which this 
contraceptive delivery is taking place, as well as reinforces the hierarchy in which this ideology is 
deemed superior.  
Feminist writers have critiqued an emphasis on “choice” as it “hides the operations of 
power that construct choices” and neglect to acknowledge or address the patriarchal structures 
which perpetuate oppression.51 Additionally, it emphasizes a women’s ability to make a “choice,” 
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while denying the way that the selection was created without that woman’s input.52 A study in 
Oman, where the government has provided free contraception to all married couples since 1994, 
found that fertility rates did not decrease, as patriarchal culture structures continued to dominate 
fertility decisions.53 In this case, a misplaced emphasis on the ability to “choose” contraception 
obscured the root cause of women’s lack of fertility control. In consideration of Fairclough’s text 
analysis which analyzes how discourse is translated into agenda-setting, a rhetoric that relies 
heavily on choice will make little progress in achieving women’s reproductive liberation.  
These sentiments are evident again in the discourse’s desired outcomes of increased use of 
contraception in the developing world. Pathfinder International begins generally by stating that 
contraception means “better health, more girls in school, greater resources for families, 
communities and nations.”54 PSI echoes by stating that “women with the ability to control their 
fertility have better access to education and employment opportunities, bringing economic benefits 
and improved livelihoods.”55 USAID writes that contraception “[improves] women’s opportunities 
for education, employment, and full participation in society” and “reduces poverty by contributing 
to economic growth at the family, community and national levels.”56 The World Health 
Organization states that access to contraception is essential for “supporting development” and an 
“opportunity for women to pursue additional education and participate in public life, including 
paid employment.”57 
The element of this discourse of particular consequence rests on its belief in contraception 
as a vehicle to encourage women’s participation in the labor market. Kalpana Wilson argues that 
liberal feminism has evolved into “neoliberal feminism” in the area of development. “Women in 
Development” (WID) approaches translated liberal feminism’s focus on “including women” to 
women’s inclusion in the production and accumulation of capital via the labor market in 
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development models.58 Wilson writes that WID initiatives “focused on women’s education, 
training and access to technology which would make them more productive and improve their 
access to the market.”59 Clearly, contraception is viewed as a line of strategic action to accomplish 
this aim. Evident in the above-mentioned discourse is the promotion of contraception of a tool that 
allows women to stay in school and participate in paid labor activity with the ultimate goal of 
economic development. Wilson notes this approach rests on the neo-classical economic 
assumption that “individuals are utility maxing and economic growth comes from the exercise of 
individual choice…supported by the free market” (Stone’s market model).60  
Postcolonial and Marxist feminism informed the subsequent “Women and Development 
(WAD) movement, which challenged WID’s approaches by pointing how women’s exploitation 
is an inherent element which sustains the process of capitalism and imperialism.61 Later, Gender 
and Development (GAD) offered an even more comprehensive counter to WID by explaining how 
the emphasis on inclusion of women in the paid labor market reproduces gendered social 
inequalities. This is because WID approaches only recognize labor performed in the capital labor 
market, ignoring labor produced by women in the domestic sphere as it does not result in the 
production of capital. WID reproduces these relations by assuming equal gender distribution in the 
household in which each individual seeks to maximize individual utility.62  
WID approaches seek to transform the domestic, uneducated, powerless “third world 
woman” through market processes and contraception is a line of strategic action to accomplish 
this aim. We return to Foucault’s claim that these inventions of efficiency create a new system of 
social control which ultimately exerts power over human’s bodies. Several studies have 
complicated the linear narrative that contraception directly produces autonomous benefits for 
women, and instead supports GAD’s assertion that gendered social inequalities exist intra-
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household. For example, Mason points that in some societies, children are essential social capital 
for women. This is especially true when a woman marries into extended-kin households, where 
they cannot gain security or respect until she has a child.63 Additionally, lack of fertility control is 
not always related to social and/or economic oppression; in western African societies, women are 
expected to be both self-supporting and have high fertility desires.64 As mentioned previously, a 
study in Oman showed that traditional and community influences remained strong, despite access 
to free contraception. The study used a bivariate link to also measure women’s education and 
employment [economic autonomy]. The fertility rate in Oman remained high, revealing that 
autonomy doesn’t always increase women’s choice in contraception in the face of remaining strong 
traditions of men making decisions regarding fertility.65  
The significance of these studies is the way they complicate the narrative embraced by the 
western organizations examined here and the WID discourse they rely upon. Solution framing 
represents both Fairclough’s text analysis and social practice. Text analysis, through wording, 
metaphors and other linguistic characteristics, explains the relationship and specifically 
interactional control between the creator and subject of the text. Further, it illuminates how these 
texts understand events and social relations and construct their own version of reality perception 
of these subjects. We have established the connection between these discourses and the power they 
wield in establishing these western organizations as modes of authority. Finally, social practice 
explains the relationship between the discourse itself and the way in which it is disseminated, 
informing social and cultural relations and structures. We have explored how these discourses 
produce biopower which is used to exert control of women in the developing world’s bodies, the 
impact of which is explored in the following section. This use of biopower occurs within the 
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practice of contraceptive delivery which masks the way in which power is exerted through 
subsuming it under the practice of development. 
 
Theory in Action: Contraception and Reproduction in Post-Colonial Puerto Rico 
The case of post-colonial Puerto Rico is useful in demonstrating the problem framing of 
overpopulation and the solution framing of contraception as a socioeconomic tool of development. 
Briggs explains the history of contraceptive delivery in Puerto Rico which occurred concurrently 
to Puerto Rican nationalist struggles against colonialism and U.S intervention. She introduces two 
nationalist parties holding opposing positions on the use of contraception in Puerto Rico. The first 
was the nationalist movement of Albanizu, which relied upon Catholic values and rhetoric to frame 
contraception as an attempted genocide of Puerto Ricans by the American missionaries and aid 
workers which were promoting and distributing it. This group held up motherhood as a glorified 
symbol of nationhood and Puerto Rico itself.66   
The opposing nationalist group consisted of liberal professionals; these were Puerto Rican 
and North American nurses, social workers, and feminists who contrastingly saw contraception as 
key to modernizing the nation and increasing its inhabitant’s wealth and quality of life.67 Briggs 
describes this group as “feminists equally possessed of a modernizing nationalism,” and birth 
control was central to this vision.68 Like American feminists, this group sought to connect 
maternalism, the state and social advancement; they promoted birth control as crucial for 
producing healthier and wealthier families in which “healthy mothers are able to educate a small 
number of children and transmit values of progress and modernization.”69 These feminists set up 
birth control clinics which targeted working-class women. 
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The efforts to improve the well-being of working-class Puerto Rican women through 
reproductive health and choice may seem benign, and a preferable alternative to Albanizu’s 
glorification of motherhood and female fertility as central to the nation. However, the dark side of 
this modernizing, liberalizing project was its support of “progressive eugenics,” which the 
movement saw as positively linked to infant and maternal health.70 Progressive eugenics became 
another tool for the colonial gaze, that saw the control of native women in their colonies to be 
essential to successful rule, in particular women’s forced adoption of the imperial country’s 
cultural values.71 Progressive eugenics supported these efforts through restricting the reproduction 
of native women in the name of development and modernization.72 
At this point, it is necessary to examine the origins of contraception in the developing 
world, which was the practice of eugenics. In the mid-19th century, the British Malthusian League 
began to advocate for birth control as a remedy for excess reproduction which they viewed as a 
cause of poverty. Briggs describes how this study of population democracy emphasized “class, 
racial, and geographical differences with respect to reproduction.”73 Specifically, Malthusians 
were concerned with rising fertility rates in non-Anglo-Saxon, non-white populations. In Puerto 
Rico, the term “overpopulation” was framed as a problem of excessive sexuality and fertility 
among working-class Puerto Rican women. This problem framing of overpopulation saw it as 
responsible for poverty, delinquency, homelessness, prostitution, and disease.74 In Puerto Rico, 
Clarence Gamble (the heir to Proctor & Gamble at the time), actively pursued a eugenics project 
through which he sought to limit reproduction among working-class and non-Anglo-Saxon 
women.75 In the 1930s, sterilization become available, and the Eugenics Sterilization Board 
authorized the use of involuntary sterilizations, with the clear goal of limiting reproduction among 
poor, dark-skinned Puerto Rican women.76  
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The discussion of race as central to the eugenics movement is critical. Black feminism has 
drawn attention to the way in which women of color experience a “double-discrimination” of race 
and gender.77 Crenshaw coined the term “intersectionality” to name how this combination of racial 
and gender-based oppressed is an “intersectional experience greater than the sum of racism and 
sexism.”78 Further, an intersectional approach criticizes mainstream feminism for treating race and 
gender as exclusive categories, arguing this further marginalizes the experiences of women of 
color.79 The contributions of critical race feminists such as Crenshaw are crucial in examining the 
racism integral to reproduction control. This is evident in publications released on the topic in the 
1930s. For example, an article titled “Overpopulation or Underpopulation? - A Review of 
Conflicting Opinions” was published in the Journal of Heredity; the author Guy Burch concluded 
that the “worst quarter” of the population was growing, and native-born whites were decreasing in 
numbers. Similarly, Lothrop Stoddard wrote in The Rising of Color that high fertility rates among 
non- “Nordic” and non- “Anglo-Saxons” were a threat to society.80 These titles represent a few 
among many examples of how the issue of race was central to fears about rising population and 
poverty among non-white population.  
An intersectional feminist analysis reveals that both sexism and racism intersect with other 
forms of inequality. The issue of reproductive control could not be more exemplary of the way in 
which racism intersects with classism and sexism. As intersectional feminism illuminates, women 
of color experience concurrently various forms of oppression as a “complex interaction of race, 
gender and class that is more than the sum of its parts.”81 Roberts, a black feminist, argues a 
harmful mythology exists which devalues black women as mothers. She explains this myth has 
developed and perpetuated in three ways. The first was the condition of slavery, in which black 
women were denied reproductive autonomy, as reproduction had capital value to slave owners. 
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The second experience is the way in which the child welfare system disproportionately takes 
children away from black mothers. Lastly, is the history of forced sterilization of black women, 
and the encouragement of government-funded sterilizations of black and poor women which 
continues today.82 While these primarily speak to experiences of black female Americans, they 
illustrate the devaluation of black mothers which began with eugenics and has continued to evolve 
and inform reproductive policy, as well as contraceptive delivery to women of color in the 
developing world. Eugenics projects by western scientists in developing countries, which later 
evolved into birth control programs, was an act of racism, sexism and classism in the way it was 
designed to limit the reproduction of poor women and women of color.  
The timing of the development of the oral contraceptive pill further reveals its racist 
origins. Briggs states by following scientific and technological breakthroughs, the development of 
the contraceptive pill should have begun in the 1940’s, rather than 1956. Studies occurring as early 
as the 1920’s had proved that estrogen and progesterone could be used to prevent ovulation, and 
more than several studies that followed indicated methods to utilize this finding to create 
contraception for humans.83 However, the timing of the oral contraceptive tool coincided with the 
beginning of U.S. involvement in development in the postcolonial world. Therefore, Briggs argues 
that the framing of overpopulation as a global social problem was a “critical precondition” for the 
development of the contraceptive pill. This was the beginning of the viewpoint that birth control 
was a key tool in economic development. This belief permeated the mindset of the liberal 
nationalist Puerto Ricans, evidenced by the founding of the Population Association in Puerto Rico. 
This was a group of mainly feminists who operated on the conviction that modernization, 
technology and science were the keys to social progress.84 Therefore, the contraceptive pill was 
itself a “product” of postcolonial development.85  
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The example of competing nationalisms in Puerto Rico – one in which maternity is 
glorified as an integral symbol of the nation, the other which views limited fertility as crucial to 
modernization – represents the way in which postcolonial struggles encompassed a battle over the 
regulation of black, brown, and working-class women’s bodies. It also illustrates the way in which 
the development and promotion of birth control by western countries in the developing world has 
a racist, classist history when considered in relation to its roots in the practice of eugenics. An 
intersectional feminist analysis seeks to understand the various forms of oppression that may be 
operating on a woman simultaneously. Racism and classism were at the center of contraceptive 
delivery because before it was “development,” it was eugenics. 
The acknowledgement of this history is crucial given the American origin of the 
organizations examined in this paper. Nine out of twelve organizations whose discourse was 
analyzed in this paper originate from the United States. This example illustrates racial conflict 
present in the United States, but these tensions are not absent in other western and historically 
imperialist nations. These organizations cannot easily be separated from the racialized history of 
their country of origin and its connection to the evolution of birth control. The implication of an 
analysis informed by an intersectional feminist analysis complicates the problem framing of unmet 
need for contraception and subjects the solution framing of contraceptive delivery to be viewed as 
a contemporary mode of colonial engagement.  
 
An Alternative Vision: Women as Active Subjects  
The discourse used by the organizations examined in this paper unilaterally view 
contraception as a socioeconomic solution to aid development in the global south. Women’s bodies 
become victims to the mission of neoliberalization and women’s empowerment serves as a 
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disguise for labor participation. This discourse is problematic in the way it perpetuates the 
phenomenon Mohanty calls originary power relations. Originary power relations refer to binary 
power structures in which men are the “unilateral” and “undifferentiated” source of power. On the 
other hand, women occupy the roles of a cumulative reaction to this power; the binary between 
men as the powerful, and women as the powerless, is created.86 Mohanty points that western 
feminist literature recreates this binary wherein western women occupy the “subject” role of 
power, and the less educated, poorer, women of color “objects” in the global south are the 
powerless.87 In this way, colonial relations are recreated, and women in the developing world are 
constructed as powerless and their political agency is denied.  
Contraception is undoubtedly a human right and a vital tool for women to embody full 
autonomy. However, the discourse around contraception must focus less on its function as a tool 
of socioeconomic development, and instead on its potential to transform women as subjects of 
resistance. Claudia Leeb explicitly recognizes the connection between power and discourse and 
the ways in which discourse “constitutes subjectivity itself.”88 Her work focuses specifically on 
the way in which discursive subject formation occurs in capitalist modes of production, and I 
examine the case of contraceptive delivery in light of her analysis. 
Foucauldian-inspired feminist discourse examines the construction of the subject as created 
through subjection to discourse.89 However, as Leeb points out, this is problematic as it denies the 
feminine subject the opportunity to engage in constructing themselves as an active subject. An 
active subject is “capable of expanding its own powers and projects, an alternative to the reactive 
subject which defines itself merely in terms of what it opposes.”90 In the case of contraception 
delivery, women in the developing world are constructed in “object” status through the binary of 
originary power structures which situate western women as modern, liberated, and in possession 
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of full reproductive control. However, the discourse around contraception can be viewed 
alternatively through Leeb’s concept of the moment of the limit, which refers to the way the 
discourse cannot completely define a subject, as the real91 and non-identity92 create a gap in the 
discourse. Identity thinking93, as defined by Adorno, lumps the needs and desires of white, middle 
to upper class, western, heterosexual women to make up the whole subject of “woman.” However, 
this renders women who do not fall into this category as non-identical.94 In our case, the non-
identical consists of women in the developing world whose reproductive needs and desires are 
defined with the falsely whole “woman” identity.  
Thus, it is evident that discourse does not have total control over constructing subjects. 
Therefore, existing within the discourse around contraception is the opportunity to understand 
women in the developing world’s use of contraception instead as an expression of active resistance 
in a patriarchal society. Leeb writes of this potential, “In this moment of the limit, the possibility 
of a political subject with the capacity of transformative agency emerges.”95 Thus, contraception 
becomes an area in which non-identity women – women of the developing world – transform 
themselves as active subjects.  
It is important here to avoid the trap described by Mohanty in constructing a “Third World 
Woman,” meaning, assuming all women in the developing world are using contraception for the 
same reasons and desires. This can be evaded through understanding the woman of the developing 
world as what Leeb calls a political subject-in-outline. By this she means the subject “moves within 
a tension of a certain coherence (the subject) necessary for agency, and permanent openness (the 
outline) necessary to remain inclusive.”96 This conceptualization of the active subject 
accomplishes two important tasks. Firstly, it does not presume a subject based on identity to 
compose of an exclusive collective body. At the same time, it retains the subject’s agency. 
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Therefore, women in the developing world are constructed as active subjects who are non-
exclusive yet have the capacity to transform the world around them.   
Women using contraception in the developing world are not necessarily conscious of the 
task of becoming active subjects. This process is nonetheless essential for understanding the 
opportunity for resistance to the dominant forces of patriarchy and capitalism which contraception 
presents. If the discourse regarding contraception fails to acknowledge women as active subjects, 
women’s empowerment through contraception is rendered hollow, as its discourse further binds 
them to the capitalist, neoliberal structures which led to their oppression. Alternatively, framing 
the use of contraception as an act of resistance transforms the woman into an active subject with 
the ability to resist objectification.  
Organizations which work in contraceptive delivery can allow room for women to be active 
subjects in their choice to use contraception by giving the developing world women they are 
working with full subject status in their conceptualization, strategy and interaction. In practical 
terms, this would look like the abandonment of their paternal, we-know-best nature which 
presumes contraceptive use to be the proven solution to developing world women’ liberation. 
Instead, the woman herself - her needs, desires, concerns and aspirations - would be centered in 
their discourse. This includes a recognition of variation among individual women, and that the 
homogeneous group of ‘women in developing world’ organizations refer to in their discourse does 
not exist.97 Thus, women as active subjects are “centered around a notion of being,” that is not 
constructed as part of or in opposition to a universal entity.98 Importantly, for this to happen, the 
market-centered discourse that characterizes fertility choices as rationally-made calculations must 
cease to “ignore the intricate webs in which women live their lives.99 Instead, it must acknowledge 
women’s full lives with relational experiences in the communities in which they live, along with 
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their own desires for reproductive control which cannot be reduced to market-based 
considerations. 
This also means that contraceptive delivery would need to be designed in light of an 
intersectional feminist analysis described aptly by Johnson-Odin when she writes, “It is not that 
black or other Third World feminists take a position against contraception, but that they seek to 
frame the discussion in a context which incorporates the impact of race and class on reproductive 
issues.”100 At first glance, contraceptive delivery in the developing world is seemingly logical in 
appealing to feminist notions of equality and autonomy. However, in order to enact fundamentally 
feminist policy, it is essential organizations offering contraceptive delivery design their programs 
in consideration of these contributions derived from various feminist analyses. When this occurs, 
organizations can provide contraception in a truly feminist manner that is empowering for the 
women they serve. 
 
Contraception as the “Master’s Tool” and Concluding Thoughts  
The promotion and delivery of contraception in the developing world must be considered 
in a feminist context with a lens sensitive to issues of gender, race and class. As we have 
discovered, the problem framing of unmet need of contraception is focused on the ways in which 
unintended pregnancies prevent full participation of women in the paid labor market. In this way, 
overpopulation provided a socioeconomic explanation for poverty in the developing world. The 
issue with this framing is dual-fold. Firstly, it abdicated both global capitalism and colonialism of 
any responsibility in producing structures which have impoverished the global south. Secondly, it 
perpetuates these structures through the encouragement of female participation in the capitalist 
system which oppresses them.  
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Another significant issue with the problem framing of contraception is the way in which it 
relies upon the essentialization of non-western culture which is rendered as “backward.” This 
discourse reproduces originary power relations which construct women in the developing world 
as powerless. Painting women as agentless reinforces their object status in a patriarchal society, 
denying their choice to use contraception as an expression of self-determined active subjectivity.  
The solution framing of contraception in the discourse of these organizations is problematic 
in its construction of contraception as a tool of socioeconomic development. Contraception is 
painted as a tool for women to enter the labor market, which effectively places women’s value 
solely in the field of capital production and accumulation, rather than as a whole person. This 
narrative of contraception as a development tool fails to leave room for the construction of a 
woman as an active subject, whose choice to use contraception can alternatively be viewed as an 
act of resistance in a patriarchal society, in which fertility is traditionally controlled by men.  
The discourse around the delivery of contraception in the developing world is predicated 
upon difference. This is the difference between the powerful and the powerless, from the western 
and the third world woman, from the one who possesses little blue pills to control her fertility and 
one who cannot. It is the difference between the developed world and the underdeveloped, between 
the secular and the religious, the liberated and the oppressed. This difference is necessary for these 
western organizations to establish themselves as the producers of discourse and knowledge and 
therefore as those who wield power. This difference is their power source.  
Concurrently, the discourse relies upon assumptions of homogeneity. It expresses the belief 
that developing world women collectively possess the same issues, motives, needs and 
preferences, as do the communities they inhabit. They are assumed to share the universal desire of 
what western feminists already hold: liberation through reproductive control. What is not the same, 
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is rendered inferior. Audre Lorde speaks from the perspective of a woman who has been “forged 
in the crucible of difference” among other women of color, poor women, and women of the 
developing world. Lorde warns those women that “the master’s tools will never dismantle the 
master’s house.”101 Contraception as a tool of socioeconomic development is a master’s tool which 
sustains the master’s house of hegemonic colonial, white, western, capitalist patriarchy. As such, 
western organizations which were born in this house will never offer women in the developing 





















 273 of 275 
Notes: 
1 Dhont, Marc. 2010. “History of Oral Contraception.” The European Journal of Contraception & Reproductive 
Health Care 15 (sup2): S12–18. https://doi.org/10.3109/13625187.2010.513071, p. S13 
2 Ibid, p. S12. 
3 Briggs, Laura. Reproducing Empire: Race, Sex, Science, and U. S. Imperialism in Puerto Rico. Berkerley, 
UNITED STATES: University of California Press, 2003. 
4 Schuler, Sidney Ruth, and Sayed M. Hashemi. “Credit Programs, Women’s Empowerment, and Contraceptive Use 
in Rural Bangladesh.” Studies in Family Planning 25, no. 2 (1994): 65–76.; Balk, Deborah. “Defying Gender Norms 
in Rural Bangladesh: A Social Demographic Analysis.” Population Studies 51, no. 2 (1997): 153–72.; Ahmed, 
Saifuddin, Andreea A. Creanga, Duff G. Gillespie, and Amy O. Tsui. “Economic Status, Education and 
Empowerment: Implications for Maternal Health Service Utilization in Developing Countries.” Edited by Beverley 
J. Shea. PLoS ONE 5, no. 6 (June 23, 2010): e11190. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0011190. 
5 Mason, Karen Oppenheim. “The Impact of Women’s Social Position on Fertility in Developing Countries.” 
Sociological Forum 2, no. 4 (1987): 718–45.; Caldwell, John C. “The Global Fertility Transition: The Need for a 
Unifying Theory.” Population and Development Review 23, no. 4 (1997): 803–12.; Jejeebhoy, Shireen J., and Zeba 
A. Sathar. “Women’s Autonomy in India and Pakistan: The Influence of Religion and Region.” Population and 
Development Review 27, no. 4 (December 2001): 687–712. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2001.00687.x.; 
Ravindran, T.K.Sundari, and U.S. Mishra. “Unmet Need for Reproductive Health in India.” Reproductive Health 
Matters 9, no. 18 (January 2001): 105–13. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0968-8080(01)90097-7.; Al Riyami, Asya, 
Mustafa Afifi, and Ruth M Mabry. “Women’s Autonomy, Education and Employment in Oman and Their Influence 
on Contraceptive Use.” Reproductive Health Matters 12, no. 23 (January 2004): 144–54. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0968-8080(04)23113-5. 
6 Mohanty, Chandra Talpade. “Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses.” Boundary 2 
12/13 (1984): 333–58. https://doi.org/10.2307/302821.; Wilson, Kalpana. “Towards a Radical Re-Appropriation: 
Gender, Development and Neoliberal Feminism: Debate: Gender, Development and Neoliberal Feminism.” 
Development and Change 46, no. 4 (July 2015): 803–32. https://doi.org/10.1111/dech.12176. 
7 Leeb, Claudia. Power and Feminist Agency in Capitalism: Toward a New Theory of the Political Subject. New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017, p. 3. 
8 Mohanty, “Under Western Eyes,” p. 63. 
9 Edwards, Michael, and David Hulme. “NGO Performance and Accountability in the Post‐Cold War World.” 
Journal of International Development 7, no. 6 (November 1, 1995): 849–56. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.3380070604, p. 849. 
10 Edwards and Hulme, “NGO Performance and Accountability in the Post-Cold War World,” p. 849. 
11 Phillips, Louise, and Marianne W. Jørgensen. Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method. London: Sage 
Publications, 2002. 
12 Cleland, John, Sarah Harbison, and Iqbal H. Shah. “Unmet Need for Contraception: Issues and Challenges.” 
Studies in Family Planning 45, no. 2 (2014): 105–22, p. 106. 
13 Mohanty, “Under Western Eyes,” p. 61. 
14 Ibid, pg. 335 
15 “Family Planning/Contraception.” World Health Organization. Accessed October 18, 2018. 
http://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/family-planning-contraception. 
16 “Strategic Priorities | Population Council.” Accessed October 18, 2018. 
https://www.popcouncil.org/about/strategic-priorities. 
17 “Family Planning.” Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. Accessed October 18, 2018. 
https://www.gatesfoundation.org/What-We-Do/Global-Development/Family-Planning. 
18 Mohanty, “Under Western Eyes,” p. 63. 
19 Ibid, p. 65. 
20 Smith, Sharon. “Engels and the Origins of Women’s Oppression.” International Socialist Review, no. 2 (Fall 
1997). 
21 Mohanty, “Under Western Eyes,” p. 65. 
22 Hunt, Tamara L. “Introduction,” in Women and the Colonial Gaze, 1–14. New York, NY: New York University 
Press, 2002, p. 14. 
                                                        
273
Editorial Board: DUJPEW Issue II 2019
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2018
 
 
 274 of 275 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
23 Mohanty, Chandra Talpade. “Feminist Encounters: Locating the Politics of Experience.” In Destabilizing Theory: 
Contemporary Feminist Debates, 74–92. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992, p. 74. 
24 “International Planned Parenthood Federation.” UNESCO, October 6, 2016. 
https://en.unesco.org/partnerships/non-governmental-organizations/international-planned-parenthood-federation. 
25 “Contraception and Reproductive Health Services | MSI-US | Marie Stopes International-US.” Accessed October 
18, 2018. https://www.mariestopes-us.org/msi-in-action/. 
26 Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, “Family Planning.” 
27 “Contraception & Family Planning.” Pathfinder International (blog). Accessed October 18, 2018. 
https://www.pathfinder.org/focus-areas/contraception-family-planning/. 
28 Population Council, “Strategic Priorities.” 
29 World Health Organization, “Family Planning/Contraception.” 
30 Johnson-Odim, Cheryl. “Common Themes, Different Contexts: Third World Women and Feminism,” in Third 
World Women and the Politics of Feminism, 316–28. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991, 
318. 
31 Mohanty, “Feminist Encounters,” p. 74. 
32 Cooper, Davina. “Productive, Relational and Everywhere? Conceptualising Power and Resistance Within 
Foucauldian Feminism.” Sociology 28, no. 2 (May 1994): 435–54, p. 439. 
33 Gutting, Gary. Foucault: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 51. 
34 Cooper, “Productive, Relational and Everywhere?,” 441. 
35 Ibid, p. 445. 
36 Ibid, p. 442. 
37 World Health Organization, “Family Planning/Contraception.” 
38 “Family Planning and Reproductive Health Program Overview.” USAID, November 2017. 
39 Gutting, “Foucault: A Very Short Introduction,” p. 89. 
40 Ibid, p. 89. 
41 Ibid, p. 52. 
42 Stone, Deborah. “Introduction: Why This Book?” In Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision-Making, Rev. 
ed., 1–13. New York: Norton, 2012, p. 10. 
43 Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, “Family Planning.” 
44 “Contraception: PSI.” Accessed October 18, 2018. https://www.psi.org/health-area/contraception/. 
45 Marie Stopes International, “Contraception and Reproductive Health Services.” 
46 PSI, “Contraception: PSI.” 
47 “World Leaders Must Act Now to Address a Global Contraceptive Crisis.” AWID, September 23, 2016. 
https://www.awid.org/get-involved/world-leaders-must-act-now-address-global-contraceptive-crisis. 
48 “Sexual & Reproductive Health.” PATH. Accessed October 18, 2018. https://www.path.org/sexual-reproductive-
health/. 
49 Population Council, “Strategic Priorities.” 
50 Cooper, “Productive, Relational and Everywhere?,” p. 447. 
51 Wolf in Lippman, Abby. “Choice as a Risk to Women’s Health.” Health, Risk & Society 1, no. 3 (1999): 281–91, 
p. 282-283. 
52 Lippman, Abby. “Choice as a Risk to Women’s Health.” Health, Risk & Society 1, no. 3 (1999): 281–91, p. 282. 
53 Al Riyami, Asya, Mustafa Afifi, and Ruth M Mabry, “Women’s Autonomy, Education and Employment in 
Oman.” 
54 Pathfinder International, “Contraception & Family Planning.” 
55 PSI, “Contraception: PSI.” 
56 USAID, “Family Planning and Reproductive Health Program Overview” 
57 World Health Organization, “Family Planning/Contraception.” 
58 Wilson, “Towards a Radical Re-Appropriation,” p. 804. 
59 Ibid, p. 805. 
60 Ibid, p. 805. 
61 Ibid, p. 806. 
62 Ibid, p. 806. 
63 Mason, “The Impact of Women’s Social Position on Fertility in Developing Countries,” p. 720. 
64 Ibid, p. 729. 
65 Al Riyami, Asya, et al., ““Women’s Autonomy, Education and Employment in Oman.” 
66 Briggs, “Reproducing Empire,” p. 77. 
274




 275 of 275 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
67 Ibid, p. 90. 
68 Ibid, p. 93. 
69 Ibid, p. 93-94 
70 Ibid, p. 99. 
71 Hunt, “Introduction,” p. 8-9. 
72 Johnson-Odim, “Common Themes, Different Contexts,” p. 323. 
73 Briggs, “Reproducing Empire,” p. 82. 
74 Ibid, p. 83. 
75 Ibid, p. 103. 
76 Ibid, p. 107. 
77 Crenshaw, Kimberle. “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of 
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feninist Theory and Antiracist Politics.” University of Chicago Legal Forum, no. 1 
(1989): 139–67, p. 149. 
78 Crenshaw, “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex,” p. 140. 
79 Ibid, p. 139. 
80 Briggs, “Reproducing Empire,” p. 82. 
81 Roberts, Dorothy E. “Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of 
Privacy,” in Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings That Informed the Movement, 384–426. New York: The New 
Press, 1995, p. 385. 
82 Roberts, “Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies,” p. 389-391. 
83 Briggs, “Reproducing Empire,” p. 129. 
84 Ibid, p. 132. 
85 Ibid, p. 130. 
86 Mohanty, “Under Western Eyes,” p. 79. 
87 Ibid, p. 79. 
88 Leeb, “Power and Feminist Agency in Capitalism,” p. 3. 
89 Ibid, p. 21. 
90 Weeks, Kathi. “Nietzsche, Foucault, and the Subject of the Eternal Return.” In Constituting Feminist Subjects, 
16–48. Cornell University Press, 1998, p. 43. 
91 The “real” is a concept described by Jacques Lacan which refers to a “fault, a hole,” in the symbolic order and its 
signifier (Leeb 35). The “symbolic subject” is created through an identification performed by a signifier. The 
signifier exists in the domain of the “big Other,” which is the domain of language (Leeb 24). This meaning is 
established in two ways: the first is being linked to a chain of signifiers (a signifying chain), and the second is the 
symbolic value attached to each signifier through being opposed to another signifier. For example, “woman” is 
created in meaning through its opposite “man” (Leeb 27). However, the “real,” according to Lacan, resists 
symbolization. Due to this hole, the Lacanian symbolic order is not wholly dominating and does not hold exclusive 
power in determining people’s subjectivities. 
92 Adorno explains that subjects cannot understand the object in its totality, and non-identical aspects are lost in 
acceptance of the whole concept. The non-identity is the “blind spot” in identity thinking; this parallels Lacan’s 
description of the “real” in the signifier. Therefore, the subject can never fully know a concept, meaning power 
structures are not all-powerful in object definition (Leeb 38).  
93 According to Adorno, the thinking subject understands an object through placing it under a conceptual category; 
he refers to this as “identity thinking.” 
94 Leeb, “Power and Feminist Agency in Capitalism,” p. 39. 
95 Ibid, p. 22. 
96 Ibid, p. 57. 
97 Mohanty, “Under Western Eyes,” p. 65. 
98 Weeks, “Nietzsche, Foucault, and the Subject of the Eternal Return,” p. 43. 
99 Lippman, “Choice as a Risk to Women’s Health,” p. 284. 
100 Johnson-Odin, “Common Themes, Different Contexts,” p. 323. 







Editorial Board: DUJPEW Issue II 2019
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2018
